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Preface and Acknowledgements
Driven primarily by political concerns to secure democracy, 
Portugal’s accession to the EU in BCDE also served as a catalyst 
for dynamic economic development following a complex process 
of democratization as well as the decolonization of Europe’s last 
empire. )is book looks at how the European Union (EU) helped 
shape the political process in Portugal on such matters as key in-
stitutions, elites and citizen attitude.
)e introduction by Nuno Severiano Teixeira, entitled “Por-
tugal and European Integration, BCFG–HIBI”,  frames Portugal’s 
participation in the process of European integration in historical 
perspective. )e text encompasses the period of the democratic re-
gime (BCFG–to date), characterizing the various steps of Portugal’s 
position towards the evolution of the European project, while also 
evaluating the cost/benefit of Portugal’s Europeanization.
In Chapter H, “)e Portuguese Political Elites and the Euro-
pean Union”, João Pedro Ruivo, Diogo Moreira, António Costa 
Pinto and Pedro Tavares de Almeida, analyze the attitude of the 
Portuguese national political elites towards the European polity, 
their evaluation of the political institutions of the European Union 
and which kinds of policies should, in their opinion, be delegat-
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ed by the member states to the European supranational level of 
government.
In Chapter J, “Governing from Lisbon or Governing from 
Brussels? Models and Tendencies of the Europeanization of the 
Portuguese government”, Carlos Jalali evaluates both the extent 
and process of the Europeanization of executive power in Por-
tugal, with particular emphasis on the period subsequent to the 
country’s accession in BCDE. )e Portuguese experience tends to 
confirm the notion that European integration processes gener-
ate an adaptation by national institutions to European demands, 
rather than fundamental transformations. At the same time, the 
Portuguese adaptation process appears to contradict the theoreti-
cal prediction that centralized and unitary states will experience a 
more di@cult process of adaptation.
In Chapter G, “Implementing the Treaty of Lisbon: )e Portu-
guese Parliament as an Actor in the European Legislative Arena”, 
Madalena Meyer Resende and Maria Teresa Paulo consider the 
response of the Portuguese parliament to the Treaty of Lisbon’s 
(HIIC) provisions for the involvement of national parliaments in 
the European legislative process, by providing a quantitative and 
qualitative assessment of the parliament’s work in the scrutiny of 
European legislation since HIIE. 
Chapter K, “Europeanization of the Portuguese Courts”, by 
Nuno Piçarra and Francisco Pereira Coutinho, deals with the 
Portuguese courts’ assimilation of the European Union legal or-
der since the accession of Portugal in BCDE and reviews “European 
duties” entrusted to the courts in the member states, as made ex-
plicit by the European Court of Justice in the framework of the 
preliminary ruling procedure, and the way Portuguese courts have 
implemented such duties during the last two decades. 
JP0.83<. 34L A<M41N?.L9.;.47:
Chapter E, “)e Europeanization of Portuguese Inter-
est Groups? Trade Unions and Employers’ Organizations”, by 
Sebastián Royo, looks at the impact of the European integration 
process on Portugal’s industrial relations. European integration 
has led to the transformation of the Portuguese economy and in-
fluenced the strategies and actions of social actors, namely, the 
transformation of Portuguese trade unions and employer associa-
tions, and outlines the main features of the country’s industrial 
relations framework.
In Chapter F, “European Integration and Party Attachments: 
)e Portuguese Case as an Example for New Democracies”, 
André Freire analyzes the impact of voting behaviour in elections 
to the European Parliament on the anchors of partisanship in 
Portugal (as an example of a new democracy). Concluding that, as 
a consequence of their second-order nature, elections to the Eu-
ropean Parliament are usually contested by the same actors, em-
phasizing mainly the same (national) issues and de-emphasizing 
European issues.
Chapter D, “)e Support in Portugal for European Integration: 
Dimensions and Tendencies”, by Pedro Magalhães, notes that the 
indicators of instrumental support for European integration have 
exhibited a tendency to decline since BCCH. Furthermore, it ar-
gues there is also an apparent increase of another form of support 
for integration: accepting the sharing of power between member 
states and the EU’s institutions in the definition of public poli-
cies. It suggests the nature of the reservoir of support for integra-
tion is changing in Portugal, from one based in the perception of 
benefits accruing to the nation state, towards support based in the 
acceptance of the EU as a political community and political 
system.
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)e conclusion, “Europeanization and Democratization in 
Portugal: Brothers-in-Arms or Frères Ennemis?”, by Maarten 
Vink, returns to the central theme of the book and discusses the 
broader implications of European integration for Portuguese de-
mocracy, using the findings from the preceding chapters to dis-
cuss to what extent European integration has strengthened or 
undermined democracy in Portugal.
* * *
)is book succeeds an earlier edition, also published by this 
press, titled Southern Europe and the making of the European Union 
(HIIJ), which focused primarily on a comparative analysis of the 
pre-accession period in Southern Europe. )e focus of this text is 
on the Portuguese case alone during the period following acces-
sion, i.e. an investigation of HK years of Europeanization.
)is book is the result of a revised and updated edition of a 
selection of papers presented at the Portuguese Institute of Inter-
national Relations, Universidade Nova de Lisboa’s (IPRI-UNL) 
summer school in June HIIE, which was organized by the editors, 
IPRI-UNL, the European Commission in Lisbon and the Mu-
nicipality of Óbidos.
)e authors would like to express their sincere thanks to all of 
those who provided the institutional and financial support that has 
made it possible to produce this volume. We would especially like 
to thank the Diário de Notícias and LUSA-Agência de Notícias 
de Portugal, for their support for the IPRI-UNL summer school, 
and the Luso American Development Foundation (FLAD) and 
Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais-Universidade 
Nova de Lisboa (IPRI-UNL) and the Institute of Social Science, 
University of Lisbon (ICS-UL) for editing support.
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We would also like to thank all those who attended the 
IPRI-UNL summer school conferences and debates, including 
those who did not publish their contribution, especially António 
Vitorino, a former EU commissioner who at the time was presi-
dent of the European AAairs Parliamentary Commission, and 
who presided over the summer school’s closing session.
We extend our special gratitude to Stewart Lloyd-Jones of 
CPHRC Editorial Services, who translated and edited many of 
the contributions to this volume, typeset the book and composed 
the index, to Alexandra Abreu Loureiro for her assistance in pre-
paring this volume, and Isabel Alcario for organizing and provid-
ing the project with constant support.
)e editors, Nuno Severiano Teixeira and António Costa Pin-
to, would like to thank their academic institutions—FCSH-UNL 
and ICS-UL, respectively—for having provided them with the 
conditions which made it possible to work on this volume.
A final word of thanks must go to Nancy Tyson for including 
this volume in this series.

Introduction:






Two political factors conditioned Portugal’s integration into 
the process of European unification between BCGK and BCFG: the 
dictatorial nature of Salazar’s regime and its tenacious resistance 
to decolonization.1 It was only following the institutionalization 
of democracy and the process of decolonization during BCFG–FK 
that the first serious steps were taken to follow a strategy of in-
tegrating Portugal into what was then the European Economic 
Community (EEC).
Portugal did not experience the same levels of international 
isolation as neighbouring Spain following the Second World War. 
Its status as a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and as a participant within other inter-
national organizations such as the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Payments 
Union (EPU), and the fact it received funds from the Marshall 
Plan—albeit on a relatively small scale—are all examples of the 
country’s international acceptance.
1 N. S. Teixeira, “Between Africa and Europe: Portuguese foreign policy, BDCI-
BCDE”, in A.C. Pinto (ed.) Modern Portugal (Palo Alto, CA: SPOSS, BCCD), pp. EI–DF; A. 
C. Pinto, O fim do Império português: A cena internacional, a guerra colonial e a descoloniza-
ção, !"#!–!"$% (Lisbon: Horizonte, HIII).
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Excluded from and mistrustful of the Treaty of Rome, which 
paved the way to the EEC, and following positions adopted by 
the United Kingdom, Portugal’s membership of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) was an important economic aim 
for the dictatorship throughout the BCEIs.2 Negotiated on favour-
able terms for Portugal, which saw most of its economic activi-
ties largely protected, the EFTA agreement laid the ground for 
the economic growth of the BCEIs and the significant increase in 
commercial relations with Europe. It also boosted the emergence 
of interest groups less involved with the colonies. However, the 
development of a pro-European outlook was essentially a conse-
quence of the decolonization process and the institutionalization 
of democracy. 
Following a complex transition process, the Portugal’s integra-
tion into the EEC became a strategic objective, with simultane-
ous political and economic overtones. Democratic consolidation 
and European integration in were to become inseparable. 
Democracy and European Integration (!"#$–!"%&)
)e military coup of HK April BCFG, paved the way for the in-
stitutionalization of Portuguese democracy. Portugal’s transi-
tion occurred at the height of the Cold War, a time when there 
were few international pressures for democratization. )e rup-
ture provoked by the military coup accentuated the crisis of the 
state, fuelled by the simultaneous process of democratization 
and decolonization of the last European colonial empire.3 Pow-
erful tensions, which incorporated revolutionary elements, were 
2 N. Andresen Leitão, “Portugal’s European integration policy, BCGF–BCFH”, Journal 
of European Integration History F (HIIB), pp. HK–JK.
3 K. Maxwell, &e making of Portuguese democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, BCCF).
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concentrated into the first two years of Portugal’s democracy. 
During BCFG–FK, Portugal also experienced a high level of foreign 
intervention, ranging from diplomatic pressure to the creation of 
political parties and social organizations (such as trade unions and 
interest groups), as well as the anti-left strategies of the so-called 
BCFK “hot summer”. As a result, Portugal was a constant topic of 
discussion at international forums from NATO to the EEC, and 
within the institutions of the Soviet bloc. 
)e military coup took the international community, particu-
larly the United States, by surprise.4 Faced with the intense so-
cial and political mobilization of the left, and concerned with the 
flight of the country’s capital and its economic elite, the moderate 
parties only had limited success in establishing themselves and 
were only able to function during the crisis due to financial and 
technical support from leading figures in the US administration 
and from other European ‘political families’, mainly the German 
Social Democrats, which often served as guarantors. 
Transition to Democracy and Decolonization 
)e EEC observed Portugal’s transition with discretion, al-
though it gave ambiguous signals. It favoured the emergence of a 
pluralist democratic system, whilst simultaneously granting some 
limited economic assistance. In BCFK, soon after the first demo-
cratic elections, the European Council announced it was prepared 
to begin economic and financial negotiations with Portugal, al-
though it stressed that, “in accordance with its historical and po-
litical traditions, the European Community can only support a 
pluralist democracy”.5
4 M. del Pero, “Kissinger e la politica estera americana nel Mediterraneo: Il caso 
portoghese”, Studi Storici G (HIIB), pp. CFJ–DD.
5 See J. Magone, “A integração europeia e a construção da democracia portu-
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)e first significant international challenge for Portuguese 
democracy was the disposal of its colonial empire. )e second was 
to open the country to the world and re-establish diplomatic re-
lations with all countries, bringing an end to the international 
isolation suAered by the deposed regime.6 Decolonization and 
the re-establishment of diplomatic relations did not constitute a 
new strategic direction for Portugal’s foreign policy; rather, in the 
midst of the strenuous conflicts during the process of democrati-
zation, there was another silent battle taking place, one concerned 
with the international strategic choices to be made by the new 
democracy. 
)e transition period was characterized by a political and 
ideological conflict centred on the country’s foreign policy goals 
and which was translated into the practice of parallel diplomatic 
actions led through various institutional agents,  and which was 
consequently reflected in the absence of a clear foreign policy.
Despite the conflicts, hesitations and indecision, the provision-
al governments, particularly those with a preponderance of mili-
tary ministers, tended to favour adopting a )ird-World approach 
to foreign policy and promoted the formation of special relations 
with the former colonies. )is was the final manifestation, albeit 
in a pro-socialist form, of the thesis that was so close to Salazar’s 
heart—Portugal’s “African vocation”. 
guesa”, in A. C. Pinto and N. S. Teixeira (eds), Penélope: Portugal e a unificação europeia, 
BD (BCCD), p. BJF. See also J. Magone, European Portugal: &e di'cult road to sustainable 
democracy (London: Macmillan, BCCF).
6 S. MacDonald, European destiny, Atlantic transformations: Portuguese foreign 
policy under the Second Republic (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, BCCJ); J. M. Ferreira, 
“Political costs and benefits for Portugal arising from membership of the European 
Community”, in J. da S. Lopes (ed.), Portugal and EC membership evaluated (London: 
Pinter, BCCJ); J. Gama, “A adesão de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias”, Política In-
ternacional BI, (BCCG-CK), pp. K–BC.
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)e consolidation of democracy, which began with the election 
of the first constitutional government in BCFE, can be character-
ized by a clear choice of Portuguese foreign policy as a Western 
country, simultaneously Atlanticist and European.  
)ese were to become the basic strategic foreign policy vectors 
for the recent democracy. )e Atlanticist outlook was predicated 
on the permanence of Portuguese foreign policy’s historical char-
acteristics, and played an important role both in directing Portu-
gal externally and in stabilizing it domestically. )e establishment 
of bilateral relations with the United States, and the strengthen-
ing of its multilateral participation within NATO, was the clear-
est expressions of the new democracy’s international position. 
Having finally overcome the )ird World temptations of the 
revolutionary period, Portugal unreservedly adopted the “Euro-
pean option” from BCFE onwards. Now, however, this choice was a 
strategic decision and a political project,  rather than the merely 
pragmatic, economic stance it had been under the authoritarian 
regime. 
Democratic Consolidation, European Option  
and Adhesion to the EEC 
Contacts between Lisbon and European institutions were ini-
tiated as early as BCFG. )e European Commission granted Por-
tugal economic assistance while the European Council made its 
political position clear: it was ready to begin negotiations on the 
condition that pluralist democracy was established. Nevertheless, 
the country’s economic situation, the political instability and con-
tinuing uncertainty during the transitional period ruled out any 
advance on the European front. 
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)e first constitutional government, led by Mário Soares, 
adopted the “European option”. )e first step in this process 
took place in August BCFE, when the Portuguese government 
successfully applied for membership at the Council of Europe. 
Once a member of this organization, which also consolidated the 
international community’s recognition of the new democratic re-
gime, Lisbon began to outline its next decisive step: its accession 
application to the EEC. 
Following a series of successful negotiations in a number of 
European capitals between September BCFE and February BCFF, 
the government made its formal application for EEC member-
ship in March BCFF. )e European Council accepted Portugal’s 
application the following month and initiated the formal acces-
sion process according to the treaties, including the mandatory 
consultation of the European Commission. In May BCFD the com-
mission presented a favourable report, clearing the way for formal 
negotiations to begin in Luxembourg the following October.7 
With the formal application made, and accession negotiations 
under way, the hesitations and polemics over the nature of Por-
tugal’s integration had finally been superseded, placing Portugal 
firmly on the European path. 
)e government was motivated by, and based its decision to 
follow this strategic option on, two principal goals. First, EEC 
membership would consolidate Portuguese democracy; second, 
EEC assistance would guarantee the modernization of the coun-
try and its economic development. Several Portuguese economists 
remained fearful, with the majority expressing grave reservations 
7 J. M. Ferreira, “Os regimes políticos em Portugal e a organização internacional 
da Europa”, Política Internacional BB (BCCK), pp. K–JC.
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regarding the impact EEC membership would have on some sec-
tors of the Portuguese economy.8
)ere then followed a complex series of negotiations over the 
ensuing seven years. A first step had been taken in September 
BCFE, prior to the country’s formal application, with the revision 
of the BCFH EEC trade agreement through the conclusion of the 
Additional and Financial Protocols, which Portugal interpreted 
as representing a form of pre-membership agreement.9 Despite 
these prior agreements, formal negotiations on Portugal’s mem-
bership continued from October BCFD until June BCDK.10
)ere were two important domestic factors explaining why the 
accession negotiations for such a small country with a relatively 
weak economy were so complex and drawn out. First, Portugal’s 
economic situation immediately prior to transition and, more im-
portantly, the economic measures taken during the revolutionary 
period—in particular, the nationalization of important economic 
sectors. 
Second, the continuous governmental instability and the na-
ture of the country’s political and constitutional regime. After BCFE 
the democratic regime was undeniably pluralist and was generally 
considered as such; however, the BCFE constitution was a product 
of the revolutionary period, and consecrated within it the Council 
of the Revolution. It was a democracy, but a democracy under 
the tutelage of an undemocratic military institution. )ese factors 
weighed heavily in the negotiations, delaying their conclusion. 
8 J. Cravinho, “Characteristics and motives for entry”, in J. L. Sampedro and J. A. 
Payno (eds), &e enlargement of the European Community: Case studies of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain (London: Macmillan, BCDJ), pp. BJB–GD. See also A. Tovias, Foreign economic 
relations of the European Community: the impact of Spain and Portugal (Boulder, CO, and 
London: Lynne Rienner, BCCI).
9 Ferreira (note F), p. HD.
10 P. Alvares and C. R. Fernandes (eds), Portugal e o Mercado Comum: Dos Acordos 
de !"$( às negociações de adesão, vol.H (Lisbon: Pórtico, BCDI).
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During the early BCDIs, Portuguese democracy overcame all 
of these objections. )e constitution was revised in BCDH and the 
Council was abolished. )e new national defence law finally es-
tablished the subordination of the armed forces to the civilian 
political authorities. By BCDJ, democracy in Portugal had been 
consolidated, clearing the domestic obstacles to the successful 
conclusion of the accession negotiations. 
One external hurdle remained. In the framework of Europe’s 
southern enlargement, the EEC was also conducting accession 
negotiations with neighbouring Spain, a much larger economy 
than Portugal, and a country that did not share its history of close 
relations with European economic institutions. Portugal’s diplo-
matic strategy was to keep its negotiations separate from Spain, 
thus hoping to secure a fast track to accession, in order to guaran-
tee the status of member state before Spain. )is tactic unsuccess-
ful, however, as the community’s policy was to negotiate with both 
Iberian nations simultaneously. )is resulted in Portugal’s acces-
sion being delayed by two years, until negotiations with Spain had 
been concluded. 
)e accession process culminated in the signing of the Treaty 
of Accession by the new government led by Mário Soares in June 
BCDK. Portugal became a full member of the EEC on B January 
BCDE.
'e Europeanization of Portugal (!"%&–()!))
Portugal’s membership of EEC paved the way to a period of 
Europeanization of the Portuguese society, registering profound 
domestic and foreign policy changes. )ese changes followed the 
deepening and enlargement process of European integration. 
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Since the democratic constitution of BCFE came into force, 
Portugal has known a wide political consensus on foreign policy, 
particularly regarding European integration. Apart for cyclical 
moments of greater ideological cleavage, there has always been 
agreement in this matter between the main Portuguese political 
parties: the centre-left Socialist Party (PS), the centre-right So-
cial Democratic Party (PSD) and the right wing Democratic and 
Social Centre (CDS). 
Such an agreement is based upon the “perception of Portugal 
as a nation, simultaneously Atlantic and European”, with the lat-
ter dimension being more important in recent decades.11
Faithful to its Atlantic roots, from BCDE Portugal’s foreign poli-
cy strengthened its European focus. )e “European option” played 
a fundamental role in the consolidation of democracy and in the 
country’s modernization. )erefore, it can be said democratization 
and modernization were the main domestic echoes of Portugal’s 
European integration during the last quarter of the HIth century.
Generally speaking, Portugal supported the BCDE Single Eu-
ropean Act, the BCCH Maastricht Treaty and the ensuing treaties 
that deepened the process of European political and economic in-
tegration. )e various governments viewed Portugal’s presence in 
the European Union (EU) as a commission and council support 
guarantee for Portuguese economic and structural development 
plans, despite realizing these alterations implied changes at the 
domestic and foreign policy levels.12 
)is process was not linear. )ree core moments highlight 
Portugal’s participation in the European integration process after 
BCDE. 
11 S. Royo (ed.), Portugal, Espanha e a integração Europeia: Um balanço (Lisbon: 
Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, HIIK), p. JE.
12 Royo (note BB).
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First, between BCDE and BCCH, which was characterized by a po-
sition of pragmatism and moderation towards the European in-
tegration process, as the country sought to adjust to the challenge 
of Europe.
Second, from BCCH to HIII, when Portugal’s participation in 
the European project reached its peak with successive Portuguese 
governments placing the country at the forefront of the European 
integration process.
Finally, from HIII onwards, which has seen a return to pragma-
tism, Portugal has used European integration tools to maximize 
its external role, balancing the costs and benefits of the country’s 
presence at the heart of the EU.
Prudence and Pragmatism:  
'e First Years of Membership 
Portugal joined the EEC at the same time as the European 
integration process was getting under way. By BCDE, the EEC was 
undergoing a period of institutional relaunch through the signing 
of the Single European Act (SEA), the first revision of the Treaty 
of Rome in about JI years. )is change received a cautious wel-
come in Portugal, as the political intensification brought about by 
the SEA led the political elite to doubt Portugal’s ability to meet 
the new demands. )e opening of the Portugal’s economy, which 
was backward compared to most of its European partners meant 
the country’s accession had to be followed by compensatory eco-
nomic measures.13 
In terms of the political goals, the Portuguese government, 
led since BCDK by Aníbal Cavaco Silva, followed a strategy that 
13 P. Lains, “Os caminhos da integração: Da autarcia à Europa do Euro”, in M. C. 
Lobo and P. Lains (eds), Em nome da Europa: Portugal em mudança (!")#–(**#) (Cas-
cais: Princípia, HIIF), pp. BG–GI.
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focused on the credibility of full Portuguese membership, while 
at the same time seeking to profit from the economic and social 
advantages arising from EEC participation.14 
Despite the moderation and pragmatism of the Portuguese 
position, the first phase of the country’s EEC membership was 
nevertheless marked by one of the base principles of the SEA: the 
decision to create a single market was intimately connected with 
the need to promote economic and social cohesion within the 
community. As a consequence, with the approval of the Delors I 
plan, Ireland and the countries of southern Europe received con-
siderable levels of financial compensation to help them meet the 
challenges of an increasingly liberalised European market. )is 
was decisive for Portugal. )e Lisbon government was one of the 
main beneficiaries of these measures, with strong consequences in 
the structural transformations performed in Portugal. Such trans-
formations also helped change the Portuguese public’s perception 
of Europe and the benefits of the country’s European integration. 
If in the early years of membership the dominant perception 
was of one of concern, regarding the country’s ability to meet the 
challenges of accessing the EEC. )e massive financial transfers 
rendered clear and visible the advantages of integration, hence 
radically changing Portugal’s perception of Europe.15
From the political perspective, European integration forced 
the Portuguese government to rethink its alliances within Europe. 
During the early years of membership, Portuguese prudence and 
the pragmatism of Cavaco Silva’s governments, ensured Portugal 
retained its Atlanticist position, aligning with its former EFTA 
14 V. Martins, “Os primeiros anos’ in N. Andresen Leitão (ed.), (* anos de inte-
gração Europeia (!")#–(**#): O testemunho português (Lisbon: Cosmos, HIIF).
15 A. G. Soares, “Portugal e a adesão às Comunidades Europeias: HI anos de inte-
gração europeia”, in R. G. Perez and L. Lobo-Fernandes (eds), España y Portugal: Veinte 
años de integración europea (Salamanca: Tórculo Edicións, HIIF), p. EC.
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partners. Following its traditional foreign policy line, at least as 
far as the European integration process was concerned, Portugal 
remained aligned with the United Kingdom, believing Margaret 
)atcher’s government were safe and prudent allies with which to 
face the growing supranational trends within Europe. 
In the autumn of BCDC, when the Berlin Wall fell and the com-
munist regimes in central and Eastern Europe collapsed, Portu-
guese foreign policy still followed the traditional Atlanticist line. 
However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, German reuni-
fication, and European enlargement and deepening that was the 
result of the Maastricht Treaty, Lisbon’s position evolved into a 
more flexible Euro-Atlantic position. )is new position became 
evident during the first half of BCCH, when for the first time Portu-
gal assumed the presidency of the EU. At the time, the European 
question was posed as new national goal, with the country truly 
committed to the EU’s new institutional form: Political Union.16
Euro-Enthusiasm:  
A Decade of Convergence 
Portugal’s BCCH EU presidency marked a change in the proc-
ess of Portugal’s integration. )e Portuguese success in ensuring 
reform of  the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), contributed 
to changes in the position of Cavaco Silva’s governments from the 
conservative of the early years, initiating a period of enthusiasm 
towards more active participation in the European project. While 
the EU entered a new stage following the signing of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, Portugal revealed itself to be a good student; moreo-
ver, one that was truly committed to the European process. 17
16 C. Gaspar, “Portugal e o alargamento da EU”, Análise Social XXXV, BKG–BKK 
(HIII), pp. JHF–FH.
17 Soares (note BK), p. FH.
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Left behind was the conservative, traditionally Atlanticist and, 
until then, dominant trend in strategic and diplomatic culture, 
which saw the Atlantic focus and the special relationship with the 
US and the Portuguese-speaking world as the Portugal’s foreign 
policy priority. With the end of the Cold War, Portugal’s interna-
tional position became increasingly Euro-Atlantic, reflecting the 
Europeanization of Portugal’s strategic orientation.
)is was particularly so from BCCK, with the European out-
look being strengthened during the remainder of the decade. )e 
country’s participation in peace missions in the Balkans clearly 
reflected the change in Portuguese foreign policy. Portugal had 
fully assumed its European status both in foreign and defence 
policy, and for the first time since the First World War, Portu-
guese armed forces took part in military operations on the Euro-
pean continent.18
Clearly taking on an Europeanist tone, which had been the 
political line of the PS since BCFE, the socialist government led by 
António Guterres, adopted the European monetary union project 
as its main goal in the European integration process.19 )e Lisbon 
government asssumed the goal of placing Portugal at the head 
of the integration process as the only way to keep a peripheral 
country at the heart of the EU’s decision-making process.20 )is 
strategy involved the immediate Europeanization of Portuguese 
public policies in all fields, which was reflected in the swift adop-
tion of legislative changes outlined in the EU treaties, particularly 
in the BCCF Amsterdam Treaty. In this sense, one could observe 
18 N. S. Teixeira, “A democracia, a defesa e as missões internacionais das forças 
armadas’, in N. S. Teixeira (ed.), Os militares e a democracia, (Lisbon: Colibri, HIIE), pp. 
FB–DC.
19 M. C. Lobo, “A atitude dos portugueses perante a UE: Perspectivas sociais e 
políticas”, in S. Royo (note BB), pp. BKI–KB.
20 Gaspar (note BE).
HI T-. E/012.345637514 18 P107/9/.:. D.;1<03<=
the incorporation of the EU’s political values at all the levels of 
Portuguese policy.
)e zenith of this strategy was reached in BCCD. Despite the 
atavistic financial indiscipline of southern European countries, 
Portugal met all the conditions and was accepted into the select 
club of European states admitted to the single European currency, 
the euro. 
Portugal achieved this aim just as Portuguese diplomacy 
achieved one of its flagship successes of the democratic regime 
with the resolution of the East Timor issue. 
Not even a UN Security Council condemnation could force 
Indonesia into ending its occupation of the former Portuguese 
territory, which it seized  in BCFK. During the BCCIs, the diplomatic 
persistence of the Portuguese government kept East Timor on the 
international agenda. In this context, the sense of belonging to 
the EU was without doubt a decisive factor in this, as it gave Lis-
bon an increasing international role enabling the people of East 
Timor to exert their right to self-determination through a UN 
supervised political transition.21
Portugal entered its second presidency of the EU in the first 
half of HIII with Europe as the priority of its national interests.. 
Unlike in BCCH, during this presidency the Portuguese government 
transmitted the image of a country that was comfortably inte-
grated into the European project, and able to mobilize its peers to 
ensure the development and improvement of the union.
In the European Council of March HIII, the Portuguese 
presidency obtained approval for the Lisbon Strategy, a declara-
tion of principles that sought to place the EU as the world’s lead-
ing economy within a decade. )rough the promotion of social, 
21 J. J. P. Gomes, “A internacionalização da questão de Timor”, Relações Internac-
ionais HK (HIBI), pp. EF–DC.
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educational and environmental policies, the Lisbon Strategy 
sought to make the European economy more competitive and 
better prepared for the challenges of globalization. 
Although bearing important fruit for the a@rmation of Eu-
rope at the start of the HBst century, Lisbon’s aims were not entirely 
achieved, partly because the implementation method allowed the 
move away from traditional communitarian integration formulae 
by introducing non-binding obligations.
In fact, in HIII most European countries were far more in-
terested in improving the EU institutions in order to prepare 
Brussels for the Eastern enlargement. )e HIII intergovernmen-
tal conference in Nice, which sought to solve the questions left 
over by the Amsterdam Treaty, was also the moment the larg-
er member states began to the diplomatic pressure in order to 
have their political weight acknowledged and enhanced within 
the European decision-making process. )is period culminate in 
a moment of Europeanist euphoria: the Nice intergovernmental 
summit gave Portugal a platform upon which it was able to fulfil 
a leadership role in respect of the medium and smaller European 
states, defending their interests from the demands of the larger 
states. )is role was paramount during the negotiations over in-
stitutional reform, at a time that was without doubt one of the 
most active moments of Portugal’s participation in the process of 
European integration.22
At the external level, the Portuguese presidency sought to 
strengthen the EU’s  international presence, benefiting from Por-
tugal’s historical relations with regional areas traditionally linked 
to its national interest.
Successes included the approval of the Common Strat-
egy for the Mediterranean and the launch of the EU-India 
22 Soares (note BK), p. FF.
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strategy following the Lisbon Summit. )e Portuguese presi-
dency’s two main goals in relation to Africa were also achieved: 
the EU-ACP Cotonu partnership agreement, which replaced the 
Lomé Convention,and the first EU-Africa Summit, which took 
place in Cairo.
Return to Pragmatism:  
A Decade of Divergence 
)e conclusions of the HIIB Nice Treaty, coupled with the east-
ern enlargement of the EU,  signalled the beginning of the end of 
Portuguese enthusiasm for European integration. 
At this point, internal and external factors contributed towards 
the Portuguese gaining a more realistic perception of their be-
longing to the European Union. In HIIB, with the resignation of 
Prime Minister António Guterres and the call for early elections, 
Portugal returned to internal political instability. )e total com-
mitment to the EU presidency and its leadership of the medium 
and smaller member states during the negotiations over the Nice 
Treaty contributed to the socialist government neglecting domes-
tic policy. )e new political instability was accompanied by an 
economic and financial downturn that came about partially as a 
result of a fall in domestic consumption and the loss of national 
export competitiveness.23
Major political and strategic changes in the international arena 
took place in the aftermath of C September HIIB, particularly the 
transatlantic crisis and divisions within Europe caused by the US-
led intervention in Iraq in HIIJ. For Portugal, however, it was EU 
enlargement to countries of the former Soviet bloc that had the 
most impact on its perception of the integration process.
23 Soares (note BK), pp. DH–J.
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At this time there were no alterations registered in either the 
course of these EU trends or in Durão Barroso’s government’s 
European policies between HIIH and HIIK.
 From a geopolitical perspective this enlargement contributed 
towards moving Europe’s centre of gravity to the East, thereby ac-
centuating Portugal’s peripheral condition in the European con-
text. 
Economically, the new member states were more attractive 
to multinational corporations seeking to benefit from the lower 
wages and skilled labour available in central and eastern Europe. 
Portugal was unquestionably one of the countries most aAected 
by the relocation of companies to the east. To this situation an-
other element was added—competition for structural funds—and 
again, Portugal was left behind.24
At this point, it should be noted the financial constraints de-
riving from economic and monetary union and adhesion to the 
euro, as well as the ongoing economic issues aAecting Portugal, 
were aggravated from HIID by the global financial crisis. 
During the first decade of the HBst century, Portugal’s GDP 
diverged from the EU average and from those of its cohesion 
partners. In BCCC Portugal’s GDP per capita was ED per cent of EU 
GDP per capita: by HIID it had fallen to EG per cent.
Despite these various di@culties at this time Portugal did not 
go back to the scepticism that was characteristic of Cavaco Silva’s 
early years in government. With the Socialist Party returning to 
power in HIIK, and the European crisis and French and Dutch 
vetoes of the European constitution notwithstanding, Portu-
gal’s attitude was one of responsible realism. Portugal’s HIIF EU 
presidency oAered proof of the country’s political maturity in the 
24 Soares (note BK), p. DJ.
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European integration project. )is was felt both at the EU’s 
internal level and through its international presence. 
Domestically, the priority of the governments led by José 
Sócrates was to ensure the conclusion of the political process for 
EU reform, which was achieved with the signing of the Lisbon 
Treaty on BJ December HIIF. 
Internationally, the priorities of Portugal’s presidency focused 
on strengthening and diversifying the EU as a global actor. )is 
was achieved through a series of successful international summits, 
including the EU-Russia summit, the second EU-Africa dummit 
and the first EU-Brazil summit, which resulted in the celebration 
of a new strategic partnership.
While these summits contributed towards strengthening the 
EU’s international presence, they also favoured Portugal’s national 
interest by extending the EU’s strategic partnerships into areas of 
its traditional strategic interest: Africa and Brazil.25 
Conclusion
Portuguese participation in the process of European integra-
tion had political, economic and social costs and benefits for the 
country. 
From the global standpoint, Portugal’s accession to the EEC 
was important both for the domestic consolidation of democracy 
and the external definition of a new model for international in-
sertion. Although Portugal was already part of the international 
post-Second World War system, as member of the UN, NATO, 
OECD and EFTA, integration into the EEC closed the cycle 
of normalization of the country’s presence in the international 
25 L. Ferreira-Pereira, “Portugal e a presidência da União Europeia (BCCH–HIIF)”, 
Relações Internacionais HI (HIID), pp. BJB–GJ.
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system, thus placing it in the select club of politically stable and 
economically developed Western democracies.
Economically and socially, a profound change occurred during 
the two decades of Portugal’s European integration. )e coun-
try’s economy experienced accelerated modernization, which had 
a clear impact at the productive structure level, as well on exter-
nal commerce and social cohesion. Portugal’s accession to the 
EEC took place at precisely the moment Europe was seeking to 
strengthen and intensify its integration through the SEA. 
)rough the provision of European structural funds and 
the introduction of cohesion policies, Portugal’s economy and 
society set out on a process of structural reformulation, with the 
goal of achieving macroeconomic stability and increased competi-
tiveness, which became one of the key-consequences of accession. 
Yet despite its di@culties and limitations, Portuguese participa-
tion in the integration process was translated at the economic and 
social level. During the first decade it resulted in its convergence 
with its European partners, and its growing divergence since the 
end of that first decade.26
Politically there was a process of Europeanization of Portu-
guese institutions and public policies. )e transposition of Euro-
pean legislation resulted in significant changes that shaped public 
institutions and policies to the practices of European institu-
tions and their decision-making processes. During the course of 
this process, the costs in terms of sovereignty transfer within the 
various aAected sectors seem to have been widely compensated 
by the economic benefits obtained, which was reflected in the 
26 S. Royo, “O alargamento de HIIG: Lições ibéricas para a Europa pós-
comunista”, in Royo (note BB).
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Portuguese public’s support for European integration and Portu-
gal’s participation in the European project.27
As far as Portugal’s foreign policy is concerned the impact 
of European integration was tremendous, even determining the 
emergence of a new model for the country’s international inser-
tion. First, it changed the contradictory perception between Eu-
rope and the Atlantic to one of complementarity. For Portuguese 
foreign policy, the European Atlanticist outlook may bring added 
value in the Atlantic and in post-colonial relations. Second, while 
the Europe/Atlantic equation remained, priorities were inverted: 
traditionally Portugal had prioritised the Atlantic and the colo-
nies while looking for European compensations; now Portugal’s 
priority is Europe and the European Union, and to obtain added 
value at the international level it seeks to take advantage of its 
Atlanticist position and post-colonial relations.
27 Lobo (note BC), pp. BKD–KC.
Do the Portuguese national political elites feel they belong to 
the European polity? How do they evaluate the political institu-
tions of the European Union (EU)? And what kind of policies 
should be delegated by the member-states to the supranational 
European level of government?
)rough the analysis of data collected in the HIIF and HIIC In-
tUne project elite surveys,1 this chapter addresses these questions 
in order to assess how the three main dimensions of European 
citizenship—identity, representation and scope of governance—
feature among deputies to the Portuguese parliament. In doing 
so, our main goal here is to describe the attitudes of those na-
tional representatives within a set of comparative perspectives. 
First, vis-à-vis the attitudes of Portuguese parties, in order to 
assess the coherence of the deputies’ attitudes with the o@cial 
positions of their parties; second, with public opinion, in order 
to explore convergent and divergent attitudes between the elite 
and citizens; and, finally, with the attitudes of two groups of 
1 For a theoretical introduction of the IntUne project, see M. Cotta and P. Isernia, 
Citizenship in the European polity: questions and explorations, report on IntUne theoretical 
framework (HIIF), www.intune.it/research-materials/theoretical-framework [accessed 
HI April HIIC]. For a brief methodological introduction to the project, see G. Ilonski, 
“Introduction: A Europe integrated and united—but still diverse?” Europe-Asia Studies 
E (HIIC), pp. CBJ–BK.
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national parliaments to which Portugal belongs—southern 
European member-states and the more diverse group of BF 
European countries in which the IntUne elite surveys were con-
ducted—thereby mapping the attitudes of Portuguese representa-
tives within the broader European context.
A Europe of Elites and of  
Executive Elitism
European integration has been described as a matter of elites, 
with limited space for the voice of the citizens. Indeed, the major 
processes of European integration have been driven by top politi-
cal leaders who have played a central role in both the founding 
steps of the European Communities in the BCKIs and in the ensu-
ing stages of enlargement (from the accession of several northern 
European countries in BCFJ to that of eastern European countries 
in HIIG and HIIF), and in the institutional deepening of the EU 
(i.e. the Single European Act and the Maastricht, Amsterdam, 
Nice and Lisbon treaties). 
During the periods between these major processes, smaller 
steps of functional integration within the bounds defined by the 
treaties have been advanced largely on the initiative of bureau-
cratic elites from the European Commission.2 
Broadly speaking, the territorial, institutional and functional 
advancements of the EU have been developed with a timing that 
is not coincidental with that of most national political agendas. 
)e top-down approach of EU decision-making, which has re-
sulted in ever greater impacts and constraints on national political 
decision-making,3 has no proportional bottom-up counterweight. 
2 M. Haller, Elite integration as an elite process: &e failure of a dream? (London, 
New York, NY: Routledge, HIIJ).
3 Jalali, chapter J.
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)e most directly representative of the European institu-
tions—the European Parliament—lacks the legislative initiative, 
a core competence of democratic chambers, and its power to de-
cide upon legislative proposals from the commission is shared 
with the European Council. 
Furthermore, elections to the European Parliament tradition-
ally have been regarded as second-order electoral disputes, the 
agenda of which are dominated by national issues,4 and the turn-
out at which are consistently lower than the declining turnout 
rates for domestic general elections, which tends to undermine 
the legitimacy of the European Parliament within the European 
polity.
Nevertheless, a large and growing number of policies are dealt 
with at the European level and impact on the everyday lives of 
millions of citizens across Europe. )is has made clear the imbal-
ance between the beginning and the end of the chain of delegation 
and accountability in the European political system. )e begin-
ning of the chain is characterized by feeble links among electors 
(and their preferences expressed through votes), parties (and their 
preferences expressed through manifestos) and parliament (and 
their preferences expressed through full legislative capacity, which 
is absent in the case of the European Parliament).  
Conversely, the major flows of delegation and accountability 
in European policy-making seem to take place at the very end 
of a highly complicated and blurred chain, mostly between insti-
tutions of executive nature (the European Commission, the Eu-
ropean Council and national governments) that, while having a 
very indirect mandate from their citizens, are designed to propose, 
negotiate and decide upon policies that are very important both in 
nature and in scope. 
4 Freire, chapter F.
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At the national level, the mainstream political parties that are 
the usual winners of national legislative (and European) elections, 
and which hold the bulk of public o@ces, have supporting dis-
courses towards the EU, but they are often vague and lack co-
herent positions on a number of important issues for ordinary 
citizens.5 
In this context, national parliaments seem not to play a lead-
ing role as political decision-makers, since their main decisional 
competences are, to a certain extent, confined to those of ex-post 
ratifiers and transposers of European legal instruments (and only 
when national constitutions so demand).
What European integration has provoked across Europe, or 
at least has reinforced, is a trend towards executive decision-
making at the national level. True, there have been eAorts to en-
hance parliamentary oversight over governments  on European 
issues (through the setting up of European AAairs Committees, 
the use of parliamentary questions, etc.).6 )ere have also been 
some institutional innovations at the European level that directly 
link national legislatures to the European Commission (the core 
legislative entrepreneur) within the framework of the European 
legislative process.7 
But it is still national governments that meet at the European 
Council to decide upon the direction of European policy-making 
5 N. Conti, “European citizenship in party Euromanifestos: Southern Europe in 
comparative perspective (BCCG–HIIG)”, in N. Conti, M. Cotta and P. T. Almeida (eds), 
Perspectives of national elites on European citizenship: A south European view (New York, 
NY: Routledge, HIBH), pp. CF–BBF.
6 E. Damgaard, “Conclusion: )e impact of European integration on Nordic par-
liamentary democracies”, &e Journal of Legislative Studies E (HIII), pp. BKB–EC. 
7 See Resende and Paulo, chapter G, on recent developments in the ex-ante dis-
semination of information from the European Commission to national legislatures and 
in the scrutiny by national parliaments. )e option for these mechanisms does not pre-
clude (rather, it strengthens) the idea that parliaments have not played their main role 
as policy initiators in important issues for their constituents.
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(in some matters together with the European Parliament), which 
are then specified and adopted by national parliaments when ma-
jor issues of their competence are at stake. 
)is process seems to contradict the traditional view of parlia-
mentary democracy, according to which the government should 
specify and execute legislation passed by parliament (even if in 
practice sometimes the government is able to control the legisla-
tive process through imposing party discipline upon parliamen-
tary majorities). )e inversion of roles between legislatures and 
executives in the approval and specification of legislation is quite 
similar to that which occurs in respect of government approval 
of international treaties followed by parliamentary ratification. 
What is new in European politics, however, is that these role 
shifts are no longer exceptional (as they are in traditional interna-
tional relations), they have become systematic, a common practice 
of the European political system that might have significant con-
stitutional implications, both in the theory and in the practice of 
European parliamentary democracies.8
While strengthening the national parliaments’ control mecha-
nisms, some member states have also sought legitimacy through 
the means of referendum. Nevertheless, of the JK referenda to have 
taken place from BCFJ to HIIC, more than half (BD) were related to 
the accession of new member-states and only BF took place within 
the framework of major treaties. 
Apart from Ireland (seven) and Denmark (six), referenda have 
not been systematically used by member-states to legitimate ma-
jor institutional advancements. )is suggests that in relation to the 
European polity most national elites have used the referendum as 
an eternally valid blank cheque signed by their constituents. 
8 For a more profound discussion of the impact of Europe integration on the 
national chains of delegation and accountability, see Damgaard (note E). 
JH T-. E/012.345637514 18 P107/9/.:. D.;1<03<=
'e Portuguese Contribution to  
European Executive Elitism 
Portugal has played its part in the construction of Europe-
an executive elitism, from the long road to accession (BCFE–DE) 
right up until late into the first decade of the HBst century. In the 
context of the polarized Portuguese transition to democracy in 
BCFG–FE, when the crucial political divisions corresponded to a 
conflict “between democrats and revolutionaries [rather] than 
between democrats and ‘involutionaries’”,9 the European option 
was an important factor in the break from a dictatorial, isolation-
ist and colonialist past that also assumed an anti-communist and 
anti-revolutionary orientation.10 As in other southern European 
transitions to democracy—particularly in Spain—“the idea that 
accession to the European Community would help guarantee lib-
eral democracy was more overtly voiced”,11 and was central to the 
strategy of the political elites during this period.
)e governing elites successfully sought to legitimate the new 
democratic order using the arguments of Europe and of member-
ship of the European Economic Community (EEC) as crucial 
means for reform towards democratic consolidation. )e swift 
Europeanization of the newly founded political parties was also 
stimulated by their merging in the transnational networks of the 
European political families. )e theme of EEC membership 
soon emerged in the programmes of the right- and centre-right 
parties, with the Social and Democratic Centre (CDS—Centro 
9 B. Alvarez-Miranda, Sur de Europa y la adhesión a la Comunidad: los debates 
políticos (Madrid: CIS/Siglo XXI de España, BCCE), p. HIH.
10 A. C. Pinto and N. Teixeira, “From Africa to Europe: Portugal and European 
integration,” in A. C. Pinto and N. Teixeira (eds), Southern Europe and the making of the 
European Union (New York, NY: SSM-Columbia University Press, HIIJ).
11 Alvarez-Miranda (note C), p. HIH.
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Democrático e Social) proclaiming itself fully pro-European, and 
the Social Democratic Party (PSD—Partido Social Democrata) 
adopting a more cautious approach.12 )e CDS, which was af-
filiated to the European Christian Democratic family, adopted a 
strongly pro-European strategy right up until accession. )e PSD, 
which was formed by the reformers and “liberals” of the dictator-
ship’s final years, first inserted itself into the European “liberal” 
family (although it would defect to the European People’s Party 
in BCCE). In BCFE the main slogan of the Socialist Party’s (PS—
Partido Socialista) electoral campaign was “Europe with us”, and 
the proposal of EEC accession was incorporated in the party’s 
programme.
Only the Communist Party (PCP—Partido Comunista Por-
tuguês) remained consistently opposed to EEC membership and 
rejected the prospect of accession. )is opposition was an impor-
tant element in its political campaigns between BCFF and BCDE. 
After the accession of Portugal in BCDE, the PCP adopted a more 
moderate position: instead of calling for Portugal’s withdrawal 
from the community, it started advocating the construction of 
“another Europe”. In recent years, the Left Bloc (BE—Bloco de 
Esquerda) has proposed a similar position.
Civil society and the interest groups representing those who 
would be most aAected by EU membership had practically no 
role to play at any stage of the accession negotiations. )e gov-
erning elites dominated the negotiating process, with only lim-
ited involvement from the business associations or the organized 
agricultural interests. Both the Confederation of Portuguese In-
dustry (CIP—Confederação da Industrial Portuguesa) and the 
12 J. M. Barroso, Le système politique portugais face à l ’integration européenne: partis 
politiques et opinion publique (Lisbon: Associação Portuguesa para o Estudo das Relações 
Internacionais, BCDJ).
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Portuguese Industrial Association (AIP—Associação Industrial 
Portuguesa) supported accession, although to diAerent extents. 
)e CIP wavered between domestic liberalization and protec-
tionism towards the EEC, initially demanding more pre-entry 
economic aid and later demonstrating its opposition to the final 
agreements, while the AIP adopted a more pragmatic “join and 
see” position.13 Nevertheless, despite the CIP’s occasional attacks, 
the hypothesis that the attitudes of these two organizations re-
flected an attempt to make the government adopt an aggressive 
negotiating stance rather than any principled opposition appears 
plausible, especially since these attitudes did not enjoy much sup-
port among their a@liates. Several interviews with leading figures 
within the employers’ organizations reveal their attitudes towards 
accession were driven by political considerations, with the EEC 
being presented as the “guarantor for greater political security that 
will encourage investment in and modernization of the produc-
tive structures in the country”.
)e very perception of EEC membership as a positive goal was 
initially restricted to the political elite. In BCFD, shortly after the 
formal membership application had been submitted, most Por-
tuguese had no opinion on Europe, with more than EI per cent 
of the population stating they did not know if EEC membership 
was essential for the future of Portugal’s economy.14 It was not 
until the early BCDIs that the Portuguese had become better in-
formed and thus better able to express a clear view on the matter. 
)e increasing importance of the European issue, togeth-
er with the broad party consensus, eventually had a favourable 
13 M. Lucena and C. Gaspar, “Metamorfoses corporativas? Associações de inter-
esses económicos e institucionalização da democracia em Portugal (I)”, Análise Social 
XXVI, BBG (BCCB), p. DCC.
14 M. Bacalhau, Atitudes, opiniões e comportamentos políticos dos portugueses, !"$+–
!""+ (Lisbon: Bacalhau e Bruneau, BCCG).
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impact on public opinion. )e Eurobarometer survey has regular-
ly recorded Portuguese public opinion since BCDI, and its reports 
have revealed a clear upward trend in support of EEC member-
ship, with a large increase in the year Portugal joined (BCDE). 
Still, rather than “a response to popular demand”, accession 
persisted as a path designed, negotiated and approved by the top 
political elite alone,15 mainly backed by a large degree of political 
consensus among the governing parties between BCFE and BCDK 
(PS, PSD and CDS). )e Portuguese elitist approach to the EU 
was eventually sharpened by the absence of a referendum, which 
had been held during the previous accession processes of Ireland, 
Denmark and the UK in BCFJ—but which was also absent in the 
processes of Greece and Spain, Portugal’s southern European 
peers in the third wave of democratization. 
)e first ten years of Portugal’s membership in the EEC are 
usually regarded as a “golden era”. It was a time of economic 
growth, rising incomes and social change in an optimistic atmos-
phere of modernization that culminated with the country meeting 
the convergence criteria for membership of the single currency, 
the euro, and then joining the single currency in BCCC. Portuguese 
foreign aAairs also benefited from the country’s status as a mem-
ber of the EU—for example, it helped relieve the tensions that 
existed between it and its former colonies in Africa. 
In the internal political sphere, a large degree of pro-European 
consensus persisted among parties that had held government po-
sitions. )e only exception to the consensual support of govern-
ing parties was the shift of the right-wing CDS (when it was in 
opposition) towards an anti-Maastricht Europe, which was the 
policy followed by a new generation of party leaders in BCCH. )e 
15 N. Bermeo, “Regime change and its impact on foreign policy: )e Portuguese 
case”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies E (BCDD), p. BG.
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party maintained this position until HIIH, when it was compelled 
to become more pro-Europe as a condition of forming a govern-
ment coalition with the PSD. 
)e mainstream centre-left PS and centre-right PSD, which 
for many years shared around DI per cent of the electorate, have 
remained largely supportive of European integration, which 
is consistent with the trend across European member states in 
which the mainstream parties constitute the bulk of political sup-
port for the EU. 
It should be noted, however, that in the Portuguese case, 
Sanches and Pereira (HIBI) found a variation within parties ac-
cording to their government/opposition status in respect of spe-
cific issues of European integration. When in government, parties 
tend to be strongly in favour of European integration on all issues, 
while when in opposition they tend to be more critical. )is gov-
ernment/opposition status-based variation diAerentiates Portugal 
from the wider spectrum of southern European member states, 
where similar variations were found to be rather limited.16 
It was in such an environment of economic and social modern-
ization and overall political consensus on European integration 
that the proportion of the population believing EEC member-
ship a good thing rose from HG.G per cent in BCDI–DH to EG.K per 
cent in BCDE–CI and finally to more than FI per cent during the 
early BCCIs.17 In BCCJ, EK per cent believed Portuguese economic 
16 Conti (note K).
17 As appears to be the case in other southern European countries, there seems 
to be a strong suggestion the urban middle classes generally tend towards being pro-
European and have a weaker sense of “national pride”, while the less educated and the 
rural lower classes generally have weak pro-European sentiments and a strong sense of 
“national pride”. See Bacalhau (note BG), p. HEC.
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development had been greatly boosted as a result of EEC mem-
bership.18
)is momentum of the BCCIs can be contrasted with the situ-
ation found during the first decade of the HBst century. )e EU’s 
movement towards institutional reform and enlargement, as well 
as the eventual reduction of EU financial support, has resulted 
in Portuguese public opinion displaying slightly but consistently 
declining levels of Euro-optimism.19
On the whole, the attitude of Portuguese citizens towards the 
EU has been positive, both in terms of aAective and instrumental 
views. However, it is important to note that the consensus has 
been mainly based on a narrow instrumental view of the benefits 
of membership for Portugal rather than on wider perceptions of 
the EU as “a good thing”.
With respect to attitudes towards the EU as a political system, 
the evidence is somewhat paradoxical: while the Portuguese tend 
not to participate in elections to the European Parliament and feel 
dissatisfied with the way democracy works in the EU, they have 
increasingly defended the transfer to the European level of key 
sovereign public policies, such as foreign and currency aAairs,20 
and increasingly of welfare policies such as education, health and 
social security.21 )is suggests that towards the end of the first 
decade of the HBst century, the attitudes of Portuguese citizens 
towards the EU were still positive and instrumental. Nonetheless, 
18 M. B. da Cruz, “National identity in transition”, in R. Herr (ed.), &e new Por-
tugal: democracy and Europe (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International and Asia Studies, 
BCCJ), p. BKF.
19 A. C. Pinto and M. C. Lobo, “Forging a positive but instrumental view: Por-
tuguese attitudes towards the EU, BCDE-HIIH”, in A. Dulphy and C. Manigand (eds), 
Public opinion and Europe: National identities and the European integration process (Brus-
sels: Peter Lang, HIIG), pp. BEK–DB.
20 Pinto and Lobo (note BC), p. BDB.
21 Magalhães, chapter D.
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increasing support for policy integration at the European level 
was grounded in the perception that the European political sys-
tem was more e@cient than Portuguese authorities when it came 
to enacting public policies.
Before moving to the section on national political elites’ at-
titudes, we should remember the following lessons from the Por-
tuguese experience. First, Portugal is a remarkable example of an 
elitist approach to European accession and integration. A key 
indicator is the absence of any referendum so far on European 
issues. Unlike the situation in most non-founding EU member-
states, Portuguese citizens never had a direct say on the European 
polity, neither before accession in BCDE nor on the many treaties 
authorizing the delegation of more policy domains to the Euro-
pean level. 
Curiously, since BCCF the Portuguese constitution has called for 
a mandatory referendum to decide upon the creation of autono-
mous sub-national authorities at the regional level, encompassing 
the transfer of a set of policy domains from the capital. In other 
words, a referendum has to be called if elites in Lisbon decide to 
delegate to a regional agent in Oporto, but such constraints are 
absent when the agent is outside Portugal, whether in Brussels or 
in Frankfurt.
Second, Portugal has been a remarkable case of executive elit-
ism in EU matters, before, during and after accession. On the 
one hand, governments have dominated the European legisla-
tive process at the national level, on the other hand, the parlia-
ment has traditionally exerted weak control over governments 
and lacked the resources to deal with EU aAairs.22 )is concen-
tration of power in the executive seems to have been eased by 
electoral results and the distribution of parliamentary seats in 
22 Resende and Paulo (note F).
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Portugal. From BCDE to HIIC, governments were for BK years backed 
by highly disciplined parliamentary majorities (including BH years 
of single party majorities). At no time since accession have the 
mainstream PS and PSD shared less than two-thirds of the par-
liamentary seats, which has paved the way both for smooth con-
stitutional reforms when needed to enact the European treaties 
and for a weaker parliamentary opposition to executive manoeu-
vres in those critical moments calling for “national unity”(e.g. the 
negotiation and approval of the Maastricht Treaty or the eAorts 
to join the Economic and Monetary Union). 
Portuguese governing elites seem to share the notion Portugal 
has to be fully pro-European, and that the government is a kind 
of guarantor of Portugal’s pro-European stance. )is may well be 
the reason the CDS had to abandon its anti-European position 
as a condition of entering into a coalition government with the 
PSD in HIIH. )is also might be the reason why the European 
manifestos issued by parties when in government never criticize 
any aspect of European integration.23
In such an executive-centred member state (within the frame-
work of such an executive-centred EU), parliament has a limited 
decision-making role in respect of European aAairs. Why, then, 
study the attitudes of parliamentary elites towards the EU? 
)ere are at least four reasons not to disregard the stances of 
national legislators. First, the national parliament, even when 
imperfect, is the best national proxy for political diversity. Map-
ping the attitudes of representatives and comparing them with 
those of their constituents is quite an interesting challenge for 
those interested in the theory and practice of representation. )e 
23 E. R. Sanches and J. S. Pereira, “Which Europe do the Portuguese parties want? 
Identity, representation and scope of governance in the Portuguese Euromanifestos 
(BCDF–HIIG)”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society BB, H (HIBI), pp. BDJ–HII.
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attitudes of the parliamentary elites may be approached through 
alternative means, for instance, through the analysis of party man-
ifestos or of the legislative behaviour of deputies. Nonetheless, 
these methods do not fully grasp individual level attitudes, which 
we believe might diAer from the viewpoints of the party cen-
tral o@ce expressed either through manifestos or through voting 
behaviour imposed on representatives through the mechanics of 
party discipline. )rough interviewing deputies in a rather uncon-
strained context, we believe we can get closer to the way national 
representatives think (even if their opinions have no immediate 
political consequences).
Second, a national parliament is still an accurate barometer of 
political elite behaviour and of the extent of its internal grade of 
integration or consensus over important issues. It is the arena in 
which systematic and institutionalized political competition takes 
place between elections. Since the ideological scope of the Portu-
guese parliament is quite diverse, any significant underlying social 
or ideological tension will probably soon appear in the parliamen-
tary arena as a form of political conflict. 
)ird, the national parliament is a crucial recruitment pool 
both for national government and for the European Parliament 
elite. Also many senior national representatives had previously 
held o@ces in national government or in European institutions. 
Monitoring the individual attitudes of national representatives 
might be a useful proxy of the political elite as a whole, and it may 
help trace the inter-institutional flows of ideas and of individual 
mental predispositions towards the EU. Furthermore, since main-
stream parties have tended to be less rigid from a programmatic 
point of view, while often keeping silence on European issues that 
are currently not on the political agenda, the record of the at-
titudinal trends of the party members in parliament could be a 
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helpful tool for predicting the possible stances taken by the party 
when those issues (re)emerge on the political agenda.
Fourth, while parliaments do not play a crucial role in the 
everyday business of European politics, in some critical circum-
stances—when a strong parliamentary majority is absent—they 
do emerge as central institutions, even when issues related to the 
EU are at stake. )e resignations of José Sócrates in Portugal and 
of Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi in HIBB, both largely as a consequence 
of the European sovereign debt crisis, are recent and sound exam-
ples of such events.
Elite Attitudes towards the EU
Elite surveys are rare in Portugal, and to our knowledge the 
HIIF and HIIC IntUne surveys are the most comprehensive on 
European issues to date.24 Within the framework of the IntUne 
project, BKH interviews were conducted with Portuguese deputies.25 
)e questionnaires were structured along the lines of the “com-
pound” model of European citizenship, which refers to the idea 
that European citizenship is an amalgamation of two separate but 
intertwined dimensions: an indirect citizenship derived from the 
national citizenship of an EU member state; and a direct one that 
originates in and is established by the existence of a system of 
European institutions. According to this model, European citi-
zenship is further characterized by a horizontal dimension that 
defines the membership linkage with the European polity (iden-
tity) and by two vertical dimensions that concern the relationship 
24 )is research was funded by a grant from the IntUne project (Integrated and 
United: A quest for Citizenship in an ever-closer Europe) financed by the Sixth Frame-
work Programme of the European Union, Priority F, “Citizens and governance in a 
knowledge-based society” (CITJ-CT-HIIK-KBJGHB).
25 Both samples were selected through a quota sampling procedure, the main cri-
teria of which were party group and seniority.
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between European citizens and EU authorities (representation 
and scope of governance).26
Here we will present and discuss descriptive data on these 
three major dimensions of European-ness. )e topics covered 
range from the degree of attachment to diAerent territorial com-
munities and the basic elements considered as constituting Euro-
pean and national identities, the levels of trust in European and 
Portuguese institutions, the assessment of the future EU institu-
tional design and attitudes towards EU common policy areas.27 
Where possible, our results will be compared with the findings 
from opinion polls and the analysis of European manifestos in 
Portugal, as well as with the results of the elite surveys of two 
26 Cotta and Isernia (note B).
27 Results of the HIIF survey have already been reported in Moreira et al., “At-
titudes of the Portuguese elites towards the European Union”, in N. Conti, M. Cotta 
and P. T. Almeida (eds), Perspectives of national elites on European citizenship: A south 
European view (New York, NY: Routledge, HIBH), pp. KF–FF. We expect the data to be 
quite consistent across waves, given the fact the composition of the Portuguese national 
parliament was basically the same in HIIF and in HIIC.
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S1/0<.: IntUne Elite Survey in Portugal (HIIF; HIIC).
N17.: Respondents were asked to answer the following question: “Some say European 
unification should be strengthened, others say it already has gone too far. What is your 
opinion? Please indicate your views using a ten-point scale. On this scale zero means 
unification has already gone too far and ten means it should be strengthened. What 
number on this scale best describes your position?’
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groups of countries: southern European member-states and the 
IntUne group.28
We begin by mapping Portuguese deputies’ attitudes according 
to a classic indicator of general support for European integra-
tion (Table H.B). With a mean support for European integration 
of around E.E, Portuguese deputies are in line with the average for 
legislators in all of the countries taking part in the IntUne survey 
(E.E), and below the F.K observed among deputies from southern 
European countries. 
Identity
In order to explore identity—the horizontal dimension of Eu-
ropean citizenship that comprises the links of citizens with their 
political communities—we analysed rates of elite attachment to 
diAerent territorial levels and their understanding of what defines 
national and supra-national identity (Table H.H).
Both in HIIF and in HIIC more than CI per cent of Portu-
guese deputies considered themselves to be attached to the EU, 
their country and their region. Variation in territorial identities is 
therefore not a question of attachment or non-attachment, but of 
degree of attachment.
With respect to the degree of territorial attachment, we found 
Portuguese legislators consider themselves strongly attached to 
Portugal as a country, and more than half feel strongly attached to 
their town or village. A total of nine out of every ten deputies felt 
very attached to their country (as opposed to only four out of ten 
28 )e group of four southern European member states is composed by Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. )e IntUne group, in which elite interviews took place, also 
includes six Western European member states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom), seven post-communist member states (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia) and by Serbia, 
which applied to join the EU in December HIIC. 
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feeling a strong attachment to Europe). )ese results are consist-
ent with another indicator of the HIIC survey. When asked if they 
regarded themselves (a) as European only, (b) as Portuguese only, 
(c) as European and Portuguese or (d) as Portuguese and Euro-
pean, four out of five Portuguese deputies regarded themselves as 
Portuguese (first) and European (then). 
For most members of the elite European identity seems then 
to be “second order” compared to national identity.29 )is is also 
consistent with the weaker presence of references to European 
identity in European manifestos compared to references to na-
tional identity.30 
29 G. Delanty, “Models of citizenship: Defining European identity and citizen-
ship”, Citizenship Studies B, J (BCCF), pp. HDK–JIJ.
30 Sanches and Pereira (note HJ).
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S1/0<.: IntUne Elite Survey in Portugal (HIIF; HIIC)
GKP107/9/.:. P1?575<3? E?57.:
)e structure of territorial allegiances among Portuguese legis-
lators follows the same pattern of the southern European member 
states and the IntUne countries, albeit with slightly—but con-
sistently—higher numbers than the average of their (southern) 
European colleagues for all levels of identity.31
When compared to the public, elites report much stronger at-
tachment to all of the polities considered, even if the order of al-
legiances (i.e. to country first, then to town/region and finally to 
the EU) remains unchanged. Indeed, the IntUne public opinion 
surveys show that no more than FI per cent of Portuguese citizens 
feel very attached to their country, whereas only HK per cent feel a 
strong attachment to the EU.
Deputies were also asked about the substantive elements 
deemed essential for being Portuguese or European (Table H.J). 
Despite the small number of cases at the country level, results in 
Portugal were once again consistent between HIIF and HIIC. 
A first glance at the data gives rise to two related inferences. 
First, there seems to be a robust collinearity between elements of 
national and European identity that are equal or very similar in 
nature. Looking at the extremes of the scales, mastering a lan-
guage of the polity and being Christian are the most and the least 
important elements of both Portuguese-ness and European-ness, 
respectively. Second, all elements—except for mastery of languag-
es in HIIF—are consistently more important in defining Portu-
guese-ness than they are for defining European-ness. Together, 
these findings seem to maintain the close connection between a 
national identity and a secondary and derivative European iden-
tity among Portuguese elites. 
31 )e results for (southern) Europe and for public opinion may be omitted for 
the reason of textual economy. Full access to these results is available by contacting 
ruivojp@fcsh.unl.pt.
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S1/0<.:: IntUne Elite Survey in Portugal (HIIF; HIIC)
N17.: Table shows results for both national identity (upper part) and European iden-
tity (lower part)
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In order to make further sense of the data, we propose classify-
ing the elements of identity as follows: 
a) Strong majority elements: )ose considered important by 
at least FK per cent of respondents and very important by 
at least KI per cent. In this segment we find respect for 
laws and institutions, being a member of the community 
and mastery of language, encompassing both Portuguese 
and European identities. Holding citizenship status and 
participating in national legislative elections also fall in 
this segment, but only for national identity. 
b) Considerable majority elements: )ose deemed im-
portant by at least KI per cent of respondents and very 
important by HK-KI per cent. )is group comprises the 
sharing of cultural traditions (for both identities), place of 
birth and having Portuguese parents (for national iden-
tity only) and participation in elections to the European 
Parliament (for European identity). 
c) Weak majority elements: )ose regarded important by at 
least KI per cent of respondents and very important by 
less than HK per cent. Here we find place of birth and fam-
ily descent (for European identity only)
d) Minority elements: )ose considered important by less 
than KI per cent of respondents. Being a Christian is the 
only characteristic in this segment, for both national and 
European identities.
Conceptually, these elements of identity may also be placed 
in two categories: a) ascribed identity, i.e. inherited attributes 
that are not dependent upon the respondent’s will, such as birth-
place and family descent (and, to a certain extent, religion); and 
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b) achieved identity, i.e. attributes dependent on the respond-
ent’s actions, such as culture, respect for laws, sentiments and lan-
guage.32 
A closer look at our data suggest that, on the whole, for Por-
tuguese deputies achieved components are more important than 
ascribed ones in respect of both Portuguese and European identi-
ties. Nonetheless, ascribed components (birthplace and family de-
scent) are significantly more important for national identity than 
for European identity. 
In order to assess the congruence of the ascribed and achieved 
components of identity at the individual level, Moreira et al. ran 
a factor analysis for the HIIF Portuguese elite sample.33 )e re-
sults confirmed an ascribed component to European identity, 
with birthplace and family descent being parts of the same factor. 
Likewise, there seemed to be an achieved dimension in which “re-
spect for law and institutions” and “feeling European” were associ-
ated. A large and positive interaction with religious and cultural 
attributes was also found, suggesting that a significant propor-
tion of deputies associated the cultural dimension of European 
identity with Christianity. It is interesting to note, however, that 
this was not the case with the cultural dimension of national iden-
tity.
With respect to the components of national identity, birth-
place and family descent formed part of ascribed identity. Among 
the Portuguese elites, the feeling of being Portuguese, the mastery 
of the Portuguese language and the sharing of Portuguese cul-
tural traditions—all elements that constituted achieved identity 
32 )e theoretical underpinnings of these concepts may be found in R. Linton, 
Study of man (New York, NY: D. Appleton-Century, BCJE), and in T. Parsons, &e social 
system (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, BCKB). 
33 Moreira et al. (note HF).
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on the European scale—were also positively contained into the 
same factor, which suggests there is also an achieved component 
to national identity. 
Overall, and according to the findings of Jerez-Mir el al., 
which compares data from the HIIF IntUne elite and mass sur-
veys, our results show that the attitude of Portuguese deputies is 
in line with the national representatives in a number of European 
countries.34 Indeed, political elites across Europe seem to favour 
achieved components over ascribed ones, which means they have 
a concept of national and European identities that could extend 
34 M. Jerez-Mir, J. Real Dato and R. Vázquez Garcia, “Identity and representa-
tion in the perceptions of political elites and public opinion: A comparison between 
southern and post-communist central-eastern Europe”, Europe-Asia Studies EB (HIIC), 
pp. CGJ–EE.
T3>?. H.G 
Trust in EU Institutions  
(,)
(**$ (**"
Trust in the European Parliament
     Mean +."' (.'!
     Standard deviation %.!& %.!&
     N 1/ 02
Trust in the European Commission
     Mean +."& +.(+
     Standard deviation %.!( %.$%
     N 1/ 02
Trust in the European Council of Ministers
     Mean (.%$ +.#'
     Standard deviation %.&# %.'*
     N 1/ 02
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citizenship beyond the closed boundaries of the jus sanguinis and 
of the jus soli. 
)e deputies’ attitudes do not coincide completely with those 
of their constituents, however. In the HIIC citizens’ survey, for in-
stance, birthplace, family descent and Christianity were deemed 
very important factors of national identity by more than KI, GI and 
JI per cent of respondents, respectively. )e higher scores these 
elements obtain have narrowed the gap between the achieved and 
the ascribed components of national identity among the popula-
tion—a gap that gets narrower still in relation to European iden-
tity.
Representation
In this section, we analyse the second dimension of European 
citizenship, representation, is part of the vertical relationship be-
tween citizens and political institutions. On this topic, the IntUne 
survey includes two inter-related questions, the first designed to 
assess the degree of legislators’ trust in the EU’s three primary 
institutions—the European Parliament, European Commission 
and European Council of Ministers (Table H.G), and a second to 
capture their prescriptive stances in respect of the EU’s future in-
stitutional development (Table H.K). 
With respect to the first dimension, the aggregate level of trust 
does not vary greatly between institutions. Nevertheless, both in 
HIIF and in HIIC the European Commission scores lower than 
the European Parliament and the European Council. A wider 
standard deviation in the level of trust in the commission also 
indicates that support for this institution is more polarized. In-
deed, the widest gap between parties in HIIF is found in the 
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average trust in the commission, which was F.JB among PSD dep-
uties and B.KI among PCP and Left Bloc deputies.35
)ese findings are in line with those found both in southern 
Europe and in Europe in general, where national representatives 
tend to trust the parliamentary institution more than they trust 
the executive institution. As for the population, the mean trust 
of Portuguese citizens in HIIF was also higher for the European 
35 Moreira et al. (note HF).
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Parliament than it was for the commission. On this particular 
point the Portuguese deputies and citizens agreed, unlike else-
where in Europe.36
All in all mean trust levels both in Portugal and in (southern) 
Europe were never lower than K.K and never higher than E.G for all 
three institutions. )is means that EU institutions received a mild 
degree of approval from Portuguese deputies. At the aggregate 
level, these results are consistent with another important indicator 
relating to the representation dimension of European citizenship: 
satisfaction with democracy in the EU. In HIIC, almost five out 
of ten deputies were somewhat satisfied with the way democracy 
worked in the EU, while only one out of ten were highly satisfied. 
When asked to prescribe future institutional developments in 
the EU political system,  four out of ten deputies strongly agree 
that member states should retain a central role, while three out of 
ten would strongly support an extension of majority voting in the 
European Council. Both opinions gather more than EI per cent 
of support (either strong or not), which may sound contradic-
tory given that majority voting in the European Council plays 
against the centrality of member-states. What might explain 
this contradiction is the fact that the mode of decision-making 
in the EU, which can be simplified across lines of (a) national 
decision-making, (b) unanimity and (c) majority voting, has 
not been approached consistently by Portuguese par-
ties in their manifestos. Lacking specific guidelines 
on this issue, deputies from the mainstream parties might feel 
free to express their diverse, and perhaps contradictory, personal 
preferences. 
36 For a closer look at these cross-country comparisons, see Jerez-Mir, Real Dato 
and Vásquez García (note JG).
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As for the other two institutions, only one out of ten deputies 
strongly agrees that the commission should become the true gov-
ernment of the EU, while five out of ten advocate strengthening 
the powers of the European Parliament. At the aggregate level, 
then, the desire for a better future for the European Parliament, 
rather than for the commission, seems to correlate with the de-
gree of trust in these institutions.
As Moreira et al. noted, these attitudes in respect of future 
institutional scenarios tend to follow the lines of mainstream/
T3>?. H.E 
EU Policies Over the Next !) Years  
(,)
(**$ (**"
Unified tax system for Europe
     Strongly in favour !+.$ !#.!
     Somewhat in favour +(.$ $+.#
     N 01 0/
Common system of social security
     Strongly in favour %%.* !".#
     Somewhat in favour (%.& +'.+
     N 03 02
Single foreign policy
     Strongly in favour $'.* $#."
     Somewhat in favour $+.& '".$
     N 1/ 02
More help for regions in di'culties
     Strongly in favour #+.& *&.'
     Somewhat in favour %+.& !*.'
     N 1/ 02
S1/0<.: IntUne Elite Survey in Portugal (HIIF; HIIC).
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radical party competition.37 )e closer one gets to the centre of 
the party system, the greater is the deputies’ support for a strong 
European Commission and the lesser their enthusiasm for the 
idea that member states remain the central actors. However, in re-
lation to the European Parliament, the divide extended along the 
left-right axis of the political spectrum, with the right less eager 
to strengthen the powers of the parliament.
Compared with their peers in (southern) Europe, Portuguese 
deputies show quite similar patterns of support for member states 
to retain a central role, for strengthening the European Parliament 
and for extending majority voting within the European Council. 
)e most interesting diAerences are found between Portuguese 
deputies and their southern European counterparts, with the lat-
ter showing significantly less support for the role of member states 
and significantly more support for the role of the commission. 
Scope of Governance
)e third dimension of European citizenship—scope of gov-
ernance—is also part of the  vertical relationship between citizens 
and political institutions, but it is specifically concerned with the 
substantive content of that relationship, i.e. to the policies dealt 
with by political institutions. For the time being, there is a hand-
ful of very important policies still not delegated by the member-
states to the EU institutions or that EU institutions have not fully 
developed. Asking whether these policies should be Europeanized 
over the next BI years is a further way to approach attitudes to-
wards the nature of the Europolity. )e set of four policies under 
survey comprises two traditionally belonging to the realm of sov-
ereign state functions (tax system and foreign policy) and another 
37 Moreira et al. (note HF).
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two related specifically to wealth redistribution functions among 
populations and regions (social security and regional policy).
)e results on this topic (Table H.E) show that further integra-
tion of each of the four policies into the European level enjoys the 
support of at least two-thirds of the national legislators. However, 
the degree of support varies significantly according to the policy 
in question. Roughly one-fifth of deputies were strongly in favour 
of both a unified tax system and a common system of social secu-
rity, while four out of ten were sharply supportive of a common 
foreign policy and eight out of ten called strongly for more help 
for those regions experiencing di@culties. 
Apart from the consensual and instrumental stance favour-
ing more help for regions in di@culties—which is unsurprisingly 
more common among recipients of structural funds, such as Por-
tugal and its southern and post-communist European peers—
national deputies are still doubtful about whether more policies 
should be delegated to the EU. 
)e path towards a common foreign policy seems quite 
smoother. Support for this comes mainly from deputies in main-
stream centre-left and centre-right parties,38 which may be a con-
sequence of the fact both PS and PSD regularly call for the EU 
to have a stronger role in the international arena.39 Moreover, for-
eign policy is not such an important issue for Portuguese deputies: 
rather, it is an area in which the domestic parliament plays a more 
limited role than the executive and even than the president.  
When it comes to the common tax and social security 
systems—policy areas in which member states remain central, 
and where, consequently, parliaments still have an important 
role—deputies are much less eager to give up their competences. 
38 Moreira et al. (note HF)
39 Sanches and Pereira (note HJ).
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No taxation without representation is a principle every deputy 
is aware of, and giving way the final say on key budgetary issues 
could result in a hollowed representation and the demise of the 
parliamentary institution as presently exists.  
Conclusions
Parliamentary deputies in Portugal are supportive of European 
integration, but the degree of their support—which is close to the 
mean for the deputies of all EU member states—is not as high 
as the support found among deputies of other southern Euro-
pean member states. As in many other countries, the mainstream 
centre-left and centre-right parties in Portugal and their deputies 
have been solid reserves of political support for integration since 
the country’s accession in BCDE.
)e underpinnings of the attitudinal relationship between na-
tional political elites and the EU may be analysed through the 
concept of citizenship, and in particular through three of its di-
mensions: identity, representation and scope of governance. 
In respect of identity, deputies feel themselves to be Portuguese 
first, then members of their local/regional community and finally 
European. )e sense of attachment to the EU is complementary 
and derived from the sense of attachment to the national commu-
nity. )e elements defining Portuguese-ness and European-ness 
converge among deputies, who tend to value achieved charac-
teristics (language, respect for laws and institutions and sense 
of belonging) over ascribed components (birthplace and family 
descent). Political elites thus take citizenship beyond the narrow, 
traditional criteria of jus sanguinis and jus soli, and instead opt for 
an inclusive concept of both national and European identities. In 
doing so, they diAer slightly from their fellow citizens, for whom 
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the proportions of achieved and ascribed components are not so 
unbalanced. 
In respect of representation, deputies tend only to be mildly 
satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU and tend not 
to display any deep trust for the European Council, the Euro-
pean Commission or the European Parliament. )is suggests a 
weak link between national parliaments and parliamentary elites, 
on the one hand, and European political institutions (and Eu-
ropean level elites), on the other. However, there is a distinction 
worth exploring: while the greatest amount of trust and support 
for strengthening institutional powers is placed in the European 
Parliament, the European Commission enjoys the least amount 
of trust and is the institution that deputies are most reluctant to 
give more power. 
)is seems to suggest there is an underlying critique of nation-
al legislators towards the executive elitism in Europe discussed at 
the beginning of this chapter. Indeed, deputies are aware of the 
role played by executive institutions in European politics: the gov-
ernment at the national level and the commission at the Europe-
an level. When asked about the eAective channels for influencing 
EU policy-making, national government and institutional lobby-
ing within the EU (and the European Commission is the home of 
European lobbying par excellence) were deemed the most eAective 
channels, while the national parliament was considered the least 
eAective. Another indicator of the malaise of national deputies 
vis-à-vis current executive elitism is that while strongly support-
ing the existence of an EU president (a position equivalent to the 
current president of the European Council), they disagree with 
this position being in the gift of the European Council, as has 
been the case since the Lisbon Treaty came into eAect. Indeed, KB 
per cent of deputies call for the position to be directly elected by 
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all EU citizens, while JJ per cent prefer the post to be filled by a 
vote of the European Parliament. In fact, only BE per cent agree 
with the current process.
When asked about any future extension of the EU’s scope of 
governance, Portuguese deputies show a considerable degree of 
interest-based pragmatism. )ey agree there should be more EU 
help for regions in di@culties (Portugal remains a net recipient 
state), but they are just as firm in their desire to close the door to 
the Europeanization of some national public policies, specifically 
those related to tax and welfare redistribution. 
)e HIIF and HIIC snapshot of Portuguese deputies’ views 
have both uncovered a wide range of supportive attitudes towards 
the European Union. However, the surveys on which this chapter 
has been based were conducted prior to the banking collapse and 
European sovereign debt crisis. 
Times have changed, and the challenge now is to understand 
how the European attitudes of national deputies will perform un-
der the stress of political and economic crises. Will the deputies’ 
weaker sense of European-ness and their critical acquiescence to 
European executive politics and the delegation of policy to Brus-
sels survive in the current climate? Recent data from Eurobarom-
eter seem to suggest that citizens might no longer believe the EU 
is a good thing from which Portugal has benefited? If that is the 
case, how will the elites react? Will they leap on the bandwagon 
with their fellow citizens, or will they act as the guardians of Por-
tuguese European-ness? In Portugal, as across Europe, this has 
become a matter of crucial interest for political research, and for 
the very future of the European polity. 

Governing from Lisbon or 
Governing from Brussels? 
Models and Tendencies of 





)e phenomenon of European integration is one of the 
clearest examples of transformation of political processes in post-
war Europe. According to Nugent and Paterson, “the single most 
striking feature of government and politics in Western Europe in 
the modern era has been the creation of a European-level political 
system”.1 Moreover, this eAect is also evident in terms of political 
discourse, as the perception of an impact of the European Union 
(EU) on governance processes permeates at the elite, media and 
mass levels.
National government is one of the areas in which adaptation at 
the European level has been most apparent. )is is evident both 
in existing theoretical models and in empirical studies. In theo-
retical terms, the sharing of responsibilities and/or governmental 
authority with the supra-national level (amongst others) has led 
some authors to propose a model of national state hollowing out, 
as public policy processes involve a larger number of agents.2 As 
1 N. Nugent and W. Paterson, “)e political system of the European Union”, in 
J. E. S. Hayward and A. Menon (eds), Governing Europe (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, HIIJ), p. CH.
2 R. Jessop, “)e transition to post-Fordism and the Schumpeterian workfare 
state”, in R. Burrows and B. Loader (eds), Towards a post-Fordist welfare? (London: 
Routledge, BCCG), pp. BJ–JF.
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Hall puts it, “sovereignty has little meaning in a context where 
the European Union has the authority to enforce regulations 
on its member states, without the agreement of their national 
governments”.3
With regard to the loss of power of nation states, even the least 
pessimistic authors do not deny there has been a transformation. 
While emphasizing the central role of national governments in 
EU governance, Müller and Wright admit they are “more con-
strained”, with “their actions [m]ore indirect, more discreet and 
more bartered”.4 Comparative studies at the European level tend 
to confirm this pattern. Müller confirms that national govern-
ments experienced significant transformations in their roles 
throughout the BCDIs, although—as he also notes—these trans-
formations involved a change in the role of nation-states rather 
than their demise.5
Research on governance processes in Portugal is relatively 
scarce. However, existing studies point to an impact of EU mem-
bership on domestic policy-making.6 Equally, it is relatively easy 
to discern the apparent eAects of European integration at the lev-
el of political discourse, with the European level being frequently 
used as a benchmark for economic development and national 
policy practices.
3 P. Hall, “Institutions and the evolution of European democracy”, in Hayward 
and Menon (note B), pp. B–BG.
4 W. C. Müller and V. Wright, “Reshaping the state in Western Europe: )e lim-
its to retreat”, in W. C. Müller and V. Wright (eds), &e state in Western Europe: Retreat 
or redefinition? (London: Frank Cass, BCCG), pp. B–BB.
5 W. Müller, “)e changing European state”, in Hayward and Menon (note B), pp. 
JEC–FC.
6 J. Magone, “Portugal”, in H. Kassim, G. Peters and V. Wright (eds), &e national 
coordination of EU policy: &e domestic level (Oxford: Oxford University Press, HIII), pp. 
BGB–EI; J. Magone, &e developing place of Portugal in the European Union (New Bruns-
wick, NJ: Transaction, HIIG); M. C. Lobo, Governar em democracia (Lisbon: Imprensa de 
Ciências Sociais, HIIK).
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)is chapter aims to analyse both the extent and process of the 
Europeanization of executive power in Portugal, with particular 
emphasis on the post-accession period. )ree main conclusions 
emerge: first, executive power in Portugal has not escaped the 
more general processes of transformation identified in compara-
tive studies; second, the Portuguese experience tends to confirm 
the findings of Maurer, Mittag and Wessels, that European in-
tegration processes tend to generate an adaptation by national 
institutions to European demands rather than fundamental 
transformations;7 and third, the Portuguese adaptation process 
paradoxically appears to contradict Schmidt’s prediction that cen-
tralized and unitary states will experience a more di@cult process 
of adaptation.8
As will be shown, this apparent paradox is accounted by the na-
tional executive’s capacity to adapt to supra-national constraints. 
Specifically, the process of European integration has generated 
new opportunity structures at the domestic level, eAectively in-
creasing the room for manoeuvre of the national executive. In 
large measure, this derives from the executive’s monopoly of rep-
resentation at the European Union level, which eAectively makes 
it the “o@cial interpreter” of EU decisions. In this sense, the Eu-
ropean level operates as an important additional “instrument” in 
the executive’s armoury against domestic opposition.
7 A. Maurer, J. Mittag and V. Wessels, “National systems’ adaptation to the EU 
system: Trends, oAers and constraints”, in B. Kohler-Koch (ed.), Linking EU and na-
tional governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, HIIJ), pp. KJ–DH.
8 V. Schmidt, “Federalism and state governance in the European Union and the 
United States: An institutional perspective”, in K. Nicolaidis and R. Howse (eds), &e 
federal vision: Legitimacy and levels of governance in the United States and the European 
Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, HIIB), pp. JJK–KG.
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What is Europeanization,  
and How can it be Measured?9
)e concept of Europeanization is an increasing presence in 
the social sciences literature. According to Featherstone, between 
BCDB and BCCK the social sciences citation index contained JH arti-
cles that had Europeanization as a subject term: from BCCE to HIIB 
this number more than doubled to DG.10 )is increased interest 
reflects a frequently ignored aspect of the European integration 
process, and consequently also of its eAects—that it is a recent 
process, and one that is being constructed and reconstructed. As 
such, the EU is “fluid, ambiguous and hybrid”, and research into 
its eAects cannot escape the constraints of the “Neurath’s boat” 
that is the EU, with inevitable impact on the Europeanization of 
domestic political institutions.11
In terms of definition, here we remain close to that initially 
used by Ladrech (BCCG). We are interested in analysing Europe-
anization as a process through which member-states are, due to 
the European level, obliged to alter their structures, policies, for-
mal regulations and consolidated practices. Moreover, we seek to 
analyse the “adaptation of institutional settings in the broadest 
sense (of rules, procedures, norms, practices) at diAerent politi-
cal levels in response to the dynamics of integration”.12 )us, the 
9 )is section is a revised version of a previously published analysis. C. Jalali, 
“A Europa como razão ou como desculpa? A europeização das instituições políticas 
nacionais”, in P. Lains and M. C. Lobo (eds), Em nome da Europa: Portugal em mudança, 
!")#–(**# (Lisbon: Principia, HIIF), pp. BFJ–CI.
10 K. Featherstone, “Introduction: In the name of ‘Europe’”, in K. Featherstone 
and C. M. Radaelli (eds), &e politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, HIIJ), p. K.
11 J. P. Olsen, “European challenges to the nation state”, in B. Steunenberg and F. 
van Vught (eds), Political institutions and public policy: Perspectives on European decision-
making (Amsterdam: Kluwer, BCCF), p. BEK.
12 Featherstone and Radaelli (note BI), p. BC.
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Europeanization of institutions becomes a matter of extent rather 
than of nature.13
Giulani adopts a much wider definition of Europeanization, 
one that includes the “autonomization” of the European govern-
mental arena from the preferences of member-states.14 To the ex-
tent this avoids causal circularity, this dimension is legitimate for 
reaching an understanding of Europeanization as a phenomenon: 
national governments are, after all, an important part of European 
governance processes. Müller notes that national governments re-
main privileged actors in the European decision-making process 
while Heritier shows both the extent of choice national govern-
ments have within the EU and how they are able to adopt innova-
tive methods in order to overcome decision deadlocks.15
However, this study departs from the assumption European 
level structures and regulations are eAectively independent of na-
tional preferences, analysing Europeanization from a “top-down” 
perspective. )is is a legitimate research strategy in the analysis of 
Europeanization processes.16 In the Portuguese case, this assump-
tion is all the more acceptable given the country’s late accession 
to the European Union and its position on the EU’s political and 
economic periphery.
)e growing literature on the Europeanization of political in-
stitutions also integrates the much wider debate over neo-institu-
tionalism (or neo-institutionalisms) as a methodology in political 
science. Börzel and Risse identify two competing methods of 
13 M. Giulani, “Europeanization in comparative perspective: Institutional fit and 
national adaptation”, in Featherstone and Radaelli (note BI), p. BJK.
14 Guilani (note BJ).
15 Müller (note K); A. Héritier, Policy-making and diversity in Europe: Escape from 
deadlock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, BCCC).
16 See, for example, T. Börzel and T. Risse, “Conceptualizing the domestic impact 
of Europe”, in Featherstone and Radaelli (note BI), pp. KF–DI.
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conceptualizing Europeanization, in terms of rational choice and 
sociological neo-institutionalism.17 With respect to the former, 
several authors have adopted Tsebelis’ veto player model to ex-
plain domestic adaptation processes to the European level.18 )e 
model here is that the European level generates new opportu-
nity structures within which agents can act, with the former in 
turn influenced by both the number of domestic veto players and 
by existing formal institutions. As such, the dispersal of power 
within the political system—both in terms of formal and infor-
mal veto players—limits the capacity for adaptation,19 whereas the 
existence of institutions that can take advantage of the European 
level (for example, regions that are able to negotiate directly with 
Brussels without going through their national government) can 
accelerate adaptation. In terms of sociological neo-institutional-
ism, pressure for adaptation is a result of transformations at the 
political culture level. )us, the rise of “European policies, norms 
and…collective understandings”, combined with the presence of 
“change agents” and/or informal cooperative institutions, leads to 
the development of new identities, the adoption of new norms 
and, consequently, domestic adaptation and change.20
Here we adopt the former type of analysis, as it is easier to fit it 
into “consequentialist logic”. In the meantime, it is worth noting 
the importance of the “goodness of fit”, which is interpreted here 
as indicating the alignment between the European and national 
levels. As several authors have noted, the idea of Europeanization 
17 Börzel and Risse (note BE), pp. KF–DI.
18 G. Tsebelis, Veto players: How political institutions work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, HIIH).
19 C. Radaelli, “)e Europeanization of public policy”, in Featherstone and Ra-
daelli (note BI), pp. HF–KE.
20 Börzel and Risse (note BE), pp. KF–C.
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requires a de-alignment or “misfit” of these two levels: “there is 
no need for domestic changes” if pressures from the European 
level align perfectly with the domestic modus operandi.21 )us, 
“adaptational pressures are generated by the fact that the emerg-
ing European polity encompasses structures of authoritative deci-
sion making which might clash with national structures of policy 
making”.22 As Börzel and Risse note, this can result in two types 
of “misfit”: in terms of public policies (when the member-states 
do not comply with European legislation); and that which inter-
ests us here—institutional de-alignment—to the extent the Eu-
ropean level “challeng[es] domestic rules and procedures and the 
collective understandings attached to them”.
In terms of research, the causal relationship between the pres-
sure to change emanating from the European level and the do-
mestic level’s substantive adaptation is not easy to determine, thus 
becoming a sort of “missing link”.23 In the absence of formal in-
stitutional transformation—as in Portugal—this “missing link” 
becomes all the more di@cult to find.
)us, two related questions emerge. )e first is regarding the 
literature’s often vague definition of the concept of Europeani-
zation. )e fact that the concept can take on several meanings 
results in it being used to characterize a relatively large set of 
phenomena.24 Because of this, Europeanization as a concept can 
lose discriminatory power and much of its analytical utility. )e 
second question is concerned with the counter-factual to Euro-
peanization. )e existence of changes that are contemporary with 
21 Börzel and Risse (note BE), p. EB.
22 Börzel and Risse (note BE).
23 K. Goetz, “European integration and national executives: A cause in search of 
an eAect?”, West European Politics HJ, G (HIII), pp. HBB–JB.
24 Radaelli (note BC).
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European integration does not of itself imply a process of Euro-
peanization. As such, the research strategy and the measurement 
of the eAects of Europeanization must be capable of isolating the 
impact of European integration vis-à-vis a whole series of other 
factors that can also influence the patterns of institutional adapta-
tion (such as internal pressures, social change, globalization proc-
esses, amongst others). )e results are thus influenced not only 
by the degree of pressure emanating from the EU, but also by 
the extent of de-alignment between the European and domestic 
levels, and by extra-EU dimensions also.
'e Europeanization of Executive Power:  
'e 'eoretical Context
One of the most important aspects of the analysis of the Euro-
pean integration process is its eAect on national executive power. 
)e debate about the existence of “new forms of governance” is 
a good example of this impact. )e literature on “governance” 
re-conceptualizes government processes, outlining the need for 
a new “map” to help us understand its modern forms.25 Stoker 
suggests this new map will involve an analysis of governance as a 
process involving a range of institutions and agents (that may or 
may not emerge from the state) and with ever less clear bounda-
ries between the roles of diAerent agents.26 Within this new map, 
the European dimension is one of the more important new arenas 
for governance and decision-making.
25 R. Rhodes, “What is new about governance and why does it matter?”, in Hay-
ward and Menon (note B), pp. EB–H.
26 G. Stoker, “Governance as a theory: Five propositions”, International Social Sci-
ence Journal KI, BKK (BCCD), pp. BF–HD.
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)e impact of the EU also ties in with the popular concept of 
the “hollowed out state”.27 )is concept suggests that functions 
that are traditionally performed by nation states are transferred 
to other institutions and levels, thereby creating a national state 
with an essentially unaltered “external façade”, but within which 
there is ever less content. In this context, Europeanization is a 
good example of this transfer of responsibilities and of the hol-
lowing out of nation states (and implicitly national executives). 
Stone, Fligstein and Sandholtz note European integration can-
not be separated from more general interaction processes that 
weaken national government structures: “)e move to European 
governance has been driven by firms trading more across national 
borders, by the economies of Europe becoming increasingly inter-
dependent in other myriad ways, and by actors gradually finding 
that the forms and methods of supranational governance served 
their evolving conception of interests”.28 Yet, regardless of the ori-
gin of this phenomenon, the impact of Europeanization on na-
tional governments appears to be particularly strong.
)e flow of responsibilities from the national to the supra-
national domain is not without its tensions and conflicts, however. 
As the study by Patrick Le Galès shows, the gradual resolution 
of conflicts between national governments and the EU tends to 
produce new equilibria (as well as potential tensions elsewhere), 
resulting in a “complex and deeply political” process of European-
ization that national governments—even ones historically as in-
fluential within the EU as France—cannot escape.29 )is process 
27 Jessop (note H); R. Rhodes, “)e hollowing out of the state: )e changing nature 
of the public service in Britain”, Political Quarterly EK, H (BCCG), pp. BJD–KB.
28 S. A. Stone, N. Fligstein and W. Sandholtz, “)e institutionalization of Euro-
pean space”, in A. S. Sweet, W. Sandholtz and N. Fligstein (eds), &e institutionalization 
of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, HIIB), p. H.
29 P. le Galès, “Est maître des lieux celui qui les organise: How rules change when 
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may be slower and more di@cult than some analysts or political 
actors might think or wish.30 Nevertheless, there is a general sense 
that, over all, the swing of the pendulum is not unfavourable to 
the European level.
One model that captures well this gradual transformation of 
political processes in contemporary Europe is that of multi-level 
governance. Marks and Hooghe note that “formal authority has 
been dispersed from central states both up to supranational in-
stitutions and down to regional and local governments”, and to 
this list we can also add the increasingly blurred boundary be-
tween the public and non-public sectors, which is noticeable in 
the role of the third sector in public policy processes.31 Multi-level 
governance is defined as being characterized by “negotiated, non-
hierarchical exchanges between institutions at the transnational, 
national, regional and local levels”.32 In this sense, the concept of 
multi-level governance allows us to overcome the separation in 
the study of international and national politics, a dichotomy that 
is increasingly inapplicable in the complex and changeable reali-
ties generated by the European integration process. As Scharpf 
posits, “the conceptual tools with which the political science sub-
disciplines of international relations and comparative politics are 
national and European policy domains collide”, in Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein (note 
HD), p. BHK.
30 See for example the comments of Romani Prodi and of Gerhard Schröder. For 
Prodi’s perspective, see the October BCCC interview with the Spanish daily El País, which 
has been republished in European Foundation Intelligence Digest D, DB (HH October–G No-
vember BCCC). Available at www.europeanfoundation.org/docs/DBid.htm. For Schröder’s 
views, see the Schröder Plan of HIIB.
31 G. Marks and L. Hooghe, “Contrasting visions of multi-level governance”, in I. 
Bache and M. Flinders (eds), Multi-level governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
HIIG), p. BK.
32 B. G. Peters and J. Pierre, “Developments in intergovernmental relations: To-
wards multi-level governance”, Policy and Politics HC, H (HIIB), p. BJB.
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approaching the study of European institutions are ill suited to 
deal with multi-level interactions”.33
)e use and development of the concept of multi-level gov-
ernance by authors such as Marks and Hooghe also captures the 
notion that the relationship between diAerent levels—and par-
ticularly of interest here, between the European and the national 
executives—is not defined by clear, hierarchical and formal ju-
risdictions.34 Rather, these can vary across (formal and informal) 
public policy arenas and can also change over time. )is distinction 
is captured in Marks and Hooghe’s definition of type I and type 
II multi-level governance, each with a clear, and clearly distinct, 
implication for governance processes. Type I involves the exist-
ence of an explicit, hierarchical and largely stable jurisdictional 
structure between the diAerent levels, and contrasts strongly with 
type II’s complex and fluid structure, composed of numerous and 
overlapping jurisdictions. )e impact of the European level is 
largely captured by this second type of multi-level governance, 
in which specific jurisdictions emerge in terms of functions, with 
intersecting and territorially overlapping jurisdictional levels, in 
a process captured by the concept of “fragmegration”. )is term, 
a contraction of fragmentation and integration, aptly illustrates 
the distinct and apparently contradictory impact when analysing 
multi-level governance in general, and the impact of Europeani-
zation on national executives in particular.35
In this regard, it is worth noting Schmidt’s prediction of the 
existence of a correlation between the impact of Europeanization 
33 Cited in Bache and Flinders (note JB), p. B.
34 Marks and Hooghe (note JB).
35 For more on this concept, see J. Rosenau, “Strong demand, huge supply: Gov-
ernance in an emerging epoch”, in Bache and Flinders (note JB).
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and the pre-existing structure of the state.36 Schmidt suggests that 
the impact of the EU’s “quasi-federal” and “quasi-pluralist” policy 
formulation structures is more intense in unitary states than in 
either federal states or those in which there is a considerable de-
gree of political decentralization, as in the former this involves a 
greater reduction in the executive power’s autonomy and control.
'e Europeanization of the Executive Power:  
'e Portuguese Case
Schmidt’s hypothesis is particularly relevant with regard to the 
Portuguese case.37 Le Galès shows Portugal as being one of the 
EU’s most centralized states.38 Yet Portugal represents a good ex-
ample of how national institutions—and in this case, executive 
power—is able to adapt to supra-national pressures, confirming 
that:
)e requirement of adaptation has not led to dramatic 
modifications with regard to the overall systemic designs 
of the member states. )us, comparing the changes at the 
European level to those in the BK national systems, a clear 
asymmetry becomes obvious. )e rate, frequency and cu-
mulative eAects of changes in the Brussels arena are larger 
and faster than those at the national level. Traditional na-
tional patterns are resistant and apparently flexible enough 
to be su@ciently capable of coping with the challenges 
from the European level. )us, we note that the reactions 
to the EC/EU system on the national level have reached a 
certain prominence, but they do not constitute a dramatic 
turnaround from traditional patterns of policy-making. 
36 Schmidt (note D).
37 Schmidt (note D).
38 P. le Galès, “)e changing European state: Pressures from within”, in Hayward 
and Menon (note B).
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Typically, we observe a mobilization of established actors 
within the existing constitutional and institutional frame-
work.39
On the one hand, it is possible to see the impact of EU mem-
bership on the national administrative structure and culture, 
with Magone arguing Europeanization was an important factor 
in the democratization of Portugal’s public administration.40 At 
the same time, this impact of Europeanization is also reflected 
in transformations in government structures, with the creation of 
the o@ce of Secretary of State for European AAairs (from BCDK 
on, with the tenth constitutional government that took o@ce that 
year), which has support of the General-Directorate of Commu-
nity AAairs (DGAC)/General-Directorate of European AAairs 
(DGAE).41 Magone also notes the increasing share of DGAC 
resources, both in terms of personnel and of responsibilities at 
the level of European aAairs, a reflection of the importance of the 
European level and of the need for support structures to deal with 
it within the executive.42 )e same conclusion can be taken from 
the creation of structures designed to interact with the EU level 
within several ministries, including the Ministry of Education’s 
o@ce for European AAairs and International Relations (GAERI) 
and the Ministry of Finance’s General-Directorate of European 
AAairs and International Relations. In order to meet the need for 
governmental coordination, the Inter-ministerial Commission 
39 Maurer, Mittag and Wessels (note F), pp. FK–E.
40 Magone, HIIB (note E).
41 )e General-Directorate of Community AAairs (DGAC) became the General-
Directorate of European AAairs (DGAE) in HIIE (see Decree-Law HIG/HIIE of HE 
October, article HF/G).
42 Magone (note E), p. BJF.
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for Community AAairs (CIAC) was also created.43 As Magone 
notes,44 this serves as the main structure for inter-ministerial and 
administrative coordination, even if its actual role does change 
over time, at times being superseded by more informal methods 
of coordination.
In practice, the impact of Europeanization on Portugal can 
be described as a mixture of transformation and inertia, to use 
the typology of Radaelli.45 Radaelli outlines four distinct types of 
adaptation by national institutions to European pressures: iner-
tia, absorption, transformation and retrenchment. )is typology 
reflects the scale and direction of the Europeanization process 
which, in the case of retrenchment, can also be negative. In such 
a case, the reaction of domestic agents (for example, due to the 
existence of multiple points of veto against Brussels) may lead in-
stitutions to accentuate their de-alignment from Europe. Inertia 
can be seen as an absence of change, for instance through delays in 
the implementation of directives, or by resistance to changes in-
troduced by the EU. Absorption indicates the adaptation—short 
of substantial transformations—of domestic structures in the Eu-
ropean context. As Héritier notes, this implies an accommoda-
tion with European public policy requirements, without causing 
any real alteration in either the key structures or in the politi-
cal system’s behavioural logic.46 Transformation, in turn, implies 
a change of paradigm, involving a fundamental modification of 
domestic political behaviour.
43 )is is now the Inter-ministerial Commission for European AAairs (see note 
GB).
44 See note GB.
45 Radaelli (note BC).
46 Cited in Radaelli (note BC), p. JF.
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)is typology is useful to the extent it establishes analytical 
criteria. Naturally, results are influenced not only by the degree 
of EU pressure but also the extent of pre-existing de-alignment 
between the European and domestic levels. At the same time, it 
is worth noting this typology is incapable of fully dealing with 
the question of correlation versus causality in the analysis of the 
impact of Europeanization.
Figure J.B above shows the percentage of transpositions and 
the respective proportion of infractions in the various stages of 
the process. As can be seen, the adaptation in Portugal tends over-
all to be one of absorption, but one resulting from a mixture of 
transformation and inertia patterns.
F59/0. J.B 
Degree of Adaptation (!"%&-())))  
(Portugal in comparative perspective)
S1/0<.: M. Giuliani, “Europeanization in comparative perspective: Institutional fit and 
national adaptation”, in K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli (eds), &e politics of Europe-
anization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, HIIJ), p. BJD
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)is pattern suggests the inadequacy of the simplistic view of 
Portugal as a “good student” within the EU. It also highlights the 
degree of choice that domestic agents—and particularly here the 
executive—have vis-à-vis European pressures. Returning to the 
argument developed in Jalali,47 the European level creates a new 
opportunity structure that domestic agents—again, especially the 
executive power—can exploit to their advantage, more specifically 
in creating support for their public policies.
'e Executive Power’s Room for Manoeuvre:  
External Ties in 'eory
As Jessop notes, increasing “fragmegration” and transfer of re-
sponsibilities from national executives to other agents does not 
prevent the former from playing a crucial and central political 
role.48 Equally, the analyses of Moravcsik and Dyson and Feath-
erstone emphasise the room for manoeuvre of executives, and 
how their actions can alter their interaction with the context of 
“fragmegration”.49
In particular, it is worth noting Dyson and Featherstone’s 
concept of vincolo esterno (external tie or external binding).50 In a 
47 Jalali (note C).
48 R. Jessop, “Multi-level governance and multi-level meta-governance: Changes 
in the European Union as integral moments in the transformation and reorientation of 
contemporary statehood”, in Banche and Flinders (note JB) pp. GC–FG.
49 A. Moravcsik, “Why the European Community strengthens the state: Domes-
tic politics and international cooperation”, Center for European Studies Working Paper %( 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, BCCG); K. Dyson and K. Featherstone, “Italy and 
the EMU as a ‘vincolo esterno’: empowering the technocrats, transforming the state”, 
South European Society and Politics, B, H (BCCE), pp. HFH–CC.
50 “External tie”, see also K. Dyson and K. Featherstone, “Italian policy beliefs 
about EMU: External discipline versus internal protection”, in Featherstone and Ra-
daelli (note BI), p. GKH. Radaelli and Franchino in turn translate it as “external lever”, see 
C. Radaelli and F. Franchino, “Analysing political change in Italy”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, BB, E (HIIG), p. CGK. In either case, the sense of an external bind generating 
new opportunity structures is quite evident.
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sense, this has as its point of departure Moravcsik’s prediction that 
national executives may have strategic interests in agreeing to Eu-
ropean commitments. 51 )e European dimension thus serves as 
a form of binding the national political system to specific public 
policies. To use Tsebelis’s model of veto players, this binding ena-
bles national executives to reduce the potential range of options 
that they present to subsequent veto agents, as well as altering 
their pay-oAs, given the costs of non-compliance with European 
agreements.52 At the same time, the European dimension also 
enables national executives to more easily adopt blame avoidance 
strategies with regard to the policies they adopt,53 with these “ex-
ternal ties” acting as an important resource for national executives 
when taking potentially unpopular measures.
In contexts like that of Portugal, characterized by a weak direct 
articulation of civil society and interest groups with Brussels,54 ex-
ecutives benefit even more disproportionately from this “Europe-
an trump card”. As Schendelen notes, Portuguese interest groups 
“play a marginal role on the input side of the EU machine”.55 )is 
pattern implies that other agents, apart from the executive, have 
an extremely limited voice in European institutions and processes, 
and the resulting near-monopoly executives have in terms of the 
representation of national interests in the EU further facilitates 
this process of external binding. As Schendelen also highlights, 
“due to their lack of su@cient size and other resources, the private 
51 Moravcsik (note GC).
52 Tsebelis (note BD).
53 R. K. Weaver, “)e politics of blame avoidance”, Journal of Public Policy E, G 
(BCDE), pp. JFB–CD.
54 See Jalali (note C) for more details.
55 R. van Schendelen, Machiavelli in Brussels: &e art of lobbying the EU (Amster-
dam: Amsterdam University Press, HIIH), p. BHE.
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groups can hardly act self-reliantly. For the remote control of the 
EU, they remain dependent on their government and their nation-
al umbrellas, which are frequently linked to the government”.56
)is has two important implications. First, it means that deci-
sions emanating from the European level have a negligible input 
from Portuguese interest groups, with the executive as the main 
representative of Portuguese interests. )is implication is all the 
more relevant if we relax the assumption of a top-down only Eu-
ropeanization process, and endogenize decisions taken at the Eu-
ropean level to national preferences. 
Second, the executive also sees its position reinforced in the 
top-down relationship, as its monopoly of representation within 
the EU also confers upon it a crucial role as the interpreter of 
European decisions at the national level and, consequently, room 
for manoeuvre.57 In specific, this enables executives to emphasise 
or play down (as necessary) European pressures when drawing 
up public policies. )is also allows for blame-avoidance, as execu-
tives can use the European dimension as a pretext for measures 
they consider desirable, but which they fear may be unpopular.58 
In this context, citizens’ attitudes towards the EU are also impor-
tant. Where citizens demonstrate more favourable attitudes to-
wards the EU, and where trust in European institutions is higher, 
resorting to the European dimension by national executives 
may be more eAective in attenuating and overcoming domestic 
opposition.
56 Schendelen (note KK), p. BHF.
57 R. Roland, Interpreters as diplomats: A diplomatic history of the role of interpreters 
in world politics (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, BCCC).
58 Jalali (note C).
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'e Executive’s Room for Manoeuvre:  
'e Portuguese Case59
)is room for manoeuvre executives have obtained as a result 
of the Europeanization process is perceptible in the Portuguese 
case. First, the favourable attitudes of the Portuguese towards the 
EU facilitate the use of external binding. )e Portuguese tend to 
have a more positive perception of the EU than the European av-
erage, and are characterized by higher levels of trust in European 
than in domestic institutions, as Figures J.H and J.J below indicate.
An example of the national executive’s recourse to external 
binding may be perceived in the policies of the BKth constitutional 
government, headed by José Manuel Durão Barroso, and which 
59 )is is a revised version of the analysis published in Jalali (note C).
S1/0<.: M. V. Cabral, P. Magalhães, M. C. Lobo, F. Nunes and A. E. Santo, Euro-
barometer %": Public opinion in the European Union, national report Portugal (European 
Opinion Research Group, HIIJ), p. F.
F59/0. J.H 
Evolution of Attitudes towards the EU (!"%"-())+, *)
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was in o@ce in the period HIIH-IK. )is government very rap-
idly adopted as its main goal the reduction of Portugal’s budget 
deficit to within the three per cent of GDP criterion of the Euro 
zone’s growth and stability pact, even if the election manifesto of 
the main coalition partner—the centre-right Social Democrats 
(PSD—Partido Social Democrata)—gave few indications of a 
public expenditure containment programme. Figure J.G shows the 
results of a content analysis of the PSD’s election manifesto, re-
sulting from the Euromanifestos project.
)is external tie emerged very early on in this government’s 
life. )e government took o@ce on Saturday, E April HIIH. Less 
S1/0<.: M. V. Cabral, P. Magalhães, M. C. Lobo, F. Nunes and A. E. Santo, Euro-
barometer %": Public opinion in the European Union, national report Portugal (European 
Opinion Research Group, HIIJ), p. JG. 
F59/0. J.J 
Trust of the Portuguese in National and European 
Institutions, Annual Average  
(BCCC–HIIJ)
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than two days later the new finance and state minister, Manuela 
Ferreira Leite, declared the HIIB budget deficit situation as being 
“extremely serious”. Four days later—on the eve of the govern-
ment completing its first week in o@ce—the prime minister em-
phasized the budget deficit question in a speech to the congress of 
the National Association of Portuguese Municipalities. Speaking 
to an important audience in terms of domestic politics, Barroso 
explained the need to contain the budget based on the Europe-
an dimension. Balancing the public accounts was described as a 
“patriotic duty given the serious situation in which we find our-
selves”, with the prime minister asking those in power at the lo-
cal level to make “an eAort to avoid Portugal being outside the 
stability pact”.60 )e escalating dramatization of the budget deficit 
60 Portugal Diário, “Durão dramático” (BH April HIIH), www.portugaldiario.iol.pt/
noticia.php?id=JKBKH&div_id=HCB.
F59/0. J.G 
())( PSD Election Manifesto Policy Positions  
(number of quasi-sentences indicating specific  
positions and preferences)
S1/0<.: Euromanifesto project dataset.
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and of the existence of entirely exogenous penalties should the 
stability pact criteria not be met was to continue later in the same 
month: alluding to the penalties Portugal could face, Barroso said 
he “pray[ed] that the HIIB deficit remain below three per cent”.61
In July HIIH, having already implemented a series of austerity 
measures, Barroso revealed that the HIIB deficit was G.B per cent 
of GDP. At the same time, Europe was used as a justification 
for the continued implementation of budgetary control policies. 
While the prime minister indicated he did not believe Brussels 
would impose sanctions, he also indicated the need to carry on 
with budgetary restraint: “It would be absurd if, at a time when 
Portugal is making an eAort to adjust, they fine us and make this 
adjustment more di@cult”.62 Once again, the association between 
internal austerity policies (for example, through a public sector 
wage freeze) and European pressure was stressed.
However, if the political message stressed that the executive’s 
main concern was meeting the stability pact criterion regard-
ing the budget deficit, the government’s actual programme—as 
submitted to parliament—enunciated a related, although not 
necessarily identical, objective. )us, Barroso’s government’s 
programme defined its economic policy objectives to be the en-
largement of the role of the market in the Portuguese economy, 
and defined the state’s weight in the economy as excessive. Many 
of the Barroso government’s policies could only be indirectly 
related to its apparent goal of controlling the budget deficit in or-
der to avoid sanctions under the terms of the stability pact, being 
rather more clearly directed at eliminating constraints on market 
61 Portugal Diário, “Orçamento rectificativo de rigor e austeridade” (HG April HIIH), 
www.portugaldiario.iol.pt/noticia.php?id=JFGGF&div_id=HCB.
62 Portugal Diário, “Durão Barroso não acredita em sanções de Bruxelas” (HE July 
HIIH), www.portugaldiario.iol.pt/noticia.php?id=KKBHC&div_id=HCB.
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forces. A good example of this is the labour legislation reform of 
HIIJ–IG, which introduced greater labour market flexibility. )e 
stress Barroso’s government laid on the budget deficit exemplifies 
the notion of binding externally to bind internally. Its recourse to 
Europe gave it an additional weapon in the formation and imple-
mentation of potentially unpopular public policies.
Final Notes
)e change in the standards and processes of government that 
is captured by concepts such as governance, multi-level govern-
ment and “fragmegration” are inevitably reflected in the operation 
and role of executive power. One of the important driving-forces 
behind such changes is the European integration process, with the 
resulting transfer of responsibilities to the supra-national level. 
)is eAect of Europeanization is particularly significant in cases 
such as Portugal, given its politically and economically peripheral 
position within the EU.
At the same time, echoing Maurer, Mittag and Wessels, the 
European integration processes do not necessarily generate fun-
damental transformations, and the Portuguese executive also 
demonstrates autonomy of action that enables it to adapt to Eu-
ropean demands. In particular, European integration creates new 
domestic opportunity structures, which executives have used to 
increase their room for manoeuvre.63 )e European level thus 
emerges as not only a constraint on national executive power, but 
also as an instrument enabling it to overcome domestic opposi-
tion and veto players who resist its public policies.
It is also worth highlighting aspects that merit examination in 
future research. In particular, the rapid growth of regulatory bod-
63 Maurer, Mittag and Wessels (note F).
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ies in Portugal since the beginning of the present century must be 
noted, confirming the assertion regulation is the (only) compo-
nent of modern government that continues to expand.64 In part, 
this is a consequence of the process of Europeanization, to the 
extent European integration is a creator of regulatory policies. At 
the same time, this emerging regulatory web may come to repre-
sent a constraint on executive autonomy, to the extent it overlaps 
with and constrains executives’ prerogatives.
64 C. Hood, O. James, G. Jones, C. Scott and T. Travers, Regulation inside govern-
ment: Waste-watchers, quality police and sleaze-busters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
BCCC).
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Introduction
)is chapter analyses the institutional and political factors 
shaping the Portuguese parliament’s response to the pressures 
for the adaptation to the Treaty of Lisbon’s provisions on the in-
volvement of national parliaments as scrutinizers of European 
legislation. In its inquiry into the factors shaping the response 
to pressures the chapter follows a conception of Europeaniza-
tion as adaptation to the conditions imposed by the European 
institutions.1 Until HIIE the parliament had no involvement in 
the European legislative cycle, mainly because it had no access to 
the legislative initiatives of the European Commission (EC), even 
those within its exclusive legislative competence.
)e peculiarity of the Portuguese case in its response to the 
European Union’s (EU) pressure for adaptation derives both from 
its participation in the political dialogue with the EC since HIIE,2 
1 T. A. Borzel and T. Risse, “Conceptualizing the domestic impact of Europe”, 
and  C. M. Radaelli, “)e Europeanization of public policy”, in K. Featherstone and 
C. M. Radaelli (eds), &e politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
HIIJ), pp. KF–DH, HF–KE; K. H. Goetz and K. H. F. Dyson, “Europeanization compared: 
)e shrinking core and the decline of state power”, in K. H. Goetz and K. H. F. Dyson 
(eds), Germany, Europe, and the politics of constraint (Oxford: New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, HIIJ), pp. JGC–FE.
2 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
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and following that the way it implemented the Treaty of Lisbon’s 
provisions—namely the subsidiarity control of EU pieces of leg-
islation. Parliaments that developed a systematic scrutiny system 
of European legislation are usually those with a strong tradition 
of control over the government in the national sphere or the pres-
ence of Eurosceptic parties.3 In Portugal both these conditions are 
absent: the parliament has some constitutional powers for con-
trolling the government but no tradition of using them and po-
litical parties have a positive consensus on integration.4 Moreover, 
parliament dedicates relatively scarce resources to the manage-
ment of European aAairs. 
Consensus among parliamentary parties—rather than the usu-
al factors contributing to the implementation of strong control 
powers over the government in the scrutiny of EU aAairs, such 
as the allocation of resources or an institutionalized conflict over 
integration—was key to the parliament’s success in shedding its 
legacy and in instituting an ex-ante scrutiny of European legisla-
tion. )e Portuguese parliament thus earned a place among the 
eight most active national parliaments as EU legislation scruti-
nizers. In this it was helped by the direct transmission of informa-
tion by the EC to national parliaments.
pean Council: A citizens’ agenda—delivering results for Europe, COM HBB (BI May 
HIIE).
3 A. Maurer, “National parliaments in the European architecture: From latecom-
ers’ adaptation towards permanent institutional change?”, in A. Maurer and W. Wessels 
(eds), National parliaments on their ways to Europe: Losers or latecomers? (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgeselschaft, HIIB), pp. HF–FE; R. Pahre, “Endogenous domestic institu-
tions in two-level games and parliamentary oversight of the European Union”, Journal 
of Conflict Resolution GB, B (BCCF), pp. BGF–FG.
4 C. Leston-Bandeira, “)e Portuguese parliament during the first two decades 
of democracy”, West European Politics HG, B (HIIB), pp. BJF–KE; M. C. Lobo and P. Magal-
hães, “Room for manoeuvre: Euroscepticism in the Portuguese parties and electorate 
BCFE–HIIK”, South European Society and Politics BE, B (HIBB), pp. DB–BIG.
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)e analysis of the parliament’s assertion of its position as a 
monitoring body at the national and European levels carried out 
in this chapter takes into account the statutory and informal ar-
rangements of the parliament’s scrutiny process, in particular the 
HIIE European Scrutiny Law (ESL) and the initiatives at Euro-
pean level—the Barroso initiative to share directly information 
on European legislation with the national parliament—and the 
early warning mechanism’s eight-week deadline for the national 
parliament’s pronouncement on the legislative initiatives imposed 
by the Treaty of Lisbon (protocol number two).5 )ese two initia-
tives reinforced and complemented the ESL by providing direct 
and timely access to draft legislation and by imposing deadlines 
for the parliament to pronounce its opinion of the draft legisla-
tion. 
Following studies on the Europeanization of national par-
liaments in the EU this chapter describes the adoption and 
implementation of the ESL and assesses the first year of the imple-
mentation of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon.6 )e parlia-
ment’s implementation of ESL resulted in an impressive number 
of laws being scrutinized. From HIIE the parliament became one 
of the most eAective scrutinizers of European legislation in the 
EU, forwarding BEH parliamentary opinions on EU institutions 
5 Law GJ/HIIE, Diário da República, B Série—No BEG, HK August HIIE, pp. EHIB–J.
6 K. Auel, “Adapting to Europe: Strategic Europeanization of national parlia-
ments”, in R. Holzhacker and E. A. Cheltenham (eds), Democratic governance and Euro-
pean integration: Linking societal and state processes of democracy (Northampton: Edward 
Elgar, HIIF), pp. BKF–FC; L. Besselink, “National parliaments in the EU’s composite con-
stitution: A plea for a shift in paradigm”, in P. Kiiver (ed.), National and regional parlia-
ments in the European constitutional order (Groonigen: Europa Law Publishing, HIIE), 
pp. BBF–JB; A. Fraga, Os parlamentos nacionais e a legitimidade da construção europeia, (Lis-
bon: Cosmos, HIIB); E. Miklin, “Visibility of choices and better scrutiny? )e eAects of 
politicization and EU decision-making”, paper prepared for the Kth ECPR Conference 
(Potsdam, BI–BH September HIIC); A. Pliakos, “National parliaments and the European 
Union: Necessity of assigning a supranational role”, Revue Européenne de Droit Public BC, 
J (HIIF), pp. FKF–DD.
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and coming on top of the EC’s rankings. )e implementation 
of the Treaty of Lisbon provided a further boost to the working 
of the system: within one year of the treaty being implemented, 
parliament had forwarded more than BII parliamentary opinions 
to EU institutions. However, in addition to the number of EU 
legislative proposals scrutinized, there is a qualitative impact of 
the legislative scrutiny onto the parliament’s participation in the 
European multi-level governance that is still understudied. Based 
on a preliminary assessment of several cases of legislative scrutiny 
undertaken by parliament, this chapter proposes that the imple-
mentation of ESL had an eAect on parliament’s relations with the 
government, with the EU institutions (EC, European parliament 
and the European Council), other national parliaments in the EU, 
as well as on the establishment of parliament’s role as a link be-
tween Portuguese civil society and European institutions. 
Internal factors of Europeanization: 'e ())& ESL  
and the ())# and ()!) Internal Scrutiny Procedures
)e adoption of the ESL, which foreshadowed the institution-
alization of a systematic scrutiny system in the summer of HIIE, 
was a key factor for the success of parliament’s record of scrutini-
zation of European legislation, which resulted in the strengthen-
ing of the oversight of parliament over government on European 
aAairs and the establishment of a direct dialogue between parlia-
ment and European institutions in the EU legislative process. By 
establishing an obligation on government to consult with parlia-
ment in areas of its exclusive or partially-exclusive competence 
(although with non-binding eAects) it opened the way for parlia-
ment to assume a role in European aAairs. )e ESL established 
the European AAairs Committee (EAC) as the coordinating 
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body for scrutiny, while also involving sectoral committees in the 
scrutiny process. ESL also anticipates an increase in plenary and 
EAC discussions on European issues. 
Since the BCCH Maastricht Treaty, national parliaments have 
been called to take a more active part in the European legislative 
process, in particular by establishing systems for scrutinizing their 
governments’ stances on European legislation in the Council of 
Ministers. Parliamentary scrutiny systems vary considerably, and 
they have been classified in three types: informal information; au-
thorized parliamentary consultation; and the mandate system.7 
Until HIIE the Portuguese parliament ran a scrutiny system of in-
formal information, and had no commitment to take a stance on 
European aAairs (Spanish, Greek and Portuguese—before Law 
GJ/HIIE). In HIIE, parliament adopted a system of authorized par-
liamentary consultation, which meant there had to be a formal ex-
change of information with the government, and which included 
regular meetings between members of parliament and ministers 
as well as the systematic scrutiny by parliament of matters that fall 
within its legislative remit (e.g. Germany, Cyprus, France, Ireland, 
Malta). )is system falls short of the powers granted parliament 
within the mandate system, where government actions are bound 
by parliament’s position (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, 
Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom).8
7 Fraga (note E).
8 COSAC, “Eighth bi-annual report: Developments in European Union proce-
dures and practices relevant to parliamentary scrutiny. Prepared by the COSAC Secre-
tariat for the XXXVIII Conference of Community and European AAairs Committees 
of Parliaments of the European Union” (HIIF); COSAC, “)irteenth bi-annual report: 
Developments in European Union procedures and practices relevant to parliamentary 
scrutiny. Prepared by the COSAC Secretariat for the XLIII Conference of Community 
and European AAairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union” (HIBI), avail-
able at www.cosac.eu/en/documents/biannual.
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)e literature points to two factors triggering the creation of 
strong systems of parliamentary scrutiny: a tradition of parlia-
mentary control over the government and the contestation of Eu-
ropean integration by Eurosceptic parties.9 )e two conditions do 
not apply in the Portuguese case: all Portuguese parliamentary 
parties support the EU and parliament has limited control over 
the government. )e analysis of the discussion of Law GJ/HIIE by 
the EAC’s working group points to a broad consensus on Europe-
an integration among parliamentary parties and how it facilitated 
the adoption of the law by the plenary. All parliamentary par-
ties presented bills along the lines of a systematic scrutiny system. 
)e Socialist Party (PS—Partido Socialista) recommended “the 
strengthening of the power and ability of parliament”,10 the PSD 
called for a strengthening of “the role of the EAC, by granting 
it a coordinating role”, in “closing the gap between citizens and 
the European decision-making process” and “assuring democratic 
control over the government and its ability to influence its posi-
tions.11 )e Popular Party (CDS—Centro Democrático Social) 
called for the fulfilment of constitutional provisions, whereas the 
Communist Party (PCP—Partido Comunista Português) called 
for the “adoption of a legal mechanism obliging the government 
to take into account the opinions of parliament” and the Left 
Block (BE) sought “a more active and decisive role on European 
aAairs” for parliament.12
)e authors of the law were operating in the wake of the de-
bates on the involvement of national parliaments in the European 
9 Maurer; Pahre (note J).
10 PS, Draft Law HEE/X, HG May HIIE.
11 PSD, Draft law HKI/X, BB April HIIE.
12 PC, Draft law HGK/X, F April HIIE; CDS-PP, Draft law HGC/X, BB April HIIE; 
BE, Draft law HFI/X, JB May HIIE.
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decision-making process during the EU convention on the Eu-
ropean constitution, and were thus aware of the growing impor-
tance of national parliament participation in EU aAairs. During 
the plenary debate preceding the vote on the EAC’s report on 
H June HIIE, the “urgency in overcoming the limitations of the 
national debate on European integration” and “preventing the dis-
tancing of parliament from the full exercise of its competences on 
European aAairs” were stressed.13 )at the formulation of national 
positions should be the result of a process of co-decision between 
the government and the parliament in order to “fight the distanc-
ing of parliamentarians from European aAairs” was defended.14 
)e ESL anticipated the Treaty of Lisbon’s views on national 
parliaments’ scrutiny of European legislation by three years. Ar-
ticle J of the scrutiny law referred to the possibility of issuing a 
“duly substantiated formal written opinion” on the compliance of 
an EU initiative with the principle of subsidiarity. )e law es-
tablished a compulsory pronouncement by parliament on matters 
reserved to it either exclusively or partially, although its character 
was non-binding. It also obliges government to inform parliament 
of its position on particular legislation, but does not impose any 
deadlines, instead using the general formula that the government 
should inform the parliament “in good time”. )us, in the absence 
of systematic governmental information to parliament on the on-
going European legislative process, the Barroso initiative’s direct 
linking of draft European legislation from the EC to national 
parliaments prevented the ESL from being a dead letter prior the 
implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon in December HIIC.15
13 Respectively, Armando França (PS) and Honório Novo (PCP), in Diário da 
Assembleia da República (DAR), I Série, BJB, J June HIIE, p. EIHF.
14 Almeida Henriques (PSD), DAR I Série, BJB, J June HIIE, p. EIJB–J. 
15 AR, Law GJ/HIIE, article H.H.
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)e law strengthens parliament’s oversight of government, 
rather than establishing it as a (co-)legislator. Other instruments 
typical of parliamentary control over the executive were also es-
tablished: three annual plenary debates with the government, two 
meetings with the Secretary of State for European AAairs in the 
EAC before and after the European Councils, and the possibility 
of meetings between the EAC/sectoral committees and the min-
isters involved in European Council meetings. 
)e EAC’s role in the scrutiny process is central and, one can 
argue, it is the main motor of parliament’s scrutiny system. In-
deed, since the introduction of the ESL, the EAC has played a 
key role in the articulation of the scrutiny process within parlia-
ment. Responsibility for initiating and concluding the scrutiny 
procedure is given to the EAC (article three of the ESL): the 
EAC “shall draw up the formal written opinion in consultation 
with the sectoral parliamentary committees with responsibility 
for the matter in question…the formal written opinion shall be 
submitted in form of a draft resolution to the plenary for debate 
and voting by simple majority, except in cases in which there are 
grounds for urgency, when the committee’s decision shall suf-
fice”. )e EAC, upon receiving draft EU laws (usually from EC) 
forwards it to the relevant sectoral committee(s), which decide 
whether to nominate a rapporteur to draft a report.16 Unless the 
EAC specifically requests their opinion, specialist committees 
freely decide whether to draft a report, draw up concrete pro-
posals, prepare the documents for the EAC’s consideration or re-
main silent on the matter. When a scrutiny document arrives the 
EAC decides on the eAect it is given. )e committee may desig-
nate one or more rapporteurs (deputado relator) for the purpose 
of drafting a written opinion (or reasoned opinion, if a breach of 
16 Article four of the second protocol in the appendix to the Lisbon Treaty.
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subsidiarity is identified), which—if adopted—is sent to the pres-
ident of the parliament, who sends it to the EU institutions and 
the government. In the case of non-approval, as in the case of the 
refusal of the opinion on one of the initiatives of the EC’s package 
for economic governance at the beginning of HIBB, the EAC may 
decide to forward the existing specialized committee report. )e 
committee may also decide to adopt a motion for a parliamentary 
resolution and send it to the plenary for debate and vote (being 
the only committee with this power). As a rule, the EAC finalises 
the scrutiny process by approving a final opinion and either sub-
mitting a resolution to the plenary for discussion and approval or 
sending it directly to parliament’s speaker for forwarding to the 
government and EU institutions. Although the ESL refers to the 
approval of the plenary as the rule, in fact the EAC vote has been 
the consensual practice for concluding the scrutiny process. )e 
Portuguese parliament follows the trend among national parlia-
ments, where the EAC is, as a rule, the arena for the adoption of 
scrutiny opinions.17
)e role of the specialist committees has been developed by 
regularly providing specialized inputs to the scrutiny process on 
the substance of the proposals falling under their scope. )is is 
why the EAC only plays a substantive role if the committee with 
responsibility for the matter in question decides not to take action 
or when a parliamentary group considers a proposal politically 
relevant. Otherwise, the EAC forwards the substantial remarks 
of the sectoral committee and analyses the legal basis of the EU 
proposal, as well as it compliance with the subsidiarity principle. 
Often the opinion sent to the government and EU institutions 
17 T. Raunio, “National parliaments and European integration: What we know 
and what we should know”, Arena Working Paper H/HIIC.
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includes a report by the specialist committee. Nevertheless, ulti-
mately the EAC’s opinion prevails. 
In order to implement the provisions stated in law GJ/HIIE the 
EAC developed and approved some procedural rules in HIIF for 
managing the legislative and non-legislative initiatives submitted 
by the EC. Considering these procedures each week the EAC dis-
tributes legislative initiatives to the relevant sectoral committees. 
)ese procedures also provide the EAC with the task of prioritiz-
ing areas of parliamentary EU scrutiny, both in the short- and in 
the long-term (on an annual basis). According to the HIIF rules 
the EAC’s chairman could have the initiatives monitored accord-
ing to the political relevance of the European initiative for Por-
tugal. )is list of priorities for political assessment was discussed 
at an EAC meeting according to three fundamental criteria: re-
served parliamentary responsibility, the principle of subsidiary 
and the strategic interest for Portugal. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, 
this distribution is made every eight weeks, which means all ini-
tiatives sent by EU Institutions under the treaty’s second protocol 
are subject to prioritization and included on the agenda of the 
committees’ weekly meetings.
As a result of the January HIBI revision of the internal scru-
tiny procedure following the September HIIC general elections in 
Portugal and the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in Decem-
ber HIIC, the EAC began distributing EU initiatives on a daily 
basis—from all EU institutions—to the competent committees. 
For those initiatives falling under the Lisbon Treaty’s “early warn-
ing mechanism”, parliament has eight weeks to take a position. 
When no report is presented by a sectoral committee within the 
first six weeks, the EAC decides whether to present an opin-
ion. Nonetheless, when a sectoral committee provides the EAC 
with a report, the committee analyses and debates it and, usually, 
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produces a “rubberstamp” final opinion. )e EAC often adds some 
additional notes, reflecting the additional information it collected 
through its informal channels of information with the govern-
ment, the permanent representative (PERMREP) in Brussels and 
within the network of national parliaments, through the Portu-
guese parliament’s permanent representative in Brussels. 
)e EAC may propose formal mechanisms to implement an 
eAective monitoring and assessment of and pronouncement by 
parliament on EU matters within its reserved legislative compe-
tence. For that purpose the EAC is entitled to ask for a sectoral 
view from permanent committees in order to ascertain parlia-
mentary opinion on EU initiatives—on the substance (sectoral 
committees), on the legal basis and the observance of the subsidi-
arity principle. )e ESL invites the EAC to “act with the sectoral 
parliamentary committees with responsibility for the matter in 
question to ensure the exchange of information and appropriate 
ways of working”.18 
)e amendments to the internal scrutiny procedure in HIBI 
also instituted the system of enhanced scrutiny, in which parlia-
ment defines six annual priorities for scrutiny, with a specific road 
map and monitoring methodology. Enhanced scrutiny begins 
with a pre-selection process using the criterion of the political 
relevance of an EU initiative for Portugal. Each parliamentary 
committee prepares its annual opinion on the EC’s legislative 
and work programme and notifies the EAC whether it intends 
to submit any EC initiative—legislative or otherwise—to the en-
hanced scrutiny procedure. Upon the receipt of these notices, the 
EAC organizes a meeting with the Secretary of State of Euro-
pean AAairs, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and 
members of the two regional parliamentary assemblies in order to 
18 Article Ed.
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debate the EC working programme and the priorities for scru-
tiny. )e EAC may, after this comprehensive consultation process, 
choose six initiatives every year for enhanced scrutiny. )e EAC 
will, in cooperation with the relevant parliamentary committee, 
draft a broader work programme for each of the selected initia-
tives. Enhanced scrutiny proceeds on the basis of these individual 
tailor-made scrutiny roadmaps. 
)e legislative and non-legislative priorities for enhanced 
scrutiny include joint meetings with the responsible sectoral com-
mittees, an exchange of information with the government, the 
PERMREP and inter-parliamentary exchange of information 
among the GI EU parliamentary chambers.
'e External Factors of Europeanization:  
'e Barroso Initiative and the Treaty of Lisbon
Although the adoption of this law implies the convergence 
of the Portuguese parliament’s scrutiny system to the model of 
systematic consultation practiced by Germany, France, Sweden 
and the Czech Republic,19 its omission of parliamentary spe-
cific scrutiny procedures, the di@culty of connecting with the 
daily political work of deputies, the lack of human resources and 
the deadlines for government passing  information European 
initiatives to parliament has been a crucial weakness in the im-
plementation process. During HIIE and HIIF the government 
seldom notified parliament on new European legislation related 
to matters of the former pillars II (common foreign and security 
policy [CFSP]) and III (freedom, security and justice [AFSJ]). 
)e timely reception of the government’s position by parliament 
is a crucial condition for the success of the scrutiny procedure. 
19 COSAC HIIF (note C).
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)erefore in such legislative areas as AFSJ and CFSP, which are 
the main matters reserved exclusively to parliament, the legisla-
ture was prevented from performing its duty to scrutinize for lack 
of access to legislative initiatives. 
)e ESL’s modesty in establishing an obligation on the gov-
ernment to inform parliament timeously of EU legislative initia-
tives predictably results in parliament being impeded in its duty 
caused by a lack of information. However, almost simultaneously 
with the approval of the law in September HIIE, as a result of the 
Barroso initiative, parliament began receiving draft EU proposals 
and consultation documents directly from the EC. As a conse-
quence the EC initiated a political dialogue with national parlia-
ments on all aspects of its plans, asking parliaments to pronounce 
on issues of subsidiarity, on proportionality, the legal basis, and 
the substance of draft proposals or political considerations.20 )e 
direct dispatch of information to parliaments gave the Portuguese 
parliament well-timed access to the text of legislative proposals 
issued by the EC prior to the onset of the EU legislative decision-
making process. )is eAectively reduced parliament’s dependence 
on government for access to this information. )is measure im-
proved parliament’s ability to fulfil its scrutiny obligations in the 
ESL.
)e coincidence between the adoption of the ESL and the 
promotion of the Barroso initiative in the summer of HIIE led the 
EAC to tailor its scrutiny procedures specifically to the newly-
established political dialogue with the EC. )is allowed parlia-
ment to pronounce on all sorts of issues and influence both the 
government’s position and the European institutions directly. )e 
success of this new approach to EU aAairs is highlighted in EC 
20 European Commission, Annual report (**" on relations between the European 
Commission and national parliaments of ( June (*!*, COM (HIBI), HIIC.
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reports, which recognise Portugal’s parliament as a “particularly 
active chamber”, which has so far sent most reasoned opinions. 
From HIIE to HIID the Portuguese parliament sent DG opinions to 
the EC, the French senate sent KJ, the German Bundesrat JC; the 
Swedish parliament JJ; the British House of Lords JI; the Danish 
Folketing HJ and the Czech senate HH,21 in HIIC the Portuguese 
parliament sent GF opinions, leaving the Czech senate behind 
with HF and the Dutch houses of parliament with BD,22 while in 
HIBI it sent BIE opinions, followed by two upper chambers—the 
Italian senate with FB and the Czech senate with HC.23
In addition to the Barroso initiative, the European Parliament 
sends parliament those of its resolutions relevant to national par-
liaments and gives notice of the European parliament committee 
to which Portuguese parliamentary opinion on EU legislation was 
forwarded for consideration. From September HIID, the perma-
nent representative of the parliament to the EU,24 with a seat in 
Brussels, regularly forwards reports on European parliament de-
bates on matters of interest to parliament and, moreover, enables 
the connection between the Portuguese PERMREP approach 
in the Coreper (Committee of Permanent Representatives) and 
the parliamentary work of the EAC’s rapporteur on the same EU 
draft.
21 European Commission HIIC (note HI).
22 European Commission HIIC (note HI).
23 European Commission HIIC (note HI); European Commission, Annual report 
(**) on relations between the European Commission and National Parliaments, CO (HIIC) 
p. JGJ, F July HIIC and European Commission, Annual report (*!* on relations between 
the European Commission and National Parliaments, COM (HIBB) p. JGK, BI June HIBB.
24 )e Portuguese parliament has had permanent representation in Brussels since 
B January HIIF, first in the form of a representative of the parliament to the COSAC 
secretariat, then since HG June HIID in the form of a permanent representative to the EU. 
)e main task of parliament’s representative in Brussels is to relay information about 
the EU decision-making process as a “qualitative support” for parliament’s scrutiny of 
the EU. 
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)e Treaty of Lisbon enhances the potential for the involve-
ment of national parliaments in the European decision-making 
processes, by recognizing national legislatures actively contrib-
ute to the good functioning of the EU and that governments are 
democratically accountable to them. More concretely, the treaty 
describes the parliaments’ involvement by guaranteeing the sub-
sidiarity principle is respected, by taking part, within the frame-
work of the area of freedom, security and justice, in the evaluation 
mechanisms for the implementation of EU policies in those areas 
and through being involved in the political monitoring of Eu-
ropol and in the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities.
In order to guarantee the greater involvement of national par-
liaments in the EU, the treaty enabled all parliaments to receive 
all consultation and planning documents from the EC, as well 
as draft legislation issued by any institution or group of mem-
ber states. Consequently, national parliaments may, within eight 
weeks, submit to the presidents of the European Parliament, the 
European Council and EC a reasoned opinion on the observ-
ance of the subsidiarity principle. )rough the early warning 
mechanism, if one-third of national parliaments (or one-quarter 
on matters relating to the AFSJ) oppose any measure, the EC is 
required to reconsider.25 After analysing the draft, the EC may 
maintain, withdraw or amend the draft. 
)e implementation of the treaty introduced an added argu-
ment and stimulus for the Portuguese parliament to actively scru-
tinize the EU’s performance, enriching its practice and promoting 
its development through the involvement of the main parliamen-
tary bodies. )e treaty introduced two of the key scrutiny factors: 
25 Each national parliament has two votes out of a total of KG, with BD representing 
one-third (nine parliaments or BD chambers) and one-quarter representing BG (seven 
parliaments or BG chambers).
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the possibility for national parliaments to speak out on EU bills; 
and a timeframe for this pronouncement. )ese factors contrib-
uted to strengthening parliamentary scrutiny, mostly by providing 
a legal basis and an additional political reason for the exercise of 
scrutiny. It has also had a remarkable spill-over eAect, both on the 
closer relationship between parliament and government and on 
the dynamics of the relationship between the GI parliamentary 
chambers in the HF member states, with reflects the Portuguese 
parliament’s way of working in this field. )e real need to issue an 
opinion within an eight-week time frame made national parlia-
ments more aware of the importance of exchanging information 
between themselves.
Assessment of the Impact of the  
Treaty of Lisbon on Parliament
)e ESL’s provision and the Barroso initiative were key factors 
in the systematic parliamentary scrutiny of European legislation. 
)e Lisbon Treaty provided a further dynamic to parliament’s 
activities by inaugurating the early warning mechanism’s eight-
week deadline for compliance with the subsidiarity principle. An 
analysis of the early years of its operation shows the initiation and 
conclusion of an impressive number of scrutiny processes, with 
the Portuguese parliament among the eight most active parlia-
ments in the EU. 
)is section contains a qualitative evaluation of the content 
and eAects of the scrutiny process. While most opinions consist of 
a synthesis of EU initiatives and approval of the proposals, some 
processes went beyond formal approval of European legislation 
and consisted of a debate on the initiative’s substance and its ef-
fects on the national economy and society. )e higher profile of 
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the scrutiny procedures also demonstrated the implications of 
parliament’s more substantive debates and opinions. In the fol-
lowing section we outline landmark cases and the main changes 
to parliament’s relations with the government, other parliaments 
and civil and economic society in respect of the European legisla-
tive process. 
!e Impact on the Relationship between Government and  
Parliament 
As Maurer asserts, the system of scrutinizing European law 
adopted by parliaments is closely related to their relationship 
with their executives.26 )e systematic scrutiny initiated in HIIE 
strengthened parliament’s oversight of government through the 
development of accountability mechanisms vis-à-vis the execu-
tive. Instead of merely rubber-stamping treaties by ratifying them, 
ESL provides parliaments with instruments for the ex ante ex-
amination of government positions regarding EU matters, which 
provides parliament greater control mechanisms.
)e main goal of the scrutiny process is to hold the Portuguese 
government accountable for its positions in the council of min-
isters, and for that the ESL gives governments a duty to provide 
information to and to consult with parliament. )is focus on gov-
ernment as an object stems from the constitutional link between 
parliament and government at the national level.  )e Portuguese 
constitution grants parliament substantial powers of control over 
the government: the government is politically responsible only 
to parliament. Members of parliament have an eAective means 
of controlling the executive. Prime ministers and ministers are 
regularly called to account by parliament, with greater use of the 
26 Maurer (note J).
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mechanisms for ensuring accountability being clearly observable, 
particularly following the reform of parliamentary procedures in 
HIIF that strengthened the control mechanisms it had over gov-
ernment activity.27 )ere is, however, no procedure for mandating 
ministers. 
)e emerging relationship between government and parlia-
ment in relation to the European legislative processes is an as-
pect of parliament’s reassertion of its powers in after decades of 
decline. While before HIIE parliament’s views on EU matters 
were of little interest to the government, since the adoption of 
ESL, and in particular following the implementation of the Lis-
bon Treaty, there has been an increase in the extent of consulta-
tion between parliament and government in relation to on-going 
European legislative projects. )is is because of parliamentary 
activism and the adoption of opinions that do not follow those 
of the government. It is already true that government provides 
information on its positions before parliament issues its opinions 
and asks for the positions of diAerent parliamentary groups on 
particular draft European projects. )e parliamentary groups have 
also become more pro-active in taking stances on draft European 
legislative projects.
)e following cases illustrate the changing relationship be-
tween government and parliament in this respect. )e first case is 
parliament’s adoption of a position contrary to the government’s 
regarding the EC framework decision on the use of the Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes. )is deci-
sion was taken in the wake of the attack on the twin towers in 
New York on BB September HIIB, and meant European countries 
would provide the United States with information about air pas-
27 AR, Standing Orders of the Assembleia da República B/HIIF, HI August HIIF, 
Diário da República BKC, HI August HIIF, Serie I.
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sengers. )e initiative was examined by three special committees: 
on constitutional aAairs, on rights, freedoms and guarantees, and 
on foreign aAairs and the Portuguese communities and European 
aAairs. Once the committee reports had been received, in accord-
ance with the rules ensuring the proportional representation of all 
parliamentary parties, the EAC nominated a rapporteur from the 
Left Bloc (BE—Bloco de Esquerda). )e opinion of the specialist 
committees notwithstanding, the BE rapporteur believed the EC’s 
decision violated the subsidiarity principle.28 Because of the con-
troversial nature of this dossier the speaker of parliament decided 
to present it to a plenary session for decision. )e EAC drafted 
a motion withdrawing the charge that the proposal violated the 
principle of subsidiarity, following which the resolution was ap-
proved by parliament.29
)e PNR case was a landmark. From then on the centre par-
ties became alert to the sensitivity of possible conflictual stances 
as a consequence of parliament’s scrutiny of EU legislation. )e 
fact the scrutiny process takes place within specialist committees 
and the EAC, where all parliamentary political parties are repre-
sented, resulted in an increase of pluralism and in an increasingly 
ideological debate along left-right lines.
)e possibility that parliament’s opinion could contradict 
those of the Portuguese government in the council of ministers 
triggered a change of heart by the parliamentary parties in re-
spect of the importance of parliament’s examination: government 
institutions became more aware of its disruptive potential. Now, 
whenever a sensitive initiative is on the table, the EAC and the 
28 Available at www.ipex.eu/ipex/cms/home/Documents/dossier_CNSHIIFIHJF/
pid/GFJGD. 
29 AR, Resolution of the Assembleia da República FB/HIIC; Proposal for a framework 
decision, COM (HIIF) p. EKG; Final SEC (HIIF) BGHH and BGKJ, on the use of passenger 
name record data for law enforcement purposes approved on HJ July HIIC.
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government attempt to coordinate positions, which has led to an 
increase in the information exchanged between the executive and 
the legislature in respect of their positions towards European leg-
islative projects. 
One other case in which parliament’s position contradicted 
that of government occurred with the vote on a proposal limiting 
the number of legislative initiatives to be scrutinized by national 
parliaments. Immediately after the Lisbon Treaty took eAect, a 
proposal from the United Kingdom called for a restricted defini-
tion of “draft legal act”, which would result in the exclusion of a 
number of directives and regulations from scrutiny by national 
parliaments with regards their compliance with the subsidiarity 
clause. )e interpretation of the UK government was adopted by 
the council on HH March HIBI. Following this, both the European 
Commission (HF April HIBI) and the European Parliament (May 
HIBI) expressed agreement with the council’s position.30 Conse-
quently, national parliaments will be prevented from examining 
regulations and directives put forward under by Article BIJ Euro-
pean Union treaty, which includes competition policy. 
Reacting to this attempt by its government to reassert its ex-
clusive competence, the UK House of Commons asked for the 
matter to be discussed within the Conference of Community and 
European AAairs Committees of Parliaments of the European 
Union (COSAC) framework by all NP. COSAC considered this 
limited interpretation would take some acts that are legislative 
in substance out of parliamentary scrutiny and called on the EC 
and the European Council to review their position. )e Portu-
guese parliament went against the restrictive approach approved 
30 See letters from these institutions at www.cosac.eu/en/meetings/MadridHIBI/
ordinary.doc. 
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by council,31 arguing the decision would lead to parliament’s re-
ception of fewer initiatives for parliamentary scrutiny. 
)ese cases show how the application of the Lisbon Treaty has 
contributed to the growing importance of the Portuguese parlia-
ment’s opinions to ministers and the PERMREP in Brussels. As 
a result both the government and the PERMREP began provid-
ing information to parliament about governmental views during 
the scrutiny procedure, and after parliament’s opinion is adopted, 
obtained detailed information about the positions of parliamen-
tary groups. )e relationship between parliament and govern-
ment on EU legislation has thus been built up, with parliament 
establishing informal information channels with government— 
particularly with the secretary of state for European aAairs and the 
PERMREP. )is has been one of the major positive side eAects 
of the Lisbon Treaty, making both parliament and government 
aware of each another’s position and, whenever possible, allow-
ing the establishment of a common position that strengthens the 
Portuguese views at the EU level.
!e Strengthening of Relations between EU National  
Parliaments 
)e Lisbon Treaty’s early warning mechanism raised the need 
for an intense and timely exchange of information among nation-
al parliaments. Going beyond the institutionalized participation 
in inter-parliamentary meetings such as COSAC, Conference 
of Speakers from EU Parliaments, European Parliament meet-
ings and the use of the inter-parliamentary information system 
(IPEX), the Portuguese parliament increased it direct contacts 
31 AR, Written opinion of the Assembleia da República on the definition of “legislative 
act” in the Treaty of Lisbon, BJth bianuual COSAC report, available at www.cosac.eu/en/
meetings/MadridHIBI/ordinary.doc.
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with other national parliaments concerning the on-going scrutiny 
process. )e exchange of information helps parliaments influence 
each other’s positions on matters of interests to Portuguese depu-
ties. 
One example of this was on the proposal for a directive on the 
liberalization of the right of entry for seasonal workers, which 
gained the highest number of reasoned opinions in HIBI (nine out 
of HJ of the chambers that examined this proposal).32 )e sensitive 
nature of the proposal ensured a great deal of attention would be 
paid to it by national parliaments. Nine chambers said the pro-
posal violated the subsidiarity principle and expressed reserva-
tions on the social rights provided for in the proposal. Although 
the one-third threshold was not reached, the pronouncement of 
HJ parliamentary chambers provided the EU institutions with a 
strong political signal and represented a warning for similar future 
initiatives. 
Parliament as a Link between Portuguese Civil Society and 
European institutions
In addition to its increased importance in the scrutiny process 
as the main institutional counterpart to government, parliament 
has become link between civil and economic societies and EU 
institutions. As the main interlocutor with the European institu-
tions in the Lisbon Treaty’s early warning mechanism, in political 
dialogue with the EC and in the inter-parliamentary cooperation 
with the European Parliament and the institutional relationship 
32 )e Portuguese parliament’s opinion raised several questions on the substance 
of the proposal, which were also quoted by the government while negotiating at the 
Coreper level. Parliament’s opinion is available at www.ipex.eu/ipex/cms/home/Docu-
ments/dossier_CODHIBIIHBI/pid/KKHCK.
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with the European Council, parliament has assumed an increas-
ingly important role as a multi-level player. 
)e action of the Portuguese parliament on the HIIF initiative 
on a sustainable European wine sector illustrates this new role as 
a mediator between the national and the European levels.33 In its 
usual process of scrutiny, the EAC nominated a rapporteur from 
the committee of economic aAairs, innovation and regional de-
velopment’s sub-committee for agriculture. It also called a public 
hearing with wine producers, the government, Portuguese MEPs 
and the responsible European commissioner. )e debate was pre-
ceded by a public consultation and resulted in a lively discussion 
on the contents and possible consequences of the proposal for the 
Portuguese agriculture and wine sector. )e public exchange on 
the proposal’s contents resulted in the concerns expressed by the 
Portuguese wine sector to be taken into account in the final ver-
sion of the directive. Finally, it allowed the wine sector to prepare 
early for the changes resulting from the directive. 
Conclusion
)e chapter outlines the institutional shape of scrutiny proce-
dures and the importance of the transmission of EC legislative 
initiatives to national parliaments. Parliament’s adaptation to the 
emerging conditions illustrates the impact of timely interaction 
between the pressure for change (the Treaty of Lisbon provisions 
for national parliaments) with reform of internal procedures of 
parliamentary scrutiny (ESL) and the availability of new infor-
mational resources provided by the EC (Barroso initiative). Rath-
er than a result of the politicization of European questions at the 
national level, the adoption of a systematic scrutiny system by 
33 AR, COM JBC (HIIF), available at www.ipex.eu/ipex/cms/home/Documents/
dossier_COMHIIEIJBC.
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parliament was the result of the deliberate coalition of cross-party 
political actors, along with the presence of several high-ranking 
EAC chairmen and motivated speakers responding to EU pres-
sures to ensure the involvement of national parliaments in the 
European legislative arena. )e preparatory work by parliament 
in establishing its EU scrutiny system through the formulation 
and implementation of the ESL was key to the full participation 
of national parliaments in exercising the powers, possibilities and 
mechanisms that the Lisbon Treaty contained three years later.
Parliament adapted to the opportunities by accommodat-
ing its internal procedures to the new realities—in particular by 
strengthening the competences and the resources of the EAC and 
calling on specialist committees to undertake the task of scru-
tinizing EU legislation. )is new routine took root during the 
years before the treaty and was already common practice when it 
entered into force. Trying to go beyond the rubberstamp approach 
of the ratification process, ex post, the instruments of ex ante and 
on-going scrutiny of government positions foreseen in the ESL 
provide parliament with an increase in its control mechanisms. 
)is is key to understanding the extent to which the Lisbon Trea-
ty’s early-warning mechanisms have been implemented.
)e analysis of some landmark cases shows the qualitative 
change in parliament’s role in the European legislative arena fol-
lowing the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, 
relations between parliament and government on the European 
legislative processes have now been routinized and parliament is 
on a path that will lead it to develop its role as a counterpart to 
government in the EU legislative process. In addition parliament 
now has a well-established procedure for daily contact with other 
national parliaments, and has taken steps to establish itself as a 
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multi-level actor and as a bridge between national stakeholders 
and European institutions. 
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Introduction
)e treaties, which during the BCKIs created the foundations 
of what is today the European Union (EU),1 granted—albeit dis-
cretely—an important role to the courts of the member states: 
that of applying EU law as common courts. 
EU law is directed towards individuals and not only towards 
member states and has a binding force superior to that of interna-
tional law. )e Europeanization of national courts has thus been 
essentially a consequence of their duty to apply a common Euro-
pean law, primarily of an economic nature, to private parties.2 Each 
1 )e European Coal and Steel Treaty (ECS), which was signed in Paris on BD 
April BCKB, entered into force on HG July BCKH and was abolished on HJ July HIIH. )e 
European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy (EAE) treaties 
were signed in Rome on HK March BCKF and came into force on B January BCKD. In contrast 
to the ECS, they contain a clause that expressly states their permanent application.  In 
BCCH, with the entry into force of the Treaty on the European Union (TUE), the Eu-
ropean Economic Community Treaty became the European Community Treaty. )e 
Lisbon Treaty, which has been in force since B December HIIC, states in article B(J) in 
fine that the “Union shall replace and succeed the European Community”. From that 
date, the Treaty of Rome became the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). )is text will refer only to the Union. All the articles from the TEU and the 
TFEU will be quoted with their new numeration.
2 )e EU treaties also attribute to the member states’ public administrations the 
role of “common enforcers” of EU law. Litigation between member states and individu-
als concerning the interpretation and the enforcement of EU law must be settled by the 
national courts.
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of the three treaties originally created a single central court—the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ)—conceived as a special court 
endowed with the competences national courts could not exer-
cise properly. Amongst those competences is the guarantee of the 
uniform interpretation and application of EU law across all mem-
ber states. )e relationship the EU treaties originally established 
between the ECJ and national courts was not hierarchical but 
cooperative.3 )is feature of the EU jurisdictional system remains 
unchanged.4 
Within the scope of that “cooperation between courts”, an 
important set of European duties has been assigned to national 
courts. Such duties have been creatively extracted mainly from 
the most important of the founding treaties—the Treaty of Rome. 
)ese Europeanizing impulses, largely jurisdictional in origin—
and of which national courts are also co-authors—will be briefly 
identified before determining the extent to which the Portuguese 
courts have adapted to them since Portugal’s accession to the EU.
'e Essential Features of the EU Jurisdictional System
)e European duties conferred upon member states’ courts can 
be explained with reference to the nature of the EU jurisdictional 
system. )erefore, it is first worth recalling the essential features 
3 P. Magnette, Au nom des peoples: Le malentendu constitutionnel européen (Paris: 
Cerf, HIIE), pp. BB, JB. According to the author, the original European Communities 
sought “an improved means of inter-state diplomacy”. )erefore the treaties were a con-
tinuation of the European diplomatic tradition, without prejudice that they constitute 
“a greater rupture with the European Machtpolitik tradition”.
4 )e establishment of the Court of First Instance in BCDD (now the General 
Court) and the European Civil Service Tribunal in HIIG, both of which were granted 
specific competences that cannot be properly exercized by national courts, in no way 
changes the deeper logic of the EU jurisdictional system.
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of this system, within the parameters of which these obligations 
have been delineated.5
National Courts as EU Common Courts
Since its foundation, the EU has organized itself according to 
the principle of subsidiarity. )is meant rejecting the creation of 
its own system of courts to apply EU law. )e Treaty of Rome 
gave that responsibility to national courts, which thereby became 
EU common courts. In other words, the member states’ courts 
took on the obligation to apply EU law in addition to their duty 
of applying national law. )e powers at their disposal as national 
courts do not necessarily coincide with their powers as EU courts. 
In the latter capacity, the ECJ has vested them with the power 
to either set aside national norms conflicting with EU law or to 
suspend their application.6
In this regard, it must be emphasized that the legal orders of 
several member states, including the Netherlands and Sweden, 
deny such powers to their courts, which are thus compelled to 
apply national legislation even when they consider it to be uncon-
stitutional.
5 )e fundamental legal basis of these obligations is now in article G (J) of the 
TEU. It is worth remembering its wording: “Pursuant to the principle of sincere co-
operation, the Union and the member states shall, in full mutual respect, assist each 
other in carrying out tasks which flow from the treaties. )e member states shall take 
any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations 
arising out of the treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. )e 
member states shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s objectives”.
6 )ese “Europeanizing impulses” for the national courts were made explicit by 
the ECJ in two well-known decisions: the Simmenthal case, BIE/FF (C March BCFD) and 
the Factortame case, HBJ/DC (BC May BCCI).
BBG T-. E/012.345637514 18 P107/9/.:. D.;1<03<=
!e European Court of Justice as Guarantor of the Uniform 
Interpretation and Application of EU Law by National Courts
One power that obviously had to be reserved to the ECJ is that 
of guaranteeing the uniform interpretation of EU law. However, a 
federalist solution was rejected in the process of achieving this ob-
jective. )is would grant the ECJ the final power to set aside na-
tional judicial decisions inconsistent with EU law and would thus 
entail the establishment of a hierarchical relationship between 
national courts and the ECJ. One of the most original aspects of 
the EU jurisdictional system is the result of the approach adopted 
by the Treaty of Rome, aimed at preventing the establishment of 
divergences on questions of EU law. It is thereafter outlined in ar-
ticle HEF of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) that if a national court has doubts on the interpretation 
of EU law it may refer the question directly to the ECJ.7 However, 
if the court which has doubts is the court of last resort, this faculty 
becomes an obligation.
)is is the so-called preliminary ruling procedure; the frame-
work within which the relationship between the ECJ and the na-
tional courts operates.
Relations between the European Court of Justice and the 
National Courts in the Preliminary Ruling Procedure
&e Nature of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure
References to preliminary rulings are an instrument for na-
tional courts but not for parties. Such procedure consists of three 
phases: (B) the national judge refers the question to the ECJ, (H) 
the ECJ answers through a preliminary ruling and (J) the national 
7 )e national judge’s doubts may also concern the validity of a EU act vis-à-vis 
the treaties and the principles contained therein.
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judge applies the ECJ’s preliminary ruling to the pending case. 
)is has important consequences for individuals: they have nei-
ther the right to refer a question to the ECJ nor can they prevent 
the national court from referring questions. )e decision to do so 
rests exclusively with the national courts, which choose whether 
or not to request a preliminary ruling, regardless of the preference 
of the parties in the case.8
Nevertheless, once the national court has decided to make a 
reference to the ECJ, all parties in the national case may take 
part in the correspondent proceedings opened before the ECJ.9 
In such proceedings there are no cross-examinations and replies 
are restricted to the oral phase of the process. In order to ensure 
continued cooperation with national courts, the ECJ established a 
presumption that questions referred are pertinent. Such presump-
tion can only be rebutted in exceptional circumstances, such as (B) 
when it is manifest that the interpretation of EU law has no rela-
tion to reality or with the object of the litigation in the national 
court, (H) when the problem is of an hypothetical nature and (J), 
when the ECJ does not have the factual and legal elements neces-
sary to present a useful response to the questions referred. In these 
8 )e decision to refer can be subject to an internal appeal, but this appeal cannot 
restrict the power of the lower court to refer a question to the ECJ. As the ECJ stated 
in Cartesio, C-HBI/IE, paragraph KJ, a lower court remains “subject to the remedies nor-
mally available under national law. Nevertheless, the outcome of such an appeal cannot 
limit the jurisdiction conferred by articleQHJGQEC (now article HEF of the TFEU) on that 
court to make a reference to the court if it considers that a case pending before it raises 
questions on the interpretation of provisions of community law necessitating a ruling by 
the court”.
9 In addition to the parties in the main process, EU institutions and member 
states may also present their observations to the ECJ in the framework of a preliminary 
procedure. For more information on the observations presented by the Portuguese state, 
see F. P. Coutinho, “Os estados-membros e os processos prejudiciais: Um balanço da 
participação portuguesa nos HI anos da adesão à União Europeia”, Negócios Estrangeiros 
C, B (HIIE), pp. HJBA.
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exceptional circumstances, the ECJ can declare the reference in-
admissible.10
Cases of Mandatory Reference for a Preliminary Ruling
)e aim of article HEF (J) of the TFEU—ensuring the uniform 
interpretation and application of EU law—is to determine those 
cases in which a reference to the ECJ should not be considered 
an option for the national court, but rather as an obligation.11 )e 
most obvious example occurs when the reference for interpreta-
tion or validity of EU law is, to quote article HEF (J) of the TFEU, 
“raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a member 
state, against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under 
national law”. If the court was not obliged to refer the matter to 
the ECJ, and was able to reach a decision alone, the objective of 
ensuring the uniform interpretation and application of EU law 
would be frustrated. )is solitary interpretation or appreciation of 
the validity of an EU provision could result in a solution contrary 
to that of any other national court of last instance.
It follows from article BC(B) in fine of the Maastricht Treaty 
(TEU—Treaty of the European Union) that the ECJ has the fi-
nal word in cases involving the interpretation and validity of EU 
law.12 )is explains why the ECJ has interpreted article HEF (J) of 
the TFEU in order to provide a very strict delimitation of cases 
in which an exception to the obligation to refer can be accepted. 
10 See, among others, the ECJ decision in Beck and Bergdorf, C-JKK/CF (F Septem-
ber BCCC), paragraph H.
11 In the ECJ’s own words, the “obligation to refer is…particularly designed to 
prevent a body of national case law that is not in accordance with the rules of com-
munity law from being established in any member state”. See the Gomes Valente case, 
C-JCJ/CD (HH February HIIB), paragraph BF.
12 See J. H. H. Weiler, “)e transformation of Europe”, Yale Law Journal BII 
(BCCB), p. HGBG.
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According to consistent case law, such an exception is only accept-
able if the national court of last instance can invoke the following: 
(B) that the EU law question is not pertinent for the resolution of 
the national judicial case, (H) that the question raised is materi-
ally identical to a previous ECJ decision or (J), that the correct 
application of EU may be so obvious as to leave no scope for any 
reasonable doubt. )e latter possibility must be assessed on the 
basis of the characteristic features of EU law and the particular 
di@culties to which its interpretation gives rise, as well as the risk 
of divergences in judicial decisions within the EU.13
)e other less obvious case the ECJ has identified as being 
subject to a mandatory reference for a preliminary ruling occurs 
when the national court does not decide in the last instance and 
has doubts about the validity of EU law vis-à-vis the treaties. In 
this case, and contrary to the text of article HEF(H) of the TFEU, 
the ECJ transformed this court into one “against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law”. )erefore, this 
court is obliged to refer a question whenever it considers EU law 
to be invalid.14
13 According to the ECJ, it must be borne in mind EU legislation is drafted in 
several languages and that the diAerent versions are all equally authentic. An interpre-
tation of a provision of EU law thus involves a comparison of the diAerent language 
versions. Even where the diAerent language versions are entirely in accord with one 
another, EU law uses terminology which is peculiar to it. Furthermore, legal concepts do 
not necessarily have the same meaning in EU law and in the law of the various member 
states. In addition, “every provision of community law must be placed in its context and 
interpreted in the light of the provisions of community law as a whole, regard being had 
to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision 
in question is to be applied”. In order to limit as far as possible the exceptions to the 
duty to refer, the ECJ further emphasizes that in any case the national judge must be 
convinced the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other member states and to 
the ECJ. )is somewhat rigid and dated case law, which might have become to some 
extent impractical in an enlarged EU, was expounded in CLIFIT, HDJ/DB (E October 
BCDH), paragraphs BE–HB and was reiterated in Intermodal, C-GCK/IJ (BK September HIIK), 
paragraph GK.
14 See Foto-Frost, JBG/DK (HH October BCDF).
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National Courts’ Duties as EU Courts
!e Duty to Enforce EU Law
As stated above, the keystone of the EU jurisdictional system 
is the preliminary rulings procedure, which has potential conse-
quences that were unforeseen by the authors of the treaties. In 
fact, within the framework of such procedure it has been possible 
to confer upon EU law a binding force similar to that of national 
law. )is became clear when, in a decision of K February BCEJ, the 
ECJ responded in the a@rmative to the question of whether ar-
ticle BH of the Treaty of Rome (now article JI of the TFEU)—
which was directed to member states—produced an “internal 
eAect”.15 In other words, a Dutch court asked if parties could “lay 
claim to individual rights which the national courts must protect”. 
)e question concerned the company Van Gend & Loos, 
which imported urea formaldehyde from Germany. )e company 
invoked article BH to contest the decision of the Dutch admin-
istrative authorities obliging it to pay more customs duties. )e 
principle of the direct eAect implies that the Treaty of Rome “is 
more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obliga-
tions between the contracting states”. According to the ECJ, the 
task assigned to it under article HEF of the TFEU confirms that 
the member states have acknowledged EU law has an authority 
which can be invoked by their nationals before the national courts 
and tribunals. Moreover, “the vigilance of individuals concerned 
to protect their rights amounts to an eAective supervision in ad-
dition to the supervision entrusted by articles BEC and BFI (now 
15 In its original version this article said “member states shall refrain from intro-
ducing, as between themselves, any new customs duties on importation or exportation 
or charges with equivalent eAect and from increasing such duties or charges as they 
apply in their commercial relations with each other”.
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articles HKD and HKC of the TFEU) to the diligence of the Com-
mission and of the member states”.
In the case Van Gend & Loos, the ECJ also established the 
supremacy of EU law over conflicting national law—albeit im-
plicitly. In eAect, EU law is able to produce immediate internal 
eAects and to confer individual rights the national courts must 
protect, only if conflicting national law—whether prior or pos-
terior to EU law, constitutional or infra-constitutional—is not 
applied by those courts.16 National courts thus began to increase 
the frequency of preliminary references to the ECJ in order to 
obtain decisions on the compatibility of national law with EU law, 
understood as a higher law.17 Indeed, this soon came to represent 
the largest proportion of cases referred to the ECJ. However, the 
ECJ never considered itself competent to answer such questions 
directly in the framework of article HEF of the TFEU18.
Notwithstanding, instead of declaring them inadmissible, the 
ECJ reformulates these questions when necessary, seeking always 
to give the national court all the elements necessary to enable it 
to decide by itself on the compatibility of national law with EU 
law.19 To that eAect, the ECJ demands from national courts the 
16 See Costa-ENEL, E/EG (BK July BCEG).
17 Among the cases referred by Portuguese judges see, for example, the case re-
ferred by the Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa, BBGI/CI (BI December BCCI), Colectânea 
de Jurisprudência V (BCCI), pp. BEI–B. In this case the Portuguese court expressly asked 
the ECJ to rule on the compatibility of a decree-law provision with the Treaty of Rome’s 
provisions on the free movement of people and services.
18 See Pretore di Salò, BG/DE (BB June BCDF), paragraph BK.
19 According to a former ECJ judge, “having paid lip service to the language of the 
treaty and having clarified the meaning of the relevant community measure, the court 
usually went on to indicate to what extent a certain type of national legislation can be 
regarded as compatible with that measure. )e national judge is thus led hand-in-hand 
as far as the door: crossing the threshold is his job, but now a job no harder than child’s 
play”. See Federico G. Mancini, “)e making of a constitution for Europe”, Common 
Market Law Review HE (BCDC), p. EIE.
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factual and legal framework of the national case in which the ref-
erence is made. Failure to do so may result in the reference being 
declared inadmissible.20 Once the ECJ enacts such a ruling, the 
referring court is obliged to set aside any national law incompat-
ible with EU law and must decide the pending case based on this 
decision.21 In this sense, a reference to the ECJ has an outcome 
that is comparable to that which occurs in federal systems when 
state law conflicts with federal law.22
Corollaries of the Duty to Enforce EU Law
)e principles of direct eAect and supremacy contributed de-
cisively to the autonomization of EU law as a new type of law,23 
more compelling than international law and almost as compel-
ling as national law.24 )e ECJ, always in cooperation with the 
national courts, proceeded to develop a collection of supplemen-
tary means to guarantee the eAectiveness of EU law. Amongst the 
most relevant are the principle of consistent interpretation and 
the principle of member states’ responsibility for the violation of 
EU law.
20 See Telemarsicabruzzo, C-JHI/CI, C-JHB/CI and C-JHH/CI (HE January BCCJ).
21 “)e national courts are presented, in the legal order of the respective member 
states, as the final recourse against the national norms conflicting with Community 
law”. See O. Dubos, Les juridictions nationales: Juge communautaire (Paris: Dalloz, HIIB), 
p. KE.
22 )is confirms the single nature of the European integration project, which has 
proved itself capable of achieving a level of legal integration similar to far more ad-
vanced federations, while retaining strong member states. See P. Magnette (note J), p. 
BGH. )e author notes that if the EU member states submit themselves to a constitution-
al discipline, it is by the force of their own will and not because they are subordinated 
to the sovereignty and the state authority of a European people—which obviously does 
not exist (p. BKH).
23 Among the reasons for the absence of direct eAect of an EU law provision is the 
possibility its content is not unconditional and su@ciently precise.
24 See P. Magnette (note J), p. BKH.
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&e Principle of Consistent Interpretation
According to this principle, member state courts must inter-
pret national norms in conformity with EU law. )is results from 
article G(J) of the TEU, which imposes on all national authori-
ties—including (within the ambit of their responsibilities) courts 
and tribunals—the obligation to adopt any appropriate measure, 
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of obligations arising out 
of EU treaties or resulting from the acts of the EU institutions. 
)is principle assumes special importance in relation to directives. 
)e direct eAect of these acts can only be invoked in proceed-
ings between individuals and public authorities (direct vertical 
eAect),25 and not between individuals (direct horizontal eAect). 
Moreover, the direct eAect of a directive can only be invoked in 
cases in which there has been no transposition into national law 
within the established deadline, or where the transposition was 
concluded in an incorrect manner.26
It follows from the principle of consistent interpretation that 
“national courts are required to interpret their national law in the 
light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to 
achieve the result referred to in the third paragraph of article BDC 
[now article HDD of the TFEU]”.27 )is “indirect direct” eAect to 
25 In this context, the ECJ interprets the concept of public authority in very wide-
ranging terms. See Foster, C-BDD/DC (BH July BCCI), paragraph HI.
26 See Ratti, BGD/FD (K April BCFC), paragraphs HJ and HG.
27 See Von Colson and Kamann, BG/DJ (BI April BCDG), paragraph HE. According to 
the Arcaro ruling (C-BED/CK [HE September BCCE]), the obligation of the national court 
to refer to the content of the directive when interpreting the relevant rules of its own 
national law reaches a limit “where such an interpretation leads to the imposition on 
an individual of an obligation laid down by a directive that has not been transposed or, 
more especially, where it has the eAect of determining or aggravating, on the basis of 
the directive and in the absence of a law enacted for its implementation, the liability in 
criminal law of persons who act in contravention of that directive’s provisions” (para-
graph GH).
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a large extent mitigates the absence of the directive’s direct hori-
zontal eAect.28
!e Principle of Member States’ Responsibility for the Violation 
of EU Law
)is principle, the most recent of the corollaries to the princi-
ple of the eAectiveness of EU law, was initially invoked by the ECJ 
against the Italian state for not transposing within the established 
deadlines a directive the provisions of which were not uncondi-
tional and su@ciently precise. )at meant such provisions could 
not be invoked before a national court. According to the ECJ, in 
such cases “the full eAectiveness of community rules would be 
impaired and the protection of the rights which they grant would 
be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when 
their rights are infringed by a breach of community law for which 
a member state can be held responsible”.
)e ECJ has held this right to reparation depends on the ful-
filment of three conditions: (B) the EU provision infringed must 
be intended to confer rights on individuals, (H) the breach must 
be su@ciently grievous and (J), there must be a direct causal link 
between the breach of the obligation resting on the member state 
and the loss or damage sustained by the injured parties.29
More recently, the ECJ—always within the preliminary rul-
ings framework—extended the principle of responsibility for the 
infringement of EU law to the decisions of the national courts 
28 )e principle of conforming interpretation was even extended to the framework 
decisions of the former EU’s third pillar through the ECJ’s ruling on the Pupino case, 
C-BIK/IJ (BE June HIIK). )is has contributed towards a considerable strengthening of 
the e@cacy of these legal acts, which were closer to international law, and particularly 
attenuated the reach of the former article JG (H) (b) of the TUE, which stated “frame-
work decisions do not produce a direct eAect”.
29 See Francovich et al., C-E/CI and C-C/CI (BC November BCCB), paragraph JJ, 
and Brasserie du Pêcheur et al., C-GE/CJ and GD/CJ (K March BCCE), paragraphs KB–H.
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adjudicating at last instance. Nevertheless, state liability for such 
an infringement “can be incurred only in the exceptional case 
where the court has manifestly infringed the applicable law”.
Among the factors the competent national court hearing a 
claim for reparation due to a judicial decision of that nature must 
take account are “in particular, the degree of clarity and precision 
of the rule infringed, whether the infringement was intentional, 
whether the error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the po-
sition taken, where applicable, by a Community institution and 
the non-compliance by the court [adjudicating at last instance] in 
question with its obligation to make a reference for a preliminary 
ruling under the third paragraph of article HJG” (now article HEF 
TFEU).30
Developing this case law, the ECJ, prompted by an Italian 
court that had referred a question for preliminary ruling concern-
ing the state’s responsibility for an infringement of EU law al-
legedly committed by one of the country’s supreme courts, ruled 
EU law precludes national legislation which (B) excluded state 
liability, in a general manner, for damage caused to individuals 
by an infringement of EU law attributable to a court adjudicat-
ing at last instance by reason of the fact that the infringement 
in question “results from an interpretation of provisions of law 
or an assessment of facts or evidence carried out by that court”, 
and (H) limited such liability solely to cases of intentional fault 
and serious misconduct on the part of the court, if “such a limita-
tion were to lead to exclusion of the liability of the member state 
concerned in other cases where a manifest infringement of the 
applicable law was committed, as set out in paragraphs KJ to KE of 
the Köbler judgment”. Since the interpretation of legal norms and 
the assessment of facts and evidence are the true essence of the 
30 See Köbler, C-HHG/IB (JI September HIIJ), paragraphs KJ–E.
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jurisdictional function, such law would be tantamount to render-
ing meaningless the principle of state responsibility for the viola-
tion of EU law by a national court adjudicating at last instance.31
With this decision, the “Europeanizing impulses” emitted to 
national courts by the ECJ case law reached a new peak. It be-
comes possible for a lower court competent to hear claims for 
reparation to judge and eventually sanction the actions of a higher 
court for infringements of EU law and particularly for infringing 
the duty to refer imposed by paragraph three of article HEF of the 
TFEU. )is has been seen as a curious inversion of roles in the 
national legal hierarchy.32 
&e Principle of Procedural Autonomy and its Limits
In the absence of provisions adopted by the EU, the nation-
al courts competent to apply EU law are in principle bound by 
their procedural judicial organization laws. It is therefore within 
this framework that individuals must seek to protect their rights 
granted by EU law. )e principle, according to which national 
courts must comply with national procedural law when applying 
EU law is called the principle of procedural autonomy of member 
states.33
Since diAerences in procedural law can have serious repercus-
sions on substantive law, the principle of the eAectiveness of EU 
law had to impose limits on the principle of procedural autonomy 
of member states. )ese limitations are two-fold: (B) national pro-
cedural law cannot make a distinction between the demands of 
individuals based on EU law and their demands based on national 
31 See Traghetti del Mediterraneo, C-BFJ/IJ (BJ June HIIE), paragraphs JE, GI.
32 See A.-S. Botella, “La responsabilité du juge national”, Revue Trimestrielle de 
Droit Européen H (HIIG), pp. HDJ–JBK.
33 See Rewe, JJ/FE (BE December BCFE).
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law (the principle of equivalence) and (H) even if such distinction 
is not made, national procedural law cannot render virtually im-
possible or excessively di@cult the exercise of rights conferred by 
EU law (the principle of eAectiveness).34
EU law proscribes, as a breach of the principle of equivalence, 
that in order to exercise rights conferred by EU law—such as the 
right of reparation for damages caused by the member state for 
the non-transposition of a directive—the individual must pay le-
gal expenses and meet deadlines more onerous than those that 
would result from the exercise of a similar right based on the na-
tional law. )e injured party can invoke such principle before the 
national court in order to eliminate the discrimination.
Similarly, EU law proscribes, in the name of the principle of 
eAectiveness, that national procedural law, despite being applied 
indiscriminately, establishes rules of proof that create a practical 
impossibility for an injured party to exercise the right of refund 
for any undue payments. In such a case, the injured party can in-
voke the principle of eAectiveness in order to prevent the applica-
tion of national norms demanding such a proof.
)ese principles represent strong “Europeanizing impulses” 
for the national courts, leading them to set aside when necessary 
any conflicting national provisions. )ese “impulses” also extend 
to the national legislator and lead it to establish procedural rules 
compatible with EU law.
It remains to be seen to what extent the principle of state re-
sponsibility for the infringement of EU law by a national supreme 
court will imply the adaptation of the judicial organization of the 
member states in order to prevent or limit the eAects of the “hier-
archical inversion” mentioned above. In any case, it is essential to 
avoid an eventual scenario whereby a supreme court could review, 
34 See Aprile, C-HHD/CE (BF November BCCD), paragraph BD.
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on appeal, a decision of a lower court that imputes on the same 
supreme court an infringement of EU law. Otherwise, the princi-
ple of impartiality would be impaired.35
A Weak Point of the EU Jurisdictional System:  
'e Precarious Nature of the Guarantees for Compliance 
with Article (&# (+) of the TFEU
)e preliminary ruling procedure has succeeded to such an 
extent that the ECJ has become a so-called “victim of its own 
success”.36 )is disguised the main weaknesses of this procedure: 
the precarious nature of the guarantees provided by the EU legal 
order itself for compliance with the duty to refer set out in article 
HEF (J) of the TFEU.37
It has been claimed a member state can, under article HKD of 
the TFEU, be called before the ECJ for infringements of EU 
35 See, however, the judgement of the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça of J December 
HIIC, P. CBDI/IF.JTBBRG.GB.S.B, Cadernos de Justiça Administrativa, FC (HIBI), pp. 
HC–JF, with a critical annotation of Maria José Rangel de Mesquita, “Irresponsabilidade 
do Estado-juiz por incumprimento do direito da União Europeia: Um acórdão sem 
futuro”, pp. JF–GK. See also Alessandra Silveira, “Da (ir)responsabilidade do estado-juiz 
por violação do direito da União Europeia—Anotação ao acórdão do Supremo Tribunal 
de Justiça de J de Dezembro de HIIC”, Scientia Iuridica, vol. LVIII, JHI (HIIC), pp FFJ–
DIG and N. Piçarra, “As incidências do direito da União Europeia sobre a organização 
e o exercício da função jurisdicional nos Estados-Membros”, encontrosdireitopublico.
blogspot.com, pp. BH–BE.
36 See T. Koopmans, “La procédure préjudicielle—victime de son succès?”, in F. 
Caportorti, C.-D. Ehlermann, J. Frowein, F. Jacobs, R. Joliet, T. Koopmans and R. Ko-
var (eds), Liber Amicorum Pescatore (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, BCDF), pp. 
JGF–KF.
37 At the national level, some member states have developed internal mechanisms 
to guarantee compliance with the duty to refer questions to the ECJ. For example, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court, the Austrian Constitutional Court and the 
Spanish Constitutional Court have all declared themselves competent to control fail-
ures to refer by courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy 
under national law. For a discussion of the Portuguese case, see N. Piçarra, O Tribunal de 
Justiça das Comunidades Europeias como juiz legal e o processo do artigo !!$ do tratado CEE: 
As relações entre a ordem jurídica comunitária e as ordens jurídicas dos estados-membros na 
perspectiva dos tribunais constitucionais, (Lisbon: AAFDL, BCCB).
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law by its courts. Nevertheless, the European Commission (EC) 
only recently initiated infringement proceedings in cases related 
to failures to refer in breach of article HEF (J) of the TFEU.38
It could also be argued that as a result of the Köbler case law, 
state responsibility emerges if the duty to refer is breached. None-
theless, article HEF (J) of the TFEU was never intended to confer 
rights upon individuals, and particularly the right to a preliminary 
reference. )is has always been rejected in the name of the “inter-
court” procedural nature of such mechanism. Nevertheless, as a 
result of the Köbler and CILFIT decisions, a supreme court that 
wishes to avoid the serious risk of giving rise to member state 
responsibility must carefully assess the necessity to make a pre-
liminary reference and cannot—except when a case is materially 
identical to one on which the ECJ has already made a ruling—
simply resolve the question ex o@cio, through the simple invoca-
tion of the clarity of the EU provisions in question.39 )is is the 
most recent “European duty” national courts are pledged to fulfil 
in this context.
Portuguese Courts’ Reactions to the  
“Europeanizing Impulses”
)e evolution of EU law has been the result of some pro- 
activity on the part of the ECJ; however, it has never ceased to be 
supported through a real legal dialogue with the national courts 
38 In a case concerning the Swedish supreme court’s failure to refer cases to the 
ECJ, see Schmauch, “Lack of preliminary rulings as an infringement of article HJG: Eu-
ropean Commission case COM HIIJ/HBEB, procedure against the Kingdom of Sweden”, 
European Law Reporter (HIIK) pp. GGKA, and U. Bernitz, “)e duty of supreme courts 
to refer cases to the ECJ: )e commission’s action against Sweden”, Swedish Studies in 
European Law B (HIIE) pp. JFA.
39 See P. J. Wattel, “Köbler, CILFIT and Welthgrove: We can’t go on meeting like 
this”, Common Market Law Review GB (HIIG), p. BFD.
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through the preliminary reference mechanism. By making refer-
ences to the ECJ, the national courts have allowed EU law both 
to expand its ambit and ensure its progressive and systematic in-
ternal consolidation. )e almost complete acceptance of the ECJ’s 
preliminary rulings gave EU law practically the same binding 
force attributed to domestic law.
)e second part of this chapter provides a brief outline on how 
Portuguese courts have reacted to the “Europeanizing impulses” 
cited above during the first two decades of Portugal’s membership 
of the EU. )is will also enable an assessment of the dialogue es-
tablished between Portuguese courts and the ECJ, as well as their 
contribution towards the development of EU law.
It is important first to analyse the way in which Portuguese 
courts have used the preliminary rulings procedure, which is the 
main framework for the establishment of such a dialogue.
Portuguese Courts and Article "#$ of the TFEU
What the Figures Reveal
Table K.B shows the number of references made by member 
states’ courts between BCDE and HIIK.40 Taking the absolute figures 
as a starting point, it should be noted that, compared to Portu-
guese courts, only the Irish, Luxembourgeois and Finnish courts 
have demonstrated less interest in making references to the ECJ. 
Portuguese preliminary references represent only B.G per cent of 
the total sent to the ECJ during the period in question.
)e rate of references from Portuguese courts has also been 
erratic. Following a slow start up in the BCDIs there was a gradual 
increase that reached its peak in HIII. In recent years there has 
40 )e BH most recent member states have not been included since there is no data 
available to enable a useful comparison.
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been a sharp fall in the number of referrals, which contrasts with 
the general trend across member states. Since HIIB, Portuguese 
courts have referred an average of just more than one case per year. 
To some extent, this undermines the thesis proposed by Sweet 
and Brunnel, who claim there is a direct link between the evolu-
tion of a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and the level of 
trade with other member states on the one hand, and the number 
of cases referred to the ECJ by the national courts on the other.41
41 See A. C. Sweet and T. L. Brunell, “Constructing a supranational constitution: 
Dispute resolution and governance in the European Community”, American Political 
Science Review CB, B (BCCD), p. FJ.
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One of the possible explanations for these figures is Portugal’s 
small population in comparison with other member states. )e 
population variable—which must not be considered decisive— 
allows for the calculation of the relative value of the total number 
of cases referred (see Table K.H).
)e introduction of this scale element worsens Portugal’s 
relative position, since its courts are the penultimate in terms of 
the ratio of population to number of references (K.GH), exceed-
ing Spain (J.FC) and coming in some distance behind courts of 
member states with similar populations, such as the Netherlands 
(HG.CI), Austria (JJ.EK) and Belgium (JG.JH).
&e Authors of the Portuguese Preliminary References
Analysing Portugal’s references from the perspective of their 
authors—that is to say, the courts that made the reference to the 
ECJ (see Table K.J)—produces a conclusive set of data.42
)e first fact to note is the disproportionate number of cases 
referred by the administrative courts (DI per cent) and those re-
ferred by the civil courts (HI per cent). Nevertheless, this may be 
partially justified by the fact EU law continues to be essentially of 
an economic and administrative nature. 
)e second fact worth noting is that only approximately one-
third of the cases referred originated in lower courts, which are 
by far the most numerous courts in the Portuguese jurisdictional 
system—as indeed they are in every jurisdictional system. 
)is figure clearly contrasts with the situation in the majority 
of member states and, therefore, casts some doubts on Weiler’s 
judicial empowerment thesis, which states it is essentially the 
42 For more on Portugal’s preliminary references, see R. Chambel Margarido, “O 
pedido de decisão prejudicial e o princípio da cooperação jurisdicional”, Working Papers 
da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Nova de Lisboa D/CC (BCCC).
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lower courts that feel a greater need to refer cases to the ECJ for 
a preliminary ruling. Weiler argues that through this mechanism 
lower courts obtain “powers reserved to the supreme courts”.43
In the case of Portugal, the Supreme Administrative Court 
(STA) made more references (JH) than all the lower administra-
tive and tax courts combined (BG). )e same cannot be said of the 
civil courts. )e statistics reveal it took the Supreme Court of Jus-
tice (STJ)—which for the purposes of article HEF (J) of the TFEU 
is one of the highest courts in the land—HI years to make its first 
reference to the ECJ.44 All the country’s lower civil courts have, 
together, referred fewer than ten cases to the ECJ.
43 See J. H. H. Weiler, “)e transformation of Europe”, Yale Law Journal BII 
(BCCB), p. HGHE.
44 )is occurred on J November HIIK, in Process IKBBEGI, which was heard by a 
former Portuguese judge in the ECJ, José Carlos Moitinho de Almeida.
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It should also be noted in this context that the Portu-
guese Constitutional Court has never made a reference to 
the ECJ within the framework of article HEF of the TFEU, a 
fact consistent with the general trend in other member states. 
However, the Portuguese constitutional court has recog-
nized its duty to refer in a manner that is uncommon amongst 
its peers.45
Portuguese Preliminary Reference Subject
Figure K.B shows the existence of a scale of priorities concern-
ing matters referred to the ECJ: a scale that reflects the fact the 
administrative and tax courts make the greatest number of refer-
ences. 
As the graph clearly shows, tax questions and those relating to 
customs duties accounted for BD and BG respectively, representing 
KE per cent of the total. Following far behind are questions relat-
ing to the approximation of laws (G), social policy (G), competition 
(J) and the free movement of goods (J).
Close analysis of the preliminary references also allows the col-
lection of other conclusive data. )e first is connected to the fact 
that such cases generally pertain to the interpretation of high-
ly specific and technical norms of EU law. Perhaps it is for this 
reason that ECJ preliminary rulings have only very rarely had a 
significant impact on the Portuguese legal order. )e main excep-
tions, however, have been some cases regarding notary and regis-
try emoluments and cases concerning the maximum cost of car 
insurance. Both resulted in legislative changes.
45 See ruling BEJ/CI (HJ May BCCI), in Acórdãos do Tribunal Constitucional BE (BCCI), 
p. JIB, and ruling EIE/CG (HH November BCCG), in Acórdãos do Tribunal Constitucional 
HC (BCCG), p. BEB. See also J. L. Cruz Vilaça, L. M. Pais Antunes and N. Piçarra, “Droit 
constitutionnel et droit communautaire: Le cas portugais”, Rivista di Diritto Europeo H 
(BCCB), p. JIB.
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)e ECJ’s Reaction to Portuguese Preliminary References 
)e picture outlined would be incomplete without a generic 
comment on the responses the ECJ has given to Portuguese pre-
liminary references.
In this respect, there have been several cases in which the ECJ 
has refused to provide an answer, since it considered the reference 
to be either inadmissible or poorly based, or because it had to be 
reformulated before it was able to decide. )is seems to reveal 
a certain lack of understanding on the part of some Portuguese 
courts as to how the preliminary rulings procedure works.
Portuguese Courts and the Duty to Refer
A closer examination of the judicial cases involving the ap-
plication of EU law but did not result in references for prelimi-
nary rulings reveals some infringements of article HEF (J) of the 
TFEU—including frequent examples of clear misunderstandings 
of the fundamental duty to refer. It is worth mentioning those 
cases in which the national court recognized the existence of 
doubts in the interpretation of EU law, but decided to resolve such 
doubts without the ECJ’s support. In other cases, the same court 
has concluded a reference is only necessary when confronted with 
unavoidable interpretative doubts. On the other hand, numerous 
rulings that refused parties’ requests for referrals invoked—either 
explicitly or implicitly—the so-called theory of acte clair, with-
out taking into account the criteria established by the ECJ in the 
CILFIT case.
Moreover, there have been several cases in which the courts re-
fused an ex o'cio power to refer, or where they excluded a reference 
concerning certain EU acts, such as recommendations. Finally, it 
should be noted that, paradoxically, all the cases mentioned were 
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heard in the STA, which is the Portuguese court responsible for 
most of the country’s preliminary references.
Portuguese Courts and the Duty to Enforce EU Law:  
'e Portuguese Peculiarity
Contrary to what may be observed in other member states, 
the assimilation of European obligations has occurred rather un-
eventfully in Portugal.
)e principles of supremacy and the direct eAect of EU norms 
were quickly accepted by Portuguese courts, although in many 
cases article eight of the constitution provided the basis for rather 
than recognition of the autonomy of EU law. In contrast to certain 
French and German courts, Portuguese courts had no di@culty 
accepting their duty to directly enforce European directives. )e 
same is true with respect to the principles of consistent interpre-
tation and the state’s responsibility for infringements of EU law.
During the first HI years of EU membership there have been 
few examples of rebellious attitudes by Portuguese courts vis-à-vis 
their European obligations. How, then, can we explain this ap-
parent peculiarity: the small number of cases referred to the ECJ 
given the acceptance by the Portuguese courts of their “Europe-
an obligations” related to the application of EU law? )ere are a 
number of possible factors that should be considered in providing 
an answer to this question.
First, when Portugal joined the EU, the member states’ courts 
had to a significant extent overcome the resistance originally sur-
rounding some of the more “revolutionary” principles of EU law, 
such as those of supremacy and the direct eAect. Second, the re-
visions of the Portuguese constitution have in some ways incor-
porated these principles and facilitated the acceptance of newly 
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created ones. )ird, the Portuguese constitution explicitly entitles 
each court to set aside provisions considered unconstitutional—a 
competence that gives all courts equal status. With this embed-
ded autonomy, the Portuguese courts may have felt less need than 
their European counterparts to seek support from the ECJ on the 
interpretation and application of EU law.
Conclusions
More than HI years after Portugal’s accession, EU law still does 
not have an impact on the Portuguese legal order comparable to 
the impact experienced in other member states.
Without prejudice to the fact some Portuguese courts are still 
not completely familiar with the preliminary reference procedure, 
the limited use of this mechanism by lower courts is largely rooted 
in the particular status they have been vested with by the BCFE 
constitution. )is status allows them to decide upon the most im-
portant questions of law without the need to seek advice or rul-
ings from superior courts. Concerning the highest courts, while 
the absence of references for preliminary rulings by the STJ may 
be perplexing, the STA’s successive violations of the duty to refer 
might also have something to do with the rigidity of the criteria 
set out in CILFIT.
The Europeanization of Portuguese 






)e process of European integration has exerted significant 
influence in the industrial relations realm, not only through the 
implementation of the acquis communautaire and European reg-
ulation on social aAairs, but more importantly by fostering the 
opening of the Portuguese economy to increasing competition, 
which has led to privatizations, downsizing and internal restruc-
turing of economic sectors, and the liberalization of the economy. 
)ese developments have generated pressures and have had an 
enormous influence on the social actors contributing to the emer-
gence of a new pattern of industrial relations. Yet the legacies of 
authoritarianism and the experience of the revolutionary period 
have hindered eAorts to institutionalize a modern and stable in-
dustrial relations setting that is based on trust and cooperation. 
)is chapter will look at the transformation of the Portuguese 
trade unions and employers’ associations, and outline the main 
features of the Portuguese industrial relations framework.1
1 )is chapter borrows from S. Royo, A new century of corporatism? Spain and 
Portugal in comparative perspective (Westport, CT: Praeger, HIIH).
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Historical Background
In Portugal, a military coup installed a new authoritarian re-
gime in BCHE. During the BCJIs the establishment of the authori-
tarian corporatist New State by the new dictator, António Salazar 
(BCJH–ED) and the approval of a new constitution in BCJJ led to the 
replacement of all independent political parties by the National 
Union (UN—União Nacional) and the banning of all independ-
ent unions in favour of new corporatist bodies. )is regime lasted 
for more than GI years.
)e legacy of intervention by an authoritarian corporatist re-
gime has left a strong imprint on the configuration of the Por-
tuguese labour market and its trade union structure. )e regime 
was also characterized by direct state intervention in the economy 
and authoritarian regulation of labour relations through corpo-
ratist institutions. )e state was in charge of licensing new firms, 
setting external tariAs, foreign investment, finance, planning and 
control over prices, wages and rents.2 A modified version of the 
Italian National Labour Statute (Estatuto de Trabalho Nation-
al) was introduced. It would regulate labour relations and inter-
est group representation for the next GI years. )e authoritarian 
government sought to overcome the class struggle. In the realm 
of industrial relations, the regime created a corporatist system of 
industrial relations based on sindicatos nacionais (national trade 
unions) and grémios (employers’ guilds), which had a legal mo-
nopoly of representation and were directly controlled by the gov-
ernment. While union membership was voluntary, non-members 
were forced to pay dues, and the government promoted collective 
bargaining very early, although it was a state-directed process, and 
2 J. Barreto, “Portugal: Industrial relations under democracy”, in A. Ferner and R. 
Hyman (eds), Industrial relations in the new Europe (Cambridge: Blackwell, BCCH), pp. 
GGK–DB.
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since it was voluntary it happened very rarely at company level. 
Until the BCEIs, wages and most labour regulations were directly 
established by the government. )e law admitted only individual 
grievances: strikes were illegal and repressed.
)e heritage of authoritarian corporatism led to a state-dom-
inated industrial relations setting. During the last period of the 
regime, the new leader—Marcelo Caetano—tried to foster more 
union autonomy and strengthen collective bargaining—which 
became legally compulsory—in order to improve productivity, 
management and to increase wages. )ese reforms introduced 
limited autonomy and fostered collective bargaining. Strikes re-
mained illegal, but the government developed state-sponsored 
conciliation and arbitration procedures to address industrial dis-
putes. )e organization of free elections within unions resulted in 
the penetration of these organizations by people opposed to the 
regime, particularly by the communists. )ey mobilized workers 
against the regime, which led to repression during the regime’s 
final years and a dramatic radicalization of class relations in the 
transition period. )ese activities resulted in a renewed member-
ship drive, fostered by the new status and respectability of these 
organizations.
)e fall of the regime in BCFG resulted in the dismantling of 
the corporatist system. In BCFG, military o@cers, concerned about 
the future of the country and disaAected by the colonial wars, 
staged a coup that ended the authoritarian regime. )is triggered 
a democratic transition process that had enormous consequences 
for Portugal’s labour market and economic institutions. However, 
the transition to democracy was not smooth: democratization was 
threatened in BCFG–FK by a revolutionary communist movement 
that sought to construct a socialist society, and which took the 
country to the brink of civil war. )e social and political climate 
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during the revolution was radically anti-capitalist, and the Com-
munist Party (PCP—Partido Comunista Português) gained con-
trol of the ministry of labour and another government post. )is 
resulted in a shift in the balance of power in favour of the workers, 
who exerted pressure—including intimidation and violence—and 
led to a spectacular increase in pay and social security benefits.
)is revolutionary period, although short, left an enduring leg-
acy in the country. In contrast to Spain, where the unions largely 
submerged their ambitions within the overall project of gradual 
reform, in Portugal the revolutionary nature of the transition proc-
ess fostered workers’ radicalization, deepened resentment between 
workers and employers and hindered the development of a new 
bargaining culture based on compromise. )is legacy is still felt 
in the country, and has hindered the modernization of the Por-
tuguese industrial relations system. In addition, state intervention 
increased during the revolution and the constitution enshrined a 
new system of industrial relations that was very favourable towards 
workers. All national banks and insurance companies, as well as 
many manufacturing firms, were nationalized. At the same time, 
the revolutionary government approved new and inflexible labour 
laws. For instance, norms regulating redundancies, dismissals and 
the rules on severance pay were very restrictive.3
Moreover, the BCFE constitution enshrined the right to job se-
curity, and this prevented successive governments from reforming 
the labour laws. Social security was extended to the whole popu-
lation in BCFG, but benefits remained low by European standards. 
Furthermore, most workers were covered by statutory regulations: 
3 One paradox, however, is that legal rules covering temporary hiring were per-
missive allowing Portuguese employers to hire workers on a temporary basis, thus by-
passing restrictions covering dismissals and the high severance pay costs. )e result 
of this development has been—as in Spain during the second half of the BCDIs—the 
increasing segmentation of the labour market and a sharp increase in temporary em-
ployment.
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the government introduced a minimum wage in BCFG that is re-
vised every year, and it approved a new law in BCFK that made 
collective dismissals di@cult. )ese measured were slowly re-
versed during the BCDIs when successive governments led by the 
liberal-conservative Social Democratic Party (PSD—Partido So-
cial Democrata) reformed the constitution and approved labour 
laws introducing a more flexible legislation facilitating collective 
dismissals and reducing the costs associated with severance of 
employment.4 )ese developments resulted in a dramatic dete-
rioration of economic conditions, with mass unemployment, high 
inflation, huge budget deficits and recession that exerted heavy 
pressures on the labour market and companies, and led to defla-
tionary policies by subsequent governments. Failed coup attempts 
in BCFG and BCFK gave way to a new phase in the transition process 
that culminated in free elections based on universal suArage in 
BCFK and BCFE. After the elections, the Socialist Party (PS—Par-
tido Socialista) led by Mário Soares became the largest party, and 
the PCP was excluded from power. A new constitution was ap-
proved in BCFE that paved the way for the establishment of a new 




)e communist-led union coalition Intersindical emerged 
from the illegal and clandestine union opposition movement 
during the authoritarian regime. )is union formed the ba-
sis of a national labour confederation after the revolution, 
4 Barreto (note H), pp. GKG–K; J. Barreto and R. Naumann, “Portugal: Industrial 
relations under democracy”, in A. Ferrer and R. Hyman (eds), Changing industrial rela-
tions in Europe: Portugal (Cambridge: Blackwell, BCCD), p. GIH.
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Intersindical Nacional, which emerged in BCFG when it gained 
control over most national unions. Two-thirds of existing unions 
joined Intersindical in BCFG–FK. Intersindical sought to monop-
olize the labour movement and advocated a unitary labour or-
ganization.5 )e communists’ influence during the revolutionary 
period facilitated this objective, and Intersindical achieved legal 
monopoly of representation under the BCFK union law; however, 
it failed to control the rank and file. New representative bod-
ies, such as the workers’ commissions, emerged spontaneously in 
workplaces outside of union control. )e leaders of these com-
missions got involved in negotiations with employers, organized 
strikes and, in some cases, even managed small companies. Yet the 
leaders of these commissions opposed the PCP and challenged 
the dominant position of the Intersindical. )ey received support 
from organizations and individuals opposed to the PCP, which 
viewed them as an alternative to Intersindical.6 In BCFE these 
commissions were recognized by the constitution. Subsequently, 
they were regulated by a BCFC law restricting their role, attributing 
them the duty of supervising management and participating in 
the administration of welfare issues within the company.
)e end of the revolutionary period resulted in the approv-
al of the BCFE constitution that abolished Intersindical’s legal 
5 United union activism during the dictatorship had been facilitated by the com-
mon struggle for democracy; however, the unions pursued diAerent strategies. )e 
radical left, the communists and the Catholic labour movement sought to overthrow 
the existing capitalist system, while the social democrats supported a more reformist 
strategy. )ese contrasting political strategies became critical during the transition and 
hindered eAorts at unification. )e struggles between labour activists were mirrored 
by partisan conflicts that split the union movement into two groups. See R. Naumann 
and A. StoleroA, “Portugal”, in B. Ebbinghaus and J. Visser (eds), &e societies of Europe: 
Trade unions in Western Europe since !"5% (New York, NY: Grove’s Dictionaries), pp. 
KKH–J.
6 Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GIC.
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monopoly.7 )e new constitution adopted a model of pluralist 
representation that allowed for the establishment of trade unions 
at any level. Pluralism reflected the divisions of the revolutionary 
period. Disputes within the left between the communists and the 
socialists and social democrats, who resented the PCP’s control 
of the labour movement, resulted in the organization of new un-
ions in all sectors. After the collapse of the authoritarian regime, 
all parties sought roots in the working class, and party activists 
played an important role in the emergence of new unions. At its 
BCFF Congress, Intersindical changed its name to the General 
Confederation of Portuguese Labour (CGTP—Confederação 
Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses).
Immediately after the formal abolition of the unity clause, 
JI unions, led by those representing banking, insurance and of-
fice employees, came together and with the support of the PS 
and the liberal-conservative Popular Democratic Party (PPD—
Partido Popular Democrático),8 founded the General Workers’ 
Union (UGT—União Geral de Trabalhadores).9 )e major aim 
of the new organization was to challenge Intersindical’s monopo-
ly of the labour movement. )is development led to union plural-
ism and inter-union competition in the workplace. As a matter of 
fact, the UGT was able to achieve a near monopoly in certain sec-
tors—such as the financial sector—and expanded rapidly in the 
7 Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GBI; D. Nataf, Democratization and social set-
tlements: &e politics of change in contemporary Portugal (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press), p. BJB.
8 )e PPD later changed its name to the Social Democratic Party (PSD).
9 At that time, the PS and PPD had very limited influence with the unions. 
)e PS was founded in BDFK, but had virtually disappeared by the BCJIs. )e PPD was 
founded shortly after the fall of the authoritarian regime. In contrast, the PCP survived 
the dictatorship and infiltrated its corporatist unions, which, because the unions were at 
the forefront of the transition, gave it leverage. See Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. 
GIC.
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manufacturing sector by signing collective agreements the CGTP 
had rejected. However, Intersindical has been able to maintain 
its position of dominance within the labour movement, with BKI 
a@liated unions against the EJ a@liated to the UGT. )e CGTP 
is dominant in manufacturing, construction, electricity, road and 
urban transport, post and telecommunications and large sections 
of the civil service, while the UGT is dominant in banking, insur-
ance, several industries and services and education, as well as in 
white-collar occupations.
During the BCDIs, the number of unions increased dramatically 
as new groups sought to represent particular groups of workers. 
)ese new groups, however, do not consider themselves part of 
the union movement. )is development has resulted in the frag-
mentation of the labour movement. )e CGTP represents EI per 
cent of unionized workers, the UGT JI–JK per cent and inde-
pendent unions less than ten per cent.10 As we will see below, 
despite repeated attempts by the UGT to consolidate and con-
centrate the union movement, fragmentation and divisions have 
remained: it was not until BCDD that the CGTP and the UGT 
established formal relations with one another. During the BCCIs 
there was a process of rapprochement between both unions, and 
some initiatives for both organizations to merge. Nevertheless the 
relationship between the two confederations remains strained.
At this point it is important to stress the Portuguese legislature 
has not given preferential treatment to either union confedera-
tion: all unions are the same and have equal rights. Despite being 
highly interventionist (for example, in the procedures covering 
collective bargaining), Portuguese law does not include any crite-
ria for representatives or recognition procedures.
10 Barreto (note H), pp. GEG–E; Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GBH.
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An important feature of Portuguese unions is their relative 
weakness and their lack of financial resources.11 As we will see 
below, union membership declined dramatically during the BCDIs 
following the conclusion of the democratic transition. As a result, 
the organizations lack adequate financial resources, and often de-
pend on external help for their survival. )ey also have few em-
ployees. A major feature has been the support given to unions by 
political parties. Up until the late BCDIs, Portuguese communist 
and socialist trade unions have maintained historically interlock-
ing directorates between the parties and the union organizations. 
)eir diAerent ideological orientations were mirrored in their 
statutes and programmes. Up until the late-BCDIs, union leaders 
had party responsibilities and, in many cases, political jobs: they 
have also been elected to parliament. In Portugal, the PS and the 
PSD have been dominant within the UGT, and the PCP within 
the CGTP. )ese institutional links between unions and parties 
still prevail, although partisan control of unions is waning.12
Finally, Portugal experienced high levels of labour conflict 
during the BCFIs, most of which was politically motivated and 
concerned with the transition to democracy. Industrial conflict 
declined sharply during the second half of the BCDIs, despite the 
11 Barreto and Naumman (note G), pp. GBH–BK.
12 Ibid, p. GBG. Although formally only personal ties exist between the unions and 
political parties, in reality union leaders and activists share political jobs and party re-
sponsibilities, with union o@cials frequently being appointed to executive positions 
within the parties (although union rules prohibit this). During the BCDIs, between five 
and nine per cent of parliamentary deputies were also o@cers within unions a@liated to 
the UGT or Intersindical, or occupied leadership positions within the confederations: 
consequently, unions are vehicles of political influence. Some of the factors explaining 
the predominance of political activity within Portuguese trade unionism include the 
historic role of societal self-regulation compared to statutory regulation, partisan con-
trol of the unions, the endemic weakness of the unions and the tendency of employers to 
rely on the government to achieve their goals for them: these tendencies were reinforced 
during the economic crisis of the BCDIs. Unions have used political action—including 
calling a general strike in BCDD—to defend the employment legislation inherited from 
the revolution.
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success of the general strike organized separately by all major un-
ions in BCDD to oppose the government’s plan to liberalize the la-
bour market and facilitate collective dismissals.
!e Union Structure
Union fragmentation has had deleterious consequences for 
collective bargaining in Portugal, because it has hindered eAorts 
to centralize and rationalize the outdated structure of collective 
bargaining. )e combination of political cleavages between the 
major unions, and the craft and territorial divisions imposed in 
the “vertical unions” during the authoritarian regime have ham-
pered the development of strong and articulated union structures. 
)is problem is particularly acute in Portugal, where centrifugal 
pressures caused by regional, political and occupational rivalries 
have generally impeded the development of concerted and uni-
tary strategies by unions.
Dispersion and fragmentation are the predominant features of 
the Portuguese union structure.13 Political schisms within Inters-
indical, coupled with the emergence of the UGT and resistance 
from certain occupational groups (particularly o@ce workers and 
professions with special functions) to integrate into centralized 
organizations, hindered eAorts to centralize and rationalize the 
outdated union structure. 
While the number of individual unions increased from JIF 
in BCFG to JDJ in BCCE, this was the result of two main processes: 
new unions were created in sectors in which union activity was 
banned during the dictatorship (that is, the public sector in cen-
tral and local administration, education, health services and public 
13 Naumann and StoleroA (note K), p. KKF.
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enterprises),14 while political competition and class consciousness 
intensified centrifugal pressures hindering rationalization eAorts.
)e CGTP and UGT remain confederations of vertical units 
in which the degree of organizational consolidation varies. CGTP 
is a confederation of about BH vertical units complemented by un-
ions at the local level that are organized within HI autonomous 
district unions within the confederation. To further complicate 
matters, many of the CGTP’s small union a@liates—and even 
some federations (for example, the teachers’ union)—are not of-
ficially a@liated with the CGTP, but are associated and integrated 
into its structure. For its part, the UGT has a dual regional and 
functional organization. Its structure is unbalanced: it has EJ af-
filiated organizations led by the three regional unions of bank 
employees, by the o@ce workers’ unions with an average of about 
BK,III members and by a large group of smaller organizations.15 
In addition, federations are less important within UGT, and they 
focus mostly on the coordination of collective bargaining. Fur-
thermore, nearly BII independent unions, mostly concentrated in 
the public service sector, are not a@liated with either of the two 
main confederations.16
14 Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GBI. )ere are now more than BKI independ-
ent unions, most small and occupational based (for example, airline pilots, train drivers, 
civil servants and dock-workers), many of which function as little more than as employ-
ment market cartels and lobbying groups, although they tend also to be highly cohesive 
and eAective. )ese unions seek to defend the particular interests of their members and 
to preserve their autonomy while opposing policies of solidarity with other organized 
workers. )ey are deeply resented by both the UGT and CGTP, which view them as 
egocentric organizations defending the privileges of certain groups.
15 Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GBI. With close links to both Scandinavian 
and central European unions, the UGT wanted to follow the example of Germany and 
Austria, with their limited number of national industrial unions. )e opposition from 
existing unions (particularly the more powerful banking, insurance, services and educa-
tion unions) has hindered plans to achieve vertical integration. National industry-based 
UGT unions in sectors such as clothing, chemicals, textiles, metal, construction etc. are 
weaker than their Intersindical peers.
16 A group of independent unions was formed by the PSD’s labour wing; however, 
they have been unable to challenge the dominant position of the major confederations.
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Union fragmentation intensified further with the foundation 
of public sector unions after the revolution and the emergence 
of new associations to cater for the specific interests of certain 
groups of workers and professionals during the latter-half of the 
BCDIs. Political competition and status consciousness have inten-
sified these processes. )e consequence of these developments has 
been that, since the revolution, the number of service sector unions 
has increased considerably.17 Finally, at the end of the BCDIs, the 
PSD’s labour organization, the Social Democrat Workers (TSD 
– Trabalhadores Social Democratas), decided to create a third 
confederation of its own, and terminate the alliance with the PS. 
)is attempt failed when the majority of PSD activists within the 
UGT rejected this proposal and remained within the UGT. Con-
sequently the Convention of Independent Unions (CSI—Con-
venção dos Sindicatos Independentes) has a limited social base 
and low representation, with only seven occupational unions and 
five sector unions. In total, during the BCDIs and BCCIs there was 
a contradictory evolution within the trade union structures. On 
the one hand, both the CGTP and UGT attempted (with limited 
success in the case of UGT) to reorganize their structures and 
deepen their vertical integration, on the other, the emergence of 
new independent occupational unions intensified the fragmenta-
tion of Portuguese unionism. )ere are now JFI unions compared 
to the JHD that existed in BCFG.18
At the beginning of the new century, the basic institutions 
of Portuguese industrial relations were clear. Union members at 
the enterprise level elect union delegates who become the main 
interlocutors with management. When there are several unions 
present, the delegates establish an enterprise-based inter-union 
17 Naumann and StoleroA (note K), pp. KKG–F.
18 Barreto and Naumann (note G), pp. GBI–BB.
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committee.19 Based on a BCFC law, in a limited number of firms the 
workers elect worker commissions, which in most cases were run 
by the dominant union representatives.20 Hence, in some medi-
um-sized firms, and in the majority of large companies, there is a 
dual model of workers’ representation with trade union represen-
tation (in the form of shop stewards, joint shop-steward commit-
tees, or union commissions [comissões sindicais]) and the workers’ 
commission. In practice, though, this dual system of workers’ rep-
resentation stipulated by law is the exception. )e existence of 
these representative bodies depends largely upon company size, 
and to a lesser extent upon union membership density within the 
company.21 Moreover, as we will see below, these workers’ com-
missions exist in a considerably smaller proportion of companies 
than do the trade union organizations and have limited statu-
tory rights to be kept informed and to be consulted.22 Addition-
ally, the right to call strikes, to negotiate and to sign collective 
agreements is reserved for union representatives. )is institutional 
setting is closed at the macro-level, with the tripartite Standing 
Social Concertation Committee (CPCS—Conselho Permanente 
de Concertação Social) being in charge of social bargaining.
Union Membership
During the dictatorship membership of the “vertical” unions 
was compulsory except in sectors such as the civil service—where 
unions were illegal; hence, the collapse of authoritarian regimes 
19 Naumann and StoleroA (note K), p. KKI.
20 A. StoleroA, “Elementos do padrão emergente de relações industriais em Portu-
gal”, Organizações e Trabalho BJ (BCCK), pp.BB–GH.
21 StoleroA (note HI).
22 Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GBK. An Intersindical survey in BCCJ revealed 
that about EI per cent of BIFE registered commissions were inactive.
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allowed unions to inherit a large number of members. In addition, 
the disappearance of o@cial unions, which motivated workers to 
join new unions that could articulate their demands, coupled with 
the euphoria associated with the transition to democracy and 
the wish of Portuguese workers to participate in public life and 
contribute to the democratization processes, fostered high levels 
of union a@liation.23 Consequently, during the first years of the 
transition process, union membership was high: between BCFC 
and BCDG membership (as a percentage of wage and salary earners) 
reached KD.D per cent.24
)is development proved short-lived. )e political and eco-
nomic conditions for union participation deteriorated sharply 
during the second half of the BCFIs. After the highs of the transi-
tion period, unions failed to live up to expectations and were un-
able to achieve outcomes favourable to their members. )ey also 
failed to develop services to their a@liates that would have made 
membership more attractive. Once the euphoria of regime tran-
sition dissipated, workers decided to cancel their memberships. 
In Portugal, this process was hastened by the PS government’s 
decision in BCFF to repeal the automatic deduction of union dues 
from wages: a move aimed at weakening the CGTP.25 )e eco-
nomic crisis that resulted in rising unemployment, the significant 
rise in temporary work and informal employment in the black 
23 Naumann and StoleroA (note K).
24 M. da C. Cerdeira, A evolução da sindicalização portuguesa de !"$5 a !""% (Lisbon: 
Ministério para a Qualificação e o Emprego), p. GE; A. StoleroA and R. Naumann, “A 
sindicalização em Portugal: A sua medida e a sua distribuição”, Sociologia: Problemas e 
Práticas BG (BCCJ); Naumman and StoleroA (note K), p. KKF.
25 Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GBH. Since BCFF, public enterprises have de-
ducted union fees from their members’ wage packets; however, private companies and 
employers’ associations have refused to follow suit, with the result unions have to make 
arrangements to collect the membership dues themselves.
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economy,26 coupled with the growth of the service sector and the 
underground economy, as well as the emergence of new forms of 
business organizations in which traditional blue-collar unskilled 
workers were no longer dominant, have also been mentioned as 
some of the reasons for the sharp decline in union membership. 
Other explanations for falling membership include poor member 
services, inter-union rivalry, union politicization and employers’ 
pressure.27 Finally, other authors have stressed the impact of the 
statutory extension of collective agreements to non-members: 
since all workers benefit from the agreements, there is little in-
centive for anyone to join trade unions and pay their dues.28
As a result of these developments, the proportion of union 
members in the labour force has declined sharply over the past 
two decades, with the number of members reaching its lowest 
point during the mid-BCDIs.29 Between BCDD and BCCI, there were 
approximately one million union members—representing JI per 
cent of the employed workforce.30 Since then, union membership 
(as a percentage of all wage and salary earners) declined by GG.H 
per cent between BCDK and BCCK, and by HIII stood at HK.E per cent. 
)is places Portugal in the group of Western European countries 
26 Barreto and Naumann (note G). )is problem is particularly acute in economic 
sectors such as construction (where the estimated proportion of informal employment 
is as high as KI per cent, and union membership is barely ten per cent), the clothing and 
footwear industry and certain service sectors.
27 J. Ribeiro, P. Granjo, N. Leitão and A. Harouna, Posições face à sindicalização: 
Desafios de mudança (Lisbon: Cosmos, BCCJ).
28 M. A. Malo, “Elecciones sindicales y comportamiento de los sindicatos es-
pañoles: Una propuesta”, Estudios sobre la Economia Española, CJ (HIIB); O. Bover, P. 
García Perea and P. Portugal, “A comparative study of the Portuguese and Spanish la-
bour markets”, Servício de Estudios, Documento de Trabajo CDIF (Madrid: Banco de Es-
paña, BCCF).
29 Cerdeira (note HG); StoleroA and Naumann (note HG); Naumann and StoleroA 
(note K).
30 Naumman and StoleroA (note K), p. KKF.
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with low- to medium-union density, although it is significantly 
ahead of both France and Spain. Union density is also unequally 
distributed: it is higher in the primary sector and the public serv-
ices and is slightly below the general level in private industries 
and services. It is important to be aware that in Portugal, union 
membership is close to BII per cent in sectors where unions have 
a monopoly of health care provision (for example, in banking, in-
surance and telecommunications).31 For instance, in contrast with 
the general trend, banking unionism in Portugal approaches CI 
per cent and membership has doubled since the revolution.32 Lev-
els of unionization are particularly strong in the railways, bank-
ing, insurance, transport and public companies, and rather weak 
in construction, commerce, textiles, food industries and ceramics. 
In Portugal, the combination of increasing union fragmentation 
and an overall decline in union density, has resulted in a decline 
in the total number of unionized workers per union (from HEII 
members per union in the late BCDIs to HIII in the late BCCIs) (see 
Table E.B). At the end of the BCCIs the CGTP and its associated 
unions represented more than FB per cent of all union members, 
and UGT less than HJ per cent.33
Business Organizations
)e authoritarian corporatist legacy also left an important im-
print in the configuration of employers’ associations; however, in 
Portugal the business associations were not integrated into the 
31 Bover, García Perea and Portugal (note HD), p. BG.
32 Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GBJ. In the banking sector the services provid-
ed to union members are well developed, collective bargaining and industrial disputes 
procedures work very eAectively, strikes are subject to ballots and the internal elections 
to the governing bodies are well contested with high participation rates.
33 Naumann and StoleroA (note K), pp. KKF–D.
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corporatist “national vertical unions”. Businesses in Portugal cre-
ated their own organizations, the national guilds, although they 
remained reluctant to participate in them. As long as they were 
not organized, companies did not have to bargain with labour, and 
this oAered them a powerful incentive to remain outside guilds 
that lacked power and autonomy. )e ine@ciency of the system 
led to a profound transformation in the late BCKIs. Unions and 
guilds up until that time were increasingly perceived to be clas-
sic organizations preventing the overthrow of the class struggle. 
)e government introduced a new system based on corporations, 
which excluded single-peak associations.34
34 Barreto (note H), p. GKJ.
T3>?. E.B 
Reported Membership by Selected Unions in Portugal 
(BCCK–HIID)
CGTP
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores da Função Pública 
do Sul e Açores (STFSA) '+.#
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores das Indústrias 
Metalúrgicas e Metalomecânica de Portugal 
(STIMMDP)
!".*
Sindicato dos Trabalhadores do Comércio, 
Escritórios e Serviços de Portugal (CESP) %(.*
CGTP*
Sindicato de Enfermeiros Portugueses (SEP) !#.$
Sindicato Nacional dos Trabalhadores da 
Administração Local (STAL) $$.(
Sindicato dos Professores da Grande Lisboa 
(SPGL) !"."
UGT Sindicato dos Bancário do Sul e Ilhas (SBSI) $".#Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte (SBN) !*."
* CGTP associated (cooperating) union.
S1/0<.:: R. Naumann and A. StoleroA, “Portugal”, in B. Ebbinghaus and J. Visser 
(eds), &e societies of Europe: Trade unions in Western Europe since !"5% (New York, NY: 
Grove’s Dictionaries, HIII), Table POBC, p. KFH.
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Before the revolution, seven corporate groups that had grown 
under the New State’s protection dominated the Portuguese 
economy. )is situation changed dramatically during the dem-
ocratic transition: indeed, one of the main consequences of the 
revolution was the expropriation of the entire domestic financial 
sector and important industrial and service companies (including 
oil, breweries, steel, transportation and telecommunications). )is 
development proved short lived, however, as Cavaco Silva’s gov-
ernments privatized practically all of them by BCCK.
After the collapse of the authoritarian regime, the Portuguese 
business guilds were disbanded. While during the democratic 
transition employers lagged behind in establishing their associa-
tion, now businesses are organized into two separate structures: 
the employers’ associations and the regional associations. In BCFG, 
the employers created the Confederation of Portuguese Indus-
try (CIP—Confederação da Industria Portuguesa), which—with 
the support of influential members of the Lisbon and Oporto 
Portuguese Industrial Associations (AIP—Associação Indus-
trial Portuguesa) that had functioned throughout the dictator-
ship—claimed to represent all sectors. Its main organizational 
foundations lay in regional associations in textiles, metallurgy and 
construction. CIP is the main employers’ body, and was created 
to protect their interests at a time they were threatened by the 
impetus of the revolutionary movement. At that time, it waged 
campaigns against state intervention, restrictive labour regulation, 
“Marxist” economic strategies and nationalizations, while lead-
ing the employers’ struggle for survival. In more recent years its 
priorities have been to reduce the role of the state in the economy 
and improving the competitiveness of Portuguese firms.35
35 Barreto and Naumann (note G), pp. GIE–D.
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)e Portuguese Confederation of Commerce and Services 
(CCP—Confederação do Comércio e Serviços de Portugal) was 
established in BCFG. Largely as a result of conflicts of interest be-
tween it a@liates (for example, the wholesale versus retail sectors), 
and the fact some important service sectors (such as, transport, 
banking and insurance) are not included, it is not as powerful as 
CIP. )e third employers’ confederation, the Confederation of 
Portuguese Farmers (CAP—Confederaçao dos Agricultores de 
Portugal), represents the interests of industrial-scale farmers.36 
)ese organizations have sought to defend business interests and 
act as channels of communication with the government. )eir 
major objective during the BCDIs was reform of the pro-labour 
legislation that had been approved during the revolutionary pe-
riod. CIP rejected any bilateral negotiations with the union con-
federation until BCCI, but were active participants in the CPCS.
While these organizations provide a wide range of services to 
member firms, membership data is not reliable. )e CPI is the 
most powerful of them, claiming to represent JK,III private com-
panies—FK per cent of all Portuguese companies.37 Internal diAer-
ences over strategies (for example, on state intervention, economic 
policy, European integration and competitiveness), and regional 
rivalries have hampered their ability to function eAectively. CIP 
gained further legitimacy and strength with the a@liation of 
AIP-Porto and AIP-Lisboa in the late-BCDIs and early-BCCIs. In-
ternal challenges are more deeply rooted in the other two organi-
zations: the CCP remains split between its wholesale and retail 
36 Naumann and StoleroA (note K), pp. KGC–KI. Small- and medium-sized farmers 
are mainly represented by CAN.
37 Barreto (note H), p. GEB; Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GIF. )is claim is 
disputed. Other scholars argue new empirical evidence indicates a EI per cent a@liation 
rate. However, unions argue membership of the employers’ organizations is lower than 
that of the unions. See J. L. Cardoso, J. Brito and F. Mendes, Empresarios e gestores da 
indústria em Portugal (Lisbon: Dom Quixote, BCCI).
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members, while the major supermarkets have established their 
own association, the Portuguese Association of Distribution 
Companies (APED—Associação Portuguesa de Empresas de 
Distribuição) outside the confederation, which has resulted in 
a series of disputes between supermarkets and other retailers. In 
addition, employers’ associations in banking, insurance and trans-
portation continue to remain outside the confederate structures. 
Finally, CAP’s social base is being challenged by a new organi-
zation, the National Agricultural Confederation (CAN—Con-
federação Nacional da Agricultura), which organises small- and 
medium-sized farmers, which constitutes the majority of agricul-
tural employers.38
)e business sector is also represented by regional associations 
providing services such as sales promotion, fairs, training and 
technological advice to their members. )ese organizations are 
smaller, but they are better organized at the local level. )e largest 
is the Lisbon-based AIP. )ese associations diAer over critical is-
sues such as the role of the public sector and the state, economic 
policies, the EU, trade barriers and competition policies, diAer-
ences that have prevented their integration as successive attempts 
to set up unitary organizations have failed. Only the CIP, the 
CCP and CAP are o@cially recognized by the state as employers’ 
representatives at top-level bodies such as the CPCS.39
Industrial Relations under Democracy
Collective Bargaining and Wage Setting
A legal minimum wage is set each year and collective bar-
gaining agreements establish a starting wage for each of the 
38 Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GID.
39 Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GID; Barreto (note H), p. GEB.
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occupational categories in the agreement. Wage flexibility in Por-
tugal is high, with the base wage in each categories being estab-
lished through collective bargaining agreements at a much lower 
relative level, giving employers greater flexibility in determining 
wage levels.40
Portuguese legislation does not define any criteria for repre-
sentation with respect to collective bargaining rights. Representa-
tion criteria and the rules governing the authority to negotiate 
agreements are key factors in limiting union bargaining power. 
Trade union representation and the ability of unions to negoti-
ate and sign collective agreements largely depends on the level of 
trade union membership.41 )e absence of a representation crite-
ria means all unions are considered representative, with all having 
equal rights.42 Since BCFE the right to negotiate and sign collec-
tive agreements has been reserved by law to union representatives. 
Workers’ commissions only have statutory rights of consultation 
and information. Furthermore, collective bargaining is voluntary, 
since few sanctions can be imposed and any union—including 
minority unions—are able to negotiate with management. Col-
lective bargaining therefore depends largely on the employers’ 
willingness to negotiate with a particular union. Both sides must 
comply with all legal requirements only after they have formally 
40 Bover, García Perea and Portugal (note HD), p. BB. A consequence of this devel-
opment has been that actual wages in Portugal generally exceed industry wage agree-
ments. By contrast, in Spain any nationally agreed wage-rates are legally binding for all 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers.
41 One of the key outcomes of the HIIB agreement on working conditions, hy-
giene and safety, and reduction of workplace accidents is that it helps clarify the actual 
representation role of the unions. )is agreement renews the commitment, initially es-
tablished in BCCB, to create workplace health and safety committees and establishes a 
six-month deadline for the development of legally-regulated procedures for the election 
of employee representatives to these committees.
42 Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GBB. Although there are some legal require-
ments, they are not enforced on the grounds they may be unconstitutional.
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agreed to negotiate. )ese provisions have contributed towards 
weakening Portuguese unions by allowing employers to ignore 
the strongest workplace unions and instead reach agreement with 
the more accommodating.43
Since the Portuguese trade union structure is characterized 
by several unions acting in an uncoordinated fashion, the conse-
quence of these developments has been that unions do not have 
as much leverage vis-à-vis employers. Other factors have also con-
tributed to limiting union power: they are financially dependent 
on the contributions they receive from their relatively small mem-
berships and inter-union coordination remains limited.44
Collective agreements only apply to workers who are rep-
resented by signatory unions; however, since the law does not 
permit diAerentiated workplace conditions based on union mem-
bership, these agreements in practice extended to all workers.45 As 
previously stated, this helps explain the low levels of trade union 
membership in Portugal: since all workers will benefit from the 
agreements, there is little incentive for people to join the union 
and pay its membership fees.46
Given there is no requirement for an absolute majority of 
union representatives to reach an agreement, and there are no 
recognition procedures or representation criteria, Portuguese 
43 Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GBB.
44 Bover, García Perea and Portugal (note HD), p. BBK. )e government grants unions 
a small “allowance” for their participation within the CPCS (generally no more than ten 
per cent of their total annual income). Declining membership numbers has resulted in 
unions facing increasing financial di@culty, particularly now that aid from foreign un-
ion movements has largely dried up. Increasingly, the confederations rely on contribu-
tions from a small number of unions and European state agencies. In BCCI, more than KI 
per cent of the UGT’s income came from just one of its (then) EB a@liates: the Southern 
Portugal Union of Banking Employees. See Barreto and Naumann (note G), pp. GBH–BK.
45 Barreto (note H), p. GFI; Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GBF.
46 Malo (note HD).
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employers have been able to open negotiations with moderate un-
ions (mainly independent unions, although in some cases with the 
UGT) with which they expect to reach more favourable agree-
ments. )is has enabled employers to break the almost complete 
“bargaining monopoly” enjoyed by the CGTP in such sectors as 
manufacturing, construction, electricity, urban transport, post and 
telecommunications, as well as in large sectors of the civil service. 
A union that is in a minority position within the sector is able to 
reach an agreement with management that covers workers who 
are not members of that union for the simple reason that only one 
agreement is enforceable for the same group of workers within 
any company. )is has limited union bargaining power in Por-
tugal, and hindered the establishment of uniform conditions at 
the national level and has resulted in widely varying wage levels 
across sectors.47 )e consequences of an over-regulated and le-
galistic framework, coupled with voluntary collective bargaining, 
helps explain the near absence of company-level bargaining in the 
private sector and the minimal impact it has on working condi-
tions.48
Once an agreement is obtained and it is registered and pub-
lished by the Ministry of Employment, it remains in force until 
superseded by a subsequent agreement, which overall, and by law, 
must not be less favourable to the workers than the one it re-
places. A consequence of this is that employers view agreements 
as potential milestones that once concluded will form the basis of 
further union demands.
Local unions and federations negotiate with the employers’ as-
sociations, groups of companies and—in some cases—large indi-
vidual firms, on both wage and non-wage issues. Traditionally, the 
47 Bover, García Perea, and Portugal (note HD), p. BJ.
48 Barreto and Naumann (note G), p. GBD.
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major objective of bargaining has been the settlement of wages; 
however, with the annual revision of the minimum wage this is 
now largely done by the government—employers are only able 
to negotiate variations between the national and industry mini-
mum rates,49 although in practice deviations from sector-level 
bargaining are common.50 )e highly regulated collective bar-
gaining framework has resulted in limited collective bargaining 
within the private sector. Managers are reluctant to negotiate at 
the company-level out of fear of encouraging union activity; un-
ions, which are weak at the company-level, also prefer industry-
level bargaining. Consequently, collective bargaining mainly takes 
place at the industry-level, and government regulations still play 
an important role. Company-level collective agreements are pos-
sible only by establishing more favourable conditions than the 
corresponding industry-level agreement, which helps explain the 
lack of company-level agreements.51 As we have seen, since the 
BCCIs there has been a tendency to move from regional to na-
tional industry agreements.
DiAerences in the union structure have also had a significant 
impact on wage bargaining. )e weakness of unions has hindered 
their attempts to set wages above the national minimum—par-
ticularly for the lower and middle occupational categories. It is 
not uncommon for employers to seek to negotiate conditions that 
will be less favourable to their employees than those they present-
ly enjoy through established industry-level agreements: a process 
that requires intermediation from the Ministry of Employment.52
49 Barreto (note H), p. GFH.
50 StoleroA (note HI).
51 Bover, García Perea and Portugal (note HD), p. BG.
52 Bover, García Perea and Portugal (note HD), pp. BJ–BG.
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Social Concertation
Following the revolutionary upheavals, intense eAorts by gov-
ernments and social actors to normalize industrial relations in 
Portugal led to the development of social bargaining. Despite the 
antagonistic relationship between union and employers and the 
ideological divisions within the labour movement that had their 
roots in the revolution, the social actors have moved towards a 
less polarized industrial relations model. Indeed, globalization 
and European integration have encouraged—rather than un-
dermined—social bargaining. Unable to escape from economic 
interdependence, Portugal has experimented with the social con-
certation model in which centralized agreements between em-
ployers’ and labour organizations seek to resolve tensions between 
economic interdependence and political sovereignty and between 
monetary and exchange rate policies.53
53 As I have argued elsewhere (S. Royo [note B], pp. HGK–E), social concertation 
describes those centralized agreements reached between union and business leaders in 
the pursuit of shared macro-economic objectives. Although this term is less common 
in the United States, it is used in neocorporatist literature throughout Western Europe 
and Latin America. )rough these agreements, unions are willing to moderate and limit 
wage growth. )e participation of governments is not mandatory, since the agreements 
are usually negotiated and signed by trade unions and business organizations with cen-
tralized structures and hierarchical powers and then followed (and implemented) by 
the majority of businesses and workers. Amongst other things, concertation agreements 
cover incomes policies, industrial relations, productivity, absenteeism, working hours, 
training etc. )ey also include provisions dealing with macro-economic issues such as 
redistribution, inflation targets, competitiveness etc., as well as institutional issues, in-
cluding the participation of social actors in economic policy-making and participation 
in state institutions etc. Social democratic governments have often participated in these 
agreements in an attempt to achieve their economic objectives, and have oAered com-
pensation, such as subsidies, increases in public expenditures, public jobs, fiscal benefits 
etc. to the social actors for their cooperation. See P. C. Schmitter, Corporatism and public 
policy in authoritarian Portugal (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, BCFG). Some Spanish authors 
may use the term corporativismo to refer to “old” corporatism, and the neologism, cor-
poratismo to mean “new” corporatism. In Portugal this system of interest representation 
is known as corporativismo. J. Martínez-Alier and J. Roca, “Spain after Franco: From 
corporatist ideology to corporatist reality”, CES working paper series BK (Cambridge, 
MA: CES-Harvard University, BCDE), pp. HJ–E.
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In Portugal, social concertation began in BCDF and was con-
solidated during the BCCIs. Social concertation agreements were 
established in BCDF, BCDD, BCCI, BCCH and BCCE, there was an agree-
ment of strategic concertation covering the BCCF–CC period, and a 
further two concertation agreements were reached in HIIB.54
)e emergence of national social bargaining in Portugal took 
place at the outset of a dramatic economic crisis of BCDJ–DK. To 
give an idea of the magnitude of the crisis, in BCDG alone the 
country’s GDP declined by B.E per cent, investment fell by BD per 
54 In BCCB the social actors signed two complementary agreements regulating 
professional training, hygiene and security in the workplace.
T3>?. E.H 
Social Concertation in Portugal 
(BCDE–HIIB)
Agreement Year Signatories
Prices and incomes policy !"*(–# CIP, CAP, CCP, UGT, government
Prices and incomes policy !"** CAP, CCP, UGT, government
Economic and social !""! CIP, CCP, UGT, government
Incomes policy !""% CIP, CAP, CCP, UGT, government
Short-term social dialogue !""( CIP, CAP, CCP, UGT, government
Strategic social pact !""(–" CIP, CAP, CCP, UGT, government
Employment policies and 
vocational training %&&!
CIP, CAP, CCP, UGT, 
CGTP-IN, government
Workplace working 
conditions, hygiene and 
safety and to reduce 
workplace accidents
%&&! CIP, CAP, CCP, UGT, CGTP-IN, government
S1/0<.: Author’s own data
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cent, unemployment rose to D.J per cent, inflation reached HC.J 
per cent, disposable family income decreased by J.F per cent and 
private consumption declined by three per cent. )e BCDJ legisla-
tive elections resulted in the formation of the Centre Bloc coali-
tion consisting of the conservative PSD and the PS, with the PS’s 
leader, Mário Soares, becoming prime minister. )is government 
implemented an International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabiliza-
tion plan and in BCDG created the CPCS. )e positive outcome of 
these polices became evident in BCDK when the economy emerged 
from recession. )e rewards were reaped by the PSD, which won 
the BCDK legislative election under the leadership of Aníbal Cavaco 
Silva.
Helped by the country’s accession to the European Commu-
nity and a generally improving international situation, the Por-
tuguese economy continued to improve during BCDE. In order to 
reduce inflation, the government pursued incomes policy agree-
ments with the social actors. Under the guise of “recommenda-
tions on incomes policy”, in BCDE the CPCS (which included the 
UGT, the government, and the three employers’ associations: CIP, 
CCP and CAP) reached an agreement on incomes policy that 
fixed wage increases at seven per cent, subject to actual inflation.55 
)is agreement dealt almost exclusively with the rate of growth of 
nominal wages for BCDF, and was based on inflation forecasts that 
proved accurate, thus contributing to the curbing of inflation.
)e process of social concertation continued after the BCDF 
legislative elections at which the PSD won a parliamentary ma-
jority. In October of that year, the CGTP—with the support of 
the PCP—decided to participate in CPCS. )e unions’ linked 
the government’s programme of structural reform (aimed at re-
vising labour legislation, introducing privatization, constitutional 
55 )e CGTP refused to participate.
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revision and agrarian reform) to the incomes policy. On BD January 
BCDD, the social actors represented in the CPCS—with the excep-
tion of the CGTP and the CIP, which both refused to sign—
reached a new incomes policy agreement.
Contrary to expectations, the process of deinflation halted in 
BCDD and UGT withdrew its support for the agreement follow-
ing the government’s refusal to adjust wage increases to recognize 
rising inflation. )e consequence of this was that no agreements 
were reached during BCDC and BCCI, although moderation con-
tinued to prevail in collective bargaining. Rising inflation, fuelled 
by huge budget deficits, forced the social actors to return to the 
bargaining table. In BCCI, the government proposed a social pact: 
the Programme of Economic and Social Progress for the BCCIs 
(Programa de progresso económico e social para os anos noven-
ta). )is initiative resulted in intense negotiations that led to the 
Economic and Social Agreement (AES—Acordo Económico e 
Social), which was signed by all members of the CPCS except the 
CGTP. 
)is pact included a reduction in the working week from GD to 
GG hours, and included a commitment for a further gradual reduc-
tion to GI hours by BCCK. It also addressed a wide range of other 
issues that were to be resolved by legislation, including: dismissals, 
health, safety and hygiene at work, unemployment benefits, voca-
tional training, working-time flexibility, supplementary social se-
curity in cases of industrial restructuring and the employment of 
minors. )e AES also covered collective bargaining and included 
a recommendation on wage policy that capped wage increases 
to BJ.K per cent. Furthermore, for the first time in the course of 
tripartite negotiations, the AES also included the annual revi-
sion of the national monthly minimum wage, which was set at 
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GI,III escudos (approximately RHKG).56 )e AES also led to a new 
labour package (pacote laboral) in BCCB, which revised legislation 
on dismissal for non-adaptation, employment of minors, working 
hours, holidays, collective bargaining rules and the arbitration of 
industrial disputes. In July BCCB all CPCS members—including 
the CGTP—signed two subsidiary agreements governing work 
safety and hygiene, and professional training.
Following the PSD’s victory at the BCCB legislative elections, 
the social partners re-opened CPCS negotiations in order to 
reach agreement on a new economic and social agreement. Af-
ter some di@cult and protracted negotiations over wage increases 
(owing to the government’s insistence on containing wage costs), 
the three employers’ confederations, the UGT and the govern-
ment signed the new agreement on BK February BCCH. )is agree-
ment limited wage increases to C.FK per cent, while increasing the 
minimum wage by BB per cent.
)e PS’s victory in the BCCK legislative election led to a resur-
gence of social bargaining through the BCCE short-term social 
dialogue agreement. )is pact was followed by the BCCE strate-
gic concertation agreement, which covered the years BCCF–CC. )e 
strategic concertation agreement consisted of a catalogue of mac-
ro-economic aims as well as a programme for employment and 
competitiveness. Among the issues included were: the contractual 
distribution of productivity gains, the promotion of competitive-
ness amongst Portuguese companies and a policy of overall wage 
growth consistent with the goal of achieving international com-
petitiveness and Portugal’s integration into European Monetary 
56 )e CGTP, demanding a BK per cent wage increase and a minimum wage of 
GB,KII escudos, refused to sign the agreement, although its secretary general, Carvalho 
da Silva, insisted “positive things have been negotiated” and agreed to take the agree-
ment to the CGTP plenary for debate. )e CAP also refused to sign this agreement. A. 
StoleroA, “Between corporatism and class struggle: )e Portuguese labour movement 
and the Cavaco Silva governments”, West European Politics BK, G (BCCH), pp. BBD–KI.
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Union. )is agreement covered most areas of macro-economic 
and social policy, including the direction of economic policy, in-
comes policy (the agreement capped average wages and pensions), 
employment policy, professional training, labour legislation, col-
lective bargaining, social security and the contribution to the 
competitiveness of Portuguese companies. )e agreement also es-
tablished a commission to supervise and guarantee its signatories 
complied with its provisions.57 In HIIB, the social partners reached 
two more social agreements: the employment policies and voca-
tional training agreement and the working conditions, hygiene 
and safety and reduction of workplace accidents agreement.
)e overwhelming belief in Portugal is that the process of 
concertation was very positive.58 By allowing for the reduction in 
unit labour costs, the agreements improved the country’s interna-
tional competitiveness, contributed to the reduction in inflation 
from BJ.G per cent in BCCI to less than three per cent in BCCC, 
and kept unemployment at levels below those in other European 
countries (around six per cent). )e agreements also contributed 
to the maintenance of an extended period of good industrial rela-
tions and social peace. Portugal, which as late as BCCF was consid-
ered to be an unlikely candidate for membership of the European 
single-currency zone, was able to comply comfortably with the 
Maastricht criteria, and—partly as a result of the concertation 
process—it was able to do so relatively painlessly: it was the only 
country able to reduce its budget deficit to below the three per cent 
of GDP set out in the Maastricht criteria while simultaneously 
increasing government spending. )is stands in stark contrast to 
57 J. da S. Lopes, “El consejo económico y social de Portugal”, in F. Durán López 
(ed.), El dialogo social y su institucionalización en España y Iberoamérica (Madrid: CES, 
BCCC), pp. CK–E.
58 Lopes (note KF), p. CK; StoleroA (note KE).
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the Spanish economy’s disappointing performance following the 
failure of concertation there in BCDE.
)e process of social concertation in Portugal has also been 
credited for its contribution to social bargaining, solidarity and 
social cohesion. It helped develop institutional mechanisms that 
have allowed social partners to participate in the decision-making 
process, thus deepening democracy and fostering social peace.
)e resurgence of social concertation in Portugal was the result 
of the re-orientation of the social partners’ strategies: a new set of 
constraints and opportunities facilitated the emergence of new 
strategies. First, in the context of the BCDIs and BCCIs, trade union 
organizations supported tripartite bargaining as a defensive strat-
egy enabling them to retake the initiative and influence policy 
outcomes. )e decision by the unions to return to the bargaining 
table was motivated to a degree by their weakness at the company-
level (as is evident with the relative decline in union membership) 
and their inability to mobilize workers eAectively in response to 
employment policies designed to liberalize the labour market. In 
other words, with their support for these macro-economic agree-
ments, organized labour sought both to mitigate the decline of its 
bargaining power at the workplace level and to participate in the 
policy-making process.59
Additionally, the resurgence of social bargaining has been fos-
tered by a process of institutional learning, which has led the so-
cial partners to conclude previous confrontational strategies were 
detrimental to the interest of their constituencies and threatened 
their own survival. )is development also reflects an attempt by 
the social partners to reconcile the need to control costs through 
greater flexibility in hiring practices and the need for cooperative 
relations at the company-level in order to remain competitive. In 
59 Royo (note B).
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other words, these agreements have constituted an institutional 
mechanism supporting business competitiveness through con-
sultative practices.60
)e emergence of new institutions to promote tripartite social 
bargaining (for example, the CPCS) has resulted in the institu-
tionalization of the political struggle between the government, 
the employers and the trade unions, and has contributed to a 
transformation in patterns of industrial relations. In other words, 
the choices the social partners made were less conditioned by the 
pre-existing institutions: the changing balance of power made the 
partners more predisposed to pursue their goals within the new 
institutions. Simultaneously, newly emerging constraints and in-
centives to change largely determined their interaction and strat-
egies.61
'e Portuguese Social Bargaining Model
Institutional and structural conditions in Portugal provide 
fruitful ground for analysing the arguments developed in the neo-
corporatist literature. Portugal lacks some of the conditions speci-
fied as characterizing neo-corporatist settlements: its trade unions 
do not organize a high proportion of the working population and 
neither do they have a monopoly of representation. Indeed, Portu-
gal has divided and weak trade unions with relatively small mem-
berships. Fragmentation is particularly acute, although two major 
confederations, the UGT and CGTP, dominate the movement. 
)ese two organizations have a tradition of ideological confronta-
tion, with the pro-communist confederation having been domi-
nant for a long time. While the CGTP has taken steps to break 
60 M. Regini, “Still engaging in corporatism? Recent Italian experience in com-
parative perspective”, European Journal of Industrial Relations J, J (BCCF), pp. HKC–FD.
61 Royo (note B).
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some of its links with the PCP, the party remains influential and 
plays an important strategic role within it—eAectively preventing 
the establishment of cordial relations with the social-democratic 
UGT. )e union confederations are also understaAed and lack the 
organizational and financial clout of their European peers. )e 
employers’ organizations are also fragmented, with three separate 
confederations vying for the support of Portuguese business. Fi-
nally, Portugal’s collective bargaining system is relatively decen-
tralized, which according to the literature on neo-corporatist is 
not conducive to wage moderation.
However, other factors have encouraged the development of 
processes of social concertation. Unions, for instance, prefer cen-
tralized bargaining to decentralization as this helps them over-
come their weaknesses at the company-level. Furthermore, there 
are relatively strong business organizations monopolizing the rep-
resentation of the business community. )ese organizations are 
not inexorably opposed to unions and avoid ideological attacks on 
the labour movement: they have also proved willing to negotiate 
with unions in order to reach a social agreement.
)e Portuguese concertation model has been characterized by 
several specific features that have resulted in a process very diAer-
ent from those elsewhere (for example, Sweden, Austria and the 
Netherlands). In Portugal, the social bargaining process has been 
identified by the primacy of political considerations over other 
objectives, strong state intervention, a unique institutional set-
ting, specific goals related to the existing political and economic 
framework and the subordination of the trade unions’ to the po-
litical parties.62
A key factor helping explain the evolution in the pattern 
of industrial relations in Portugal has been the nature of the 
62 Royo (note B), pp. HBI–BG.
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transition to democracy. )e revolutionary phases of the democ-
ratization process encouraged worker radicalization and ampli-
fied class antagonisms.63 )is created a legacy of mistrust among 
the actors and deepened the politicization of industrial relations. 
Portuguese labour was a major actor during the transition process 
and actively participated in the development of the pro-labour 
constitution of BCFE.64 )e consequence of this has been that suc-
cessive democratic governments have faced constraints when try-
ing to reform employment laws to make them more favourable to 
business (for example, in BCDF the Constitutional Court declared 
labour reforms that had been approved by the PSD government 
to be unconstitutional), consequently, the employers’ point of view 
has never had a hegemonic influence and they were aware they 
had to negotiate with labour in order to reform employment laws.
One of the major features facilitating the development and 
institutionalization of social concertation in Portugal was the es-
tablishment of the CPCS in BCDJ by the Centre Bloc government. 
)is body was charged with forging consensus between the so-
cial partners in order to facilitate concertation. Its main role is to 
formalize participation mechanisms, guarantee the transparency 
of the bargaining process and ensure the opinions of the social 
partners are considered in legislative process that may aAect them. 
)e CPCS has been able to moderate the CGTP’s opposition to 
63 Barreto and Naumann (note G). Other scholars have argued the Spanish model 
seems to confirm a coalition of “intra-regime soft-liners”and “extra-regime soft-liners” 
results in a less consensual model of industrial relations in which the role of unions is 
diminished because they are not necessary for the consolidation of that coalition’s goals. 
In contrast, in Portugal “extra-regime soft-liners” played a central role in the democra-
tization process, resulting in a more inclusive system of industrial relations because they 
needed the support of organized labour for the consolidation of their programme. Nataf 
(note F), p. HBI.
64 R. Durán Muñoz, Acciones colectivas y transiciones a la democracia: España y Por-
tugal, !"$5–!"$$ (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, BCCF).
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central bargaining and has encouraged collaboration between the 
two union confederations.
No Portuguese government has been able to forge a constitu-
tional majority with which it can impose its views: the PSD never 
obtained a majority su@ciently large that would allow them to 
rewrite the country’s constitution. )is has resulted in the need 
for political leaders to forge alliances with other social actors in 
order to reform the system. Institutional factors also help account 
for outcomes. )e Portuguese political system is presidential, and 
while the president does not enjoy the same political power as the 
presidents of either France or the United States, he has been able 
to block government proposals he does not support. One of the 
major features of the Portuguese system is that it gives the presi-
dent the authority to refer controversial legislation to the con-
stitutional court. )is balance is reinforced when the president 
comes from a diAerent party from the government. During the 
latter half of the BCDIs, while the PSD was in o@ce, Mário Soares 
was elected president with the support of the PS and PCP. Once 
in o@ce, he was able to restrain the PSD’s impetus for reform and 
safeguard workers’ rights. In BCDE he stopped the PSD’s employ-
ment reform law by referring it to the constitutional court where 
it was declared unconstitutional. In total, he used his power of 
referral no less than JJ times, forcing the PSD to redraft its legis-
lation on HH occasions.65
)e country’s political parties continue to play a crucial role 
within the unions (and vice versa). Union representatives are of-
ten found on party lists for election to parliament, and party o@-
cials serve on union executive committees. )is inter-relationship 
has played a critical role in the process of concertation, since it 
has allowed political parties (particularly the PSD and PS) to 
65 Nataf (note F), p. BCB.
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influence unions (particularly the UGT). )e UGT consists of 
unions controlled by both the PS and the PSD (in BCDB the PS 
controlled HI unions and the PSD HG). )e union’s executive is 
organized along party lines, with both parties agreeing the union 
should be involved in national dialogue on economic policy. Be-
cause of this, the UGT eschews class-conflict and prefers consen-
sus and negotiation to confrontation.66
Conclusions:  
'e Europeanization of Interest Groups?
)e European integration process has exerted a significant in-
fluence over the realm of industrial relations, both through the 
implementation of the acquis communautaire and European regu-
lation of social aAairs and by promoting elite socialization and the 
development of trans-national networks that have proved vital for 
strengthening interest groups (which receive substantive support 
from their European counterparts). )e development of econom-
ic interests and networks at the European level has also strength-
ened support from the economic actors for democracy as well as 
for the European economic and social model. However, the most 
important eAect of Europeanization has been to foster the open-
ing of the Portuguese economy to competition, which has led to 
privatizations, downsizing and the internal restructuring of eco-
nomic sectors and economic liberalization. )ese developments 
have generated pressures and have had significant influence on 
the social partners, thereby contributing to the emergence of new 
industrial relations patterns.
Nevertheless, the legacies of authoritarianism and expe-
riences of the revolutionary period have hindered eAorts to 
66 Nataf (note F), p. BGJ.
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institutionalize modern and stable industrial relations based on 
trust. Indeed, Portuguese industrial relations are still marked by 
the heritage of authoritarian corporatism and the specific charac-
teristics of the democratic transition: in particular, revolutionary 
mass mobilization encouraged radicalization and class antagonism 
and resulted in state intervention and regulation.67 )e absence of 
trust is rooted in the turmoil of the revolutionary period that was 
linked to the goal of eliminating capitalism and the introduction 
of legislation biased towards the workers. )ese developments 
shifted the balance of power between labour and capital, and as a 
consequence organized labour’s political influence has been fairly 
strong in comparison to that exercised by organized business. )e 
class conflict was further aggravated by the split between commu-
nists and socialists which, as we have seen, led to the labour move-
ment’s fragmentation. As a result, diAerences in strategy, structure 
and practices impede the development of closer relations between 
the unions. )e consequences of this—ideological division, po-
litical polarization, fragmented labour and business movements, 
a rigid labour market (with limited scope for redundancies and 
a strict definition of what constitutes fair dismissal), antagonis-
tic relationships between labour and capital and a high degree 
of mobilization and conflict—continue to be felt today and have 
mitigated the eAects of Europeanization, blunting its impact on 
the behaviour and ideological outlook of actors and hindering the 
establishment of a model based on trust and cooperation.
)e current state of aAairs has some significant consequenc-
es. One of the main challenges for so-called under-organized 
economies is to develop a coordinating capacity among social 
partners enabling them to respond to international pressures and 
solve economic problems resulting from increased international 
67 Naumann and StoleroA (note K), p. KGF.
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competition and market integration.68 Unfortunately, in Portugal 
there have been limited improvements in technology, manage-
ment and commercial strategies, and limited productivity growth. 
Portuguese competitiveness is still based on low wages; however, 
this is an unsustainable model in a globalized world in which Por-
tugal faces increasing competition from new EU member states 
and the low-cost economies of East Asia.
)e competitiveness challenge requires structural reforms 
and productivity growth, both of which demand higher invest-
ment in infrastructure, redoubled eAorts to increase the quality 
of education, the rigorous promotion of competition in all areas 
and tax simplification. Portugal needs to shift from a low-cost 
model towards a high-value-added one based on adding value to 
the capital intensity of production. )is will demand investment 
in capital technology, a new culture of entrepreneurship, human 
capital with strong skills and—more importantly—a more flexi-
ble industrial relations framework based on trust and cooperation. 
While changes in production regimes and occupational structure 
demand greater flexibility, increasing competition rewards insti-
tutional mechanisms that facilitate cooperation between social 
actors and tilts the balance of wage-setting towards the tradable 
sector of the economy; hence, the importance of social bargain-
ing—which is key to promoting a shift from a low-cost model 
towards high-value-added one.
What are the Prospects for National Social Bargaining?
It is still not clear if current trends will persist in the future: 
whether they will consolidate the state’s traditionally dominant 
68 P. Hall and D. Soskice (eds), Varieties of capitalism: &e institutional foundations 
of comparative advantage (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, HIIB), pp. B–FI.
BFD T-. E/012.345637514 18 P107/9/.:. D.;1<03<=
role in industrial relations, or if they will allow social actors to take 
the initiative and assert their autonomy. )e success (or failure) of 
these initiatives will determine the consolidation of this approach. 
As we have seen, the return of national social bargaining has had 
positive consequences for the Portuguese economy and has con-
tributed to sustained and rapid growth. 
At the same time, the discussion above suggests the motiva-
tions that led social actors to return to national social bargaining 
are more structural than the goal of participation in the single 
European currency, and that they are likely to persist into the fu-
ture. Given the di@culties government and employers have had in 
the past in controlling overall wage growth without support from 
unions, coupled with the erosion further fragmentation would 
have on the position of the main confederations, the social actors 
should have powerful incentives to continue this approach. )e 
examination of the role played by the CES and the CPCS suggest 
a cooperative strategy based on social bargaining will be more du-
rable the more the social actors are able to develop their capacity 
for strategic learning.
Other developments favour the continuation of these proc-
esses. Firstly, wage moderation is a key to closing the gap between 
Portugal and the richer EU countries (Portugal’s per capita GDP 
is only FG per cent of the EU average), to exploiting Europe-wide 
specialization, and to attracting investment from European part-
ners (Portugal’s average hourly manufacturing wage is still less 
than half that of Germany). 
)e abandonment of comprehensive macro-bargaining strate-
gies—which cover every issue and culminated in macro-agree-
ments—in favour of a new strategy based on diAerent bargaining 
tables is more conducive to agreements. Portugal’s social ac-
tors have adopted a more flexible approach through the parallel 
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negotiation of various social concertation agreements—each of 
limited scope. )is bargaining strategy is based on package deals 
that include labour market organization and flexibility in return 
for substantial social policy reforms. 
)e new pacts seek to maintain the balance between both flex-
ibility and solidarity and equity and e@ciency. )ey are part of a 
political exchange: social benefits and employment in exchange 
for flexibility and wage moderation. 
In countries such as Portugal, where unilateral reforms have 
not been eAective and have encountered significant resistance, 
governments are likely to continue using this strategy to gain 
legitimacy for unpopular employment and social reforms and 
overcome the social partners’ institutional veto. In turn, the social 
partners are likely to accept this approach for as long as they par-
ticipate in the policy-making process and receive compensation. 
Finally, an additional incentive is the fact social bargaining 
helps prevent a negative spill-over from social policy into wage 
bargaining.69
With an industrial relations’ settings deeply rooted in the law, 
and in which there is a strong tradition of state intervention, the 
challenge for Portugal is to build new institutional mechanisms 
that will provide the instruments needed for governments to 
adopt adequate supply-side policies and contain inflation, while 
maintaining sound fiscal policies and ensuring micro-actors have 
the necessary internal and external flexibility and lower costs ena-
bling them to compete eAectively in a globalized market. 
Social bargaining is an adequate instrument for achieving 
these goals: it provides the social actors with processes through 
69 A. Hassell and B. Ebbinghaus, “From means to ends: Linking wage moderation 
and social policy reform”, in G. Fajertag and P. Pochet (eds), Social pacts in Europe: New 
dynamics (Brussels: ETUI, HIII), pp. EB–DG.
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which they can achieve the balance between e@ciency and soli-
darity while also being able to overcome veto points.
Because monetary union subjects macro-economic policy 
in the Eurozone to a single monetary authority, the European 
Central Bank, monetary union results in further restrictions on 
domestic economic policy. Although some scholars have already 
predicted the end of centralized concertation schemes, new analy-
ses are proving the importance incomes policy will have in the 
context of monetary union.70 
Incomes policy, with its influence on both labour relations 
costs, seems to continue to be an adequate instrument that will 
enhance competitiveness and contribute towards the convergence 
objective being pursued by European economies. However, the 
benefits of centralized wage bargaining will hinge largely on the 
ability of union leaders to control overall wage growth in order to 
avoid monetary policy measures that will lead to increased lev-
els of unemployment.71 Monetary union will result in the decen-
tralization of wage bargaining throughout the EU because the 
most encompassing union organizations will be less inclusive, and 
therefore may have less incentive to internalize inflationary pres-
sures caused by wage increases.72 
70 T. Iversen, Contested economic institutions: &e politics of macroeconomics and wage-
bargaining in organized capitalism (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, BCCC).
71 S. Perez, “Yet the century? )e return to national social bargaining in Italy and 
Spain, and some possible implications”, paper presented to the American Political Sci-
ence Association, Boston (BCCD), p. HH; P. Hall and R. Franzese, “Mixed signals: Central 
bank independence, coordinated wage bargaining and European Monetary Union”, In-
ternational Organization, KH, J (BCCD), pp. KIK–JK.
72 )e United Kingdom’s industrial relations services’ publication, Towards a Euro 
wage?, suggests the euro will push bargaining systems both ways—towards centraliza-
tion and decentralization—depending on the region, economic sector and company. 
Financial Times (BJ October BCCD), p. J. In a speech in London, European Central Bank 
board member Sirkka Hamalainen stated labour flexibility has improved and that wage 
settlements have become more moderate since the introduction of the single currency. 
She claimed “there is evidence of a very significant change in labour market behaviour 
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)e risk will be that, in the context of monetary union—in 
which wage bargaining is relatively fragmented although there is 
a single monetary authority for the area—wage bargainers will be 
less responsive to threats from central bank. Nevertheless, since 
unit labour costs will remain a critical factor in improving com-
petitiveness, there will be strong pressure on governments, em-
ployers and unions to pursue national social bargaining.
in the euro area countries, particularly in the field of wage negotiations … discipline has 
greatly improved in that field, with wage demands apparently assuming a permanently 
lower level of inflation and adjusting faster to cyclical conditions than was the case prior 
to the introduction of the euro”, Financial Times (HE February HIIH), p. G.
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)e HIIG European Parliament elections marked a major 
change in the European Union’s (EU) existence: due to the en-
largement, ten new member states participated in those elections. 
Of those countries, eight are consolidating democracies that until 
around the beginning of the BCCIs were under authoritarian com-
munist rule (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia).1 )us, they had their first Euro-
pean Parliament elections around BG years after their first demo-
cratic elections. )e southern European democracies that are also 
members of the EU (Greece, Portugal and Spain) share some 
characteristics with the eight post-communist democracies that 
might be relevant for the study of European Parliament elections. 
First, they began their transitions to democracy in the mid-BCFIs. 
Consequently, they share an authoritarian heritage with the new 
consolidating democracies of east and central Europe. Second, 
they held their first European elections shortly after their first na-
tional democratic elections. From BCDB–DF until HIIC, six (Portugal 
and Spain) or seven (Greece) European Parliament elections took 
1 In HIIF two other post-communist countries (Bulgaria and Romania) entered 
the EU.
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place in the new southern European democracies. We derive our 
research questions bearing these characteristics in mind.
)e theoretical framework of the paper is mainly the perspec-
tive that was first presented by Reif and Schmitt (BCDI) follow-
ing the first European Parliament elections in BCFC, that is, the 
so-called second-order elections model. First-order elections are 
those where there is much at stake, that is, the control of executive 
power.2 Due to their second-order nature, European Parliament 
elections are usually contended by the same actors, emphasizing 
mainly the same (national) issues and de-emphasizing European 
issues. )us, voting behaviour is basically structured by the same 
contextual supply-side factors as in first-order national elections 
(in the present paper, and especially for the Portuguese case, these 
are the national legislative elections to the lower and single cham-
ber). 
However, not all contextual constraints active in first-order 
elections are active in European Parliament elections: there are 
usually no constraints in terms of government formation, fur-
thermore, since the European Parliament elections have no ma-
jor consequences for national (or European) politics, electors are 
more free to “vote with their heart” than in first-order elections, 
where they more often “vote with their head”. Basically, there are 
three major modes of voting in European Parliament elections: 
“voting with the head”, “voting with the heart” and “voting with 
the boot”.3 
2 C. van der Eijk and M. Franklin (eds), Choosing Europe? &e European electorate 
and national politics in the face of the Union (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, 
BCCE); M. Marsh, “Testing the second-order election model after four European elec-
tions”, British Journal of Political Science HD (BCCD) pp. KCB–EIF; and W. van der Brug and 
C. van der Eijk (eds), European elections and domestic politics: Lessons from the past and 
scenarios for the future (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, HIIF).
3 M. Franklin, “)e fading power of national politics to structure voting behav-
iour in elections to the European Parliament”, paper presented at the Conference on 
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Voting with the head is when voters take account of strategic 
considerations (so as to not waste votes on parties that are un-
likely to have a say in government formation and to avoid voting 
for those parties that might have a destabilizing eAect upon the 
parliament), voting with the heart is to vote for the preferred par-
ty without taking into account any strategic considerations while 
voting with the boot is often protest voting against the incumbent 
government, the political class, the programmes and/or the candi-
dates of the parties voters would normally vote for, or to indicate 
support for a particular policy.4
In European Parliament elections, most voters vote with the 
head (mirroring their voting behaviour in first-order elections).5 
In these elections the number of those who vote with their heart 
or with their boot varies according to many factors, especially the 
timing of the national electoral cycle. Second-order elections pro-
vide opportunities for voters defect the parties they would nor-
mally vote for in first-order elections.6 
Franklin envisages two major possible results of those oppor-
tunities for defection in European Parliament elections. First, “the 
experience of voting diAerently will aAect socialization across the 
board and delay or prevent the acquisition of strong national 
partisanships”.7 )is first eAect might be especially disturbing for 
new democracies, creating major di@culties for the stabilization 
of the political and party systems by delaying or even preventing 
the establishment of stable patterns of voting behaviour. Second, 
the HIIG European Elections, Central European University, Budapest, May HB (HIIK), 
pp. G–E. Available at www.ees-homepage.net/papers. 
4 Franklin (note J), p. E.
5 Franklin (note J).
6 Franklin (note J).
7 Franklin (note J), p. F.
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“it is possible that the diAerent socializing experiences of these 
young voters will aAect only their behaviour in European Par-
liament elections, building awareness that European Parliament 
elections are diAerent even while allowing them to acquire just 
as strong a partisanship in national elections as earlier cohorts of 
voters did”.8 
A recent study focused on volatility measures based on aggre-
gate data showed only small diAerences between first-order and 
European Parliament elections,9 but we know volatility indices 
based on aggregate data are only very crude measures of the elec-
toral fluxes between elections.
Considering Portugal as one example of the new (southern 
European) democracies, this chapter’s objective is to analyse the 
impact of voting behaviour in elections to the European Parlia-
ment on the anchors of partisanship in Portugal (as an example 
of a new democracy). After some contextual introduction about 
the nature and characteristics of political institutions in Portugal, 
namely the electoral systems across the two diAerent types of elec-
tions, we evaluate the specificity of voting behaviour in Europe-
an Parliament elections, vis-à-vis voting behaviour in first-order 
contests, namely in terms of the extent to which the opportunities 
for defection are used by voters. 
After those analyses, we evaluate the impact of voting behaviour 
in European Parliament elections on the anchors of partisanship 
(in new democracies). )e strength of the anchors of partisanship 
will be assessed not only in terms of voting behaviour, but also in 
terms of the levels of party identification among the Portuguese 
8 Franklin (note J).
9 D. Caramani, “Is there a European electorate and what does it look like? Evi-
dence from electoral volatility measures, BCFE–HIIG”, West European Politics HC, B (HIIE), 
pp. B–HF.
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adult population immediately before the first European election 
and until HIIC.
Due to their second-order nature,10 European Parliament 
elections provide opportunities for defection without major con-
sequences for the (national) political system; however, in new 
democracies—especially in the first decades of the new regimes—
this can be disturbing for the consolidation of ties between elec-
tors and political parties and, consequently, for the stabilization of 
the party system. By studying Portugal in its first three decades 
of democracy we can learn some lessons about the impact of Eu-
ropean Parliament elections upon the stabilization of the anchors 
of partisanship in new democracies, which may be helpful for 
post-communist member states. )us, we will analyse the impact 
of voting behaviour in European Parliament elections upon the 
anchors of partisanship at the national level in Portugal (as an 
example of the new southern European democracies), and try to 
extract some lessons for the new EU members. However, some at-
tention will also be given to the HIIC European Parliament elec-
tions in Portugal. 
)e BJ June HIIC European Parliament elections were espe-
cially interesting for the Portuguese media, politicians and citi-
zens because they took place shortly before the legislative and 
local elections of HF September and BB October HIIC, respectively. 
Because of this proximity, elections to the European Parliament 
were seen as a kind of primary for the forthcoming national elec-
tions. )is also gave them special significance in terms of electoral 
10 In fact, if we consider turnout rates, European elections can even be considered 
third-order elections. Let us consider only the example of the three recent southern 
European democracies. Between BCDF and HIIG the average turnout in local elections 
(Greece FH.JJ per cent, Portugal EB.K per cent, Spain EE.F per cent) was much higher 
than the average turnout in European elections (Greece ED.HH per cent, Portugal GF.F per 
cent, Spain KD.B per cent), especially in Portugal and Spain where there is no compulsory 
voting, which allows us to consider the latter as third-order elections.
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behaviour research concerning second-order elections. Here we 
also reflect on these issues, not only by looking at the HIIC Euro-
pean elections from a longitudinal perspective, but also by com-
paring the result with those of the national elections.
Considering what has been said above, it should now be clear 
why we are concentrating on the long-term interrelations between 
voting behaviour in national and European elections in Portugal: 
because we are especially interested in the impact of voting be-
haviour in these second-order elections on the long-term consoli-
dation of partisanship in new democracies. 
)e existence (or absence) of a significant long-term impact of 
voting behaviour in European elections upon the anchors of par-
tisanship can be of special interest for the new post-communist 
democracies in terms of the lessons for party system stabilization. 
)ese lessons cannot be learned by studying the short-term 
interrelations between voting behaviour in national and European 
elections in the new post-communist democracies because we are 
talking about long-term impacts.11 )erefore, the findings of this 
chapter are based mainly on longitudinal data. 
)is method of statistical analysis was chosen because the 
main aim of our research is to study data with repeated measure-
ments on the same units over the period of study. Moreover, the 
second-order elections model makes no predictions in terms of 
the long-term interrelations between voting behaviour in national 
and European elections,12 and that is yet another reason to con-
sider our study innovative vis-à-vis previous studies. 
11 H. Schmitt, “)e European Parliament elections of June HIIG: Still second-
order?” Available at www.ees-homepage.net/papers.
12 K. Reif and H. Schmitt, “Nine second-order national elections: A conceptual 
framework for the analysis of European election results”, European Journal of Political 
Research D, B (BCDI), pp. J–GG.
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)ere is a recent study that analyses European Parliament 
elections (vis-à-vis first-order elections) and uses a longitudinal 
perspective, but its scope is diAerent from ours because it only 
analyses electoral volatility.13
Finally, we should bear in mind that while this chapter will 
concentrate on the Portuguese case, whenever relevant it will also 
report the corresponding data from Greece and Spain.14 Moreo-
ver, the conclusions will be built on the results from Greece, Spain 
and Portugal.
'e Role of Elections in the  
Portuguese Political System
Before Portugal’s relatively bloodless Carnation Revolution of 
HK April BCFG, free and fair elections with universal suArage and a 
competitive party system were unheard of there. Portugal’s transi-
tion to democracy was initiated by a coup led by junior military 
o@cers who committed themselves to holding free elections one 
year from the date of coup. )e elections to the constituent as-
sembly were held on HK April BCFK, followed by the first free con-
stitutional parliamentary elections on HK April BCFE.
Portugal’s political system is semi-presidential,15 and thus the 
only two institutions with national electoral legitimacy and a re-
sponsibility for forming government are the president and par-
liament. )e head of state is the directly-elected president, but 
this o@ceholder must share power with the head of government 
13 Caramani (note C).
14 )ese cases are analysed more thoroughly in A. Freire and E. Teperoglou, “Eu-
ropean elections and national politics: Lessons from the ‘new’ southern European de-
mocracies”, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties BF, B (HIIF), pp. BIB–HH and 
A. Freire and E. Teperoglou, “Eleições europeias e política nacional: Lições das ‘novas’ 
democracias do sul da Europa”, Perspectivas: Portuguese Journal of Political Science and 
International Relations H (HIIF), pp. HC–KG.
15 M. Duverger, “A new political system model: Semi-presidential government”, 
in A. Lijphart (ed.) Parliamentary versus presidential government (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, BCDI), pp. BGH–C.
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(prime minister) who is responsible to parliament. Although the 
president had more significant powers from BCFE–DH, leading to 
an unclear presidential-parliamentary balance of power, the BCDH 
constitutional revision substantially reduced some of these pow-
ers, making the system more “premier-presidential”.16 )e presi-
dential term is five years with a maximum of two terms. Since 
its transition to democracy began in BCFG, Portugal has had six 
presidential elections, only one of which required a second round 
run-oA.
)e legislative branch, parliament, is unicameral and composed 
of HJI members elected in HH multimember constituencies (the 
electoral systems used in European and legislative elections are 
presented below). Deputies serve four-year terms in o@ce. Par-
liamentary elections ultimately determine which party will form 
the government, who will become prime minister and, thus, who 
will share executive power with the president. )ese are clearly the 
most important elections in the political system.
Less important elections (in terms of their contribution to the 
functioning of the national political system) also take place in Por-
tugal at the local, regional and European levels. Local and region-
al level elections under democratic rules began in BCFE, following 
the promulgation of Portugal’s new constitution. )e constitution 
provided for three distinct levels of local governance (autarquias 
locais) according to their respective territorial delimitations—the 
ward (freguesia), the county-level municipality (concelho) and the 
special administrative regions of the Azores and Madeira.
Elections to the European Parliament began in Portugal and 
Spain in June BCDF, following their accession to the European 
Community in BCDE. Voters have gone to the polls five times for 
European elections, and their importance for national politics is 
16 M. Shugart and J. Carey, Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and elec-
toral dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, BCCH).
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the same as elsewhere in the EU: they are of secondary impor-
tance to the functioning of the political system, both in terms of 
the constitutional order and (usually) in terms of their political 
consequences. 
'e Electoral Systems in Legislative  
and European Parliament Elections
Except for the presidential contests, the electoral systems used 
across diAerent types of Portuguese elections are quite similar.17 
Both legislative and European elections are contested under the 
d’Hondt system of proportional representation and closed lists. 
Since BCFK the only significant change in the electoral system for 
legislative elections was the reduction in the number of deputies 
from HKI to HJI for the BCCB election. 
)is change resulted in a minor reduction in the average dis-
trict magnitude: from BB.G seats per district between BCFK and BCDF, 
to BI.K from BCCB onwards.18 )is system benefits large parties the 
most (those receiving more than HK per cent of the vote), is rela-
tively fair to medium sized parties (those with BK–HK per cent of 
the vote) and can even allow for the entry of very small parties 
(those with around B.K–J per cent of the vote) due to the very large 
district magnitude of the Lisbon and Oporto constituencies.
As for European elections, the state consists of one single 
constituency returning HG Members of the European Parliament 
(MEP) in HIIG (HG seats from BCDF–DC and HIIG, and HK seats 
from BCCG–CC). However, although still maintaining a nation-
17 A. Freire, “Second-order elections and electoral cycles in democratic Portugal”, 
South European Society and Politics C, J (HIIG), pp. KG–FC.
18 However, it should be noted the range of district magnitudes is very high. For 
further details, see F. F. Lopes and A. Freire, Partidos políticos e sistemas eleitorais: Uma 
introdução (Lisbon: Celta, HIIH), especially pp. BJK–GJ.
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wide constituency, the number of Portugal’s seats in the European 
Parliament was reduced to HH between the HIIG and HIIC Euro-
pean elections. 
European elections are conducted under proportional repre-
sentation with closed lists. Unlike in the national elections there 
is no legal threshold. It can be said the electoral system used for 
European elections is not as fair to small- and medium-sized par-
ties as the parliamentary electoral system because of the absence 
of the two large city constituencies of Lisbon and Oporto in the 
European contest. However, average district magnitude in legisla-
tive elections is not as high as in European elections. Except for 
the small parties with urban constituencies concentrated in Lis-
bon and Oporto, the benefit introduced by legislative elections in 
terms of district magnitude is not entirely clear.
Considering the characteristics of the electoral systems in 
Greek and Spanish legislative elections (which are much more 
disproportional than in Portugal) and European elections (which 
are basically similar to those of Portugal), we can say that in 
Greece small and medium-small parties have a much greater 
chance of getting elected in European elections than they have in 
legislative elections.19 
For the Spanish case the latter proposition is true only for the 
small and medium-sized parties with geographically dispersed 
votes (Communist Party of Spain/United Left [PCE/IU—Par-
tido Comunista de España/Izquierda Unida] and the Demo-
cratic and Social Centre [CDS—Centro Democrático y Social). 
However, for the regionalist parties that benefited most from the 
geographic concentration of their vote in national elections, it is 
much more di@cult to achieve representation in the European 
19 Freire and Teperoglou “European elections” (note BG) and Freire and Teperglou 
“Eleições europeias” (note BG).
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Parliament, which is why these parties usually run as a coalition 
for the European elections.20
'e Party Systems in Legislative  
and European Parliament Elections
Portuguese democratic politics has been dominated by four 
parties: the centre-left Socialist Party (PS—Partido Socialista), 
the centre-right Social Democratic Party (PSD—Partido Social 
Democrata), the orthodox Portuguese Communist Party (PCP—
Partido Comunista Português) and the right-wing Democratic 
Social Centre-Popular Party (CDS-PP—Centro Democrático e 
Social-Partido Popular).21  Additionally, small and micro parties 
from both the left and the right have persisted in Portuguese poli-
tics.
)ere has been a fundamental transformation of the Portu-
guese party system in a majoritarian direction since BCDF. As we 
can see in Table F.B, since the end of the BCDIs there has been a 
clear bipartisan trend in legislative elections, although this trend 
was reversed in the HIIC elections. )ese trends can be detect-
ed in Table F.B by observing the vote for the two major parties 
(the sum of the vote percentages of PS and PSD in each elec-
tion) and by analysing the eAective number of parties (ENEP: 
electoral—votes; ENPP: parliamentary—seats), especially at the 
parliamentary level (ENPP). In both cases, across time and since 
20 G. Colomé, “Espagne”, in Y. Déloye (ed.), Dictionnaire des élections européennes 
(Paris: Economica, HIIK) pp. HJD–GH and R. Espindola and F. Garcia, “Spain”, in J. Lodge 
(ed.), &e (**5 elections to the European Parliament (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 
HIIK), pp. HJI–D.
21 T. C. Bruneau, P. N. Diamandouros, R. Gunther, A. Lijphart, L. Morlino and 
R. S. Brooks, “Democracy, southern European style”, in P. N. Diamandouros and R. 
Gunther (eds), Parties, politics and democracy in new southern Europe (Baltimore, MD: 
)e Johns Hopkins University Press, HIIB), pp. BE–DJ.
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N17.::
* Least squares index = S (T (Si – Vi)H/H). Si and Vi — percentage of seats and votes 
for each party, respectively. See M. Gallagher, “Proportionality, disproportionality and 
electoral systems”, in Electoral Studies, BI, B (HIIC), pp. JJ–KB.
** ENEP = B / T ViH , where Vi represents the proportion of votes for party “i”.
1. Effective number of electoral (ENEP) and parliamentary (ENPP) parties. Data elab-
orated by author using the formula proposed by M. Laakso and R. Taagepera, “EAective 
number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe”, Comparative Political 
Studies, BH, B (BCFC), pp. J–HF.
*** ENPP = B / T SiH , where Si represents the proportion of seats for party “i”, Laakso 
and Taagepera (BCFC), p. G.
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BCDF, the format of the Portuguese party system is increasingly 
similar to a two-party system format. However, the HIIC legisla-
tive elections showed some significant change in the majoritarian 
trend (BCDF–HIIC). )e winner (the PS) obtained the second-low-
est share of the vote (JE.E per cent) since BCDF (the second low-
est was in HIIH, when the PSD obtained GI.H per cent), and the 
two major parties together (EK.F per cent) had the lowest share of 
the vote since BCDF (the second lowest was FH.G per cent in BCDF). 
)e increase in party system fragmentation benefited the medi-
um/small parties, especially the CDS-PP: the ENEP (eAective 
number of electoral parties) reached the highest level (G.IC) since 
BCDF (the second highest level between BCDF and HIIC was J.JJ in 
HIIK). At the parliamentary level (ENPP) things also changed 
significantly in HIIC: the ENEP (J.HK) reached the highest level 
since BCDF (the second highest was in BCCC: H.EB).22 
With the exception of the non-party cabinets president 
António Ramalho Eanes appointed during the late BCFIs, the 
PS and PSD have always controlled government. )is has been 
achieved either by the parties governing alone (PS: BCFE–F, BCCK–
HIIH, HIIK–C, HIIC–BB; PSD: BCDK–CK) or in coalition (PS-CDS: 
BCFF–FD; PSD-CDS-PPM: BCFC–DJ; PS-PSD: BCDJ–DK; PSD-
CDS-PP: HIIH–HIIK, HIBB–present). )e BCDK election is associ-
ated with several significant features, some of which only became 
clear at the BCDF realignment election and after.23 Perhaps most 
22 Freire and Teperoglou, “European elections” (note BG) and A. Freire, “A new 
era in democratic Portugal? the HIIC European, legislative and local elections”, South 
European Society and Politics BK, G (HIBI), pp. KCJ–EBJ.
23 Bruneau et al. (note HB), pp. BE–GK; A. Freire, “Party system change in Portugal, 
BCFG–HIIK: )e role of social, political and ideological factors”, Portuguese Journal of So-
cial Science G, H (HIIK), pp. HB–GI; A. Freire, “Mudança do sistema partidário em Portugal, 
BCFG–HIIC: O papel dos factores políticos, sociais e ideológicos”, in M. A. Cruz, Eleições e 
sistemas eleitorais: Perspectivas históricas e políticas (Oporto: Universidade do Porto, HIIC), 
pp. HBK–EH.
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significant was the concentration of the vote in two major parties: 
a majoritarian trend in the political system.24 )e change from 
“consensual” to “majoritarian” democracy has several features: 
from a fragmented to a kind of bipartisan party system, from 
coalition (or minority) and unstable governments to single party 
majorities (most of the time) and rather stable governments and 
from a strong parliament (and president) to a strong government 
(and prime minister).25
Another major change associated with the majoritarian trend 
is that since BCDF cabinet stability has substantially improved.26 
During this period only one PS government (BCCC–HIIH) and the 
PSD-PP coalition (HIIH–K) did not complete their terms. On JI 
November HIIG, following a succession of problems with the new 
cabinet’s performance, the president announced his intention to 
call elections in February HIIK, which the PS won with its first 
ever majority. A long legislature (KG months) followed with the 
PS leading a single-party majority government. It was this legis-
lature—the tenth—that was under scrutiny in the HIIC election 
cycle.27 
Did the developments in the party system that occurred in 
legislative elections occur in European (and local) elections? 
Tables F.H and F.J shows the trends in the “eAective number of 
electoral parties” in Portuguese European and local elections.28 
Comparing Portuguese legislative and European Parliament elec-
24 Freire and Teperoglou “European elections” (note BG); Bruneau et al. (note HB).
25 Freire (note HJ); Bruneau et al. (note HB); Freire and Teperoglou “European elec-
tions” (note BG); Freire (note HH).
26 Freire (note HJ); Freire, “Mudança do sistema” (note HJ); Bruneau et al. (note HB).
27 Due to a legislative change that pointed to the need for national government 
mandates/terms to end by September so the new government could prepare its budget.
28 To trace the evolution of each of the four main Portuguese parties and compare 
the performance of large and medium-small parties across diAerent types of elections in 
both countries, we used the same rules concerning the decomposition of the votes for 
Portuguese coalitions as those presented in Freire (note BD).
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tions in terms of the trends in the “eAective number of electoral 
parties” (ENEP) (Table F.H), we can see there is a clear synchro-
nicity. In both types of elections there was a majoritarian drive 
between BCDF and HIIK, with a significant reduction in the eAec-
tive number of parties. Moreover, what seems to be a very slight 
reversal of trends in recent legislative elections (BCCC–HIIK) is also 
mirrored in recent European contests (BCCC–HIIG).
Additionally, the strong reversal of trends in the election of 
HF September HIIC was already anticipated in the BJ June HIIC, 
European elections: a return to the party system format char-
acteristic of the consensual era of Portuguese politics (BCFK–DF). 
Furthermore, we can see that European elections seem to be los-
ing their distinctive character vis-à-vis first-order ones. Still, in 
the medium- to long-term, first-order elections seem to be con-
taminating the European contests, a feature not predicted by the 
second-order elections theory, since this model makes no longi-
tudinal predictions.29 However, the HIIC also showed the oppos-
tive “influence”: changes in the party system format begun first in 
European elections (BJ June HIIC) and were mirrored in the legis-
lative elections (HF September HIIC). )us, party system change is 
clearly an element of continuity between the HIIC European and 
legislative elections.
)e majoritarian trend in the Portuguese party system at the 
level of legislative elections, which is visible in the concentration 
of votes for the two major parties and in the decline in the “ef-
fective number of electoral parties”, was also mirrored both in the 
European and local elections, albeit with a delay (see Tables F.H 
and F.J). )is trend first became apparent at the national level, 
29 For further details, as well as for a systematic comparison of this data for the 
Portuguese case with Greece and Spain, where similar conclusions were found for Spain 
but not for Greece (due to the presence of a two-party system format right since the 
BCFIs), see Freire and Teperoglou “European elections” (note BG).
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before spilling over to both the European and local levels. And 
all this took place without any significant change to the electoral 
system—only changes in the patterns of electoral behaviour. 
What we see in the HIIC European elections is a sharp inver-
sion of that trend. In the HIIC European elections the ENEP 
index (which considers the number of parties weighted by their 
respective electoral strength) reached G.CE, its highest figure since 
BCDF and well above its second-highest level of G.JK achieved in 
BCDC: between BCCG and HIIG the ENEP index was always below 
J.FK. )is sharp inversion of the majoritarian trend was replicated 
in the September HIIC legislative elections in which the ENEP 
index reached G.ID, its highest level since BCDF, and while lower 
than the figure obtained in the European elections it was never-
theless higher than that found in the “consensual period” elections 
of BCFK, BCFE and BCDJ (which were J.EE, J.CC and J.FG, respectively) 
(see Table F.B). However, in the HIIC local elections the ENEP in-
dex actually fell to J.GJ from the J.EF obtained in HIIK (Table F.J). 
)e reasons for this latter deviation in the local elections are 
several and beyond the scope of the present paper.30 Nevertheless, 
several elements can be outlined in an attempt to understand why 
the sharp inversion of the majoritarian trend was not followed in 
the HIIC local elections. First, we should bear in mind local elec-
tions are more disproportional: average values for the complete 
period are G.F per cent (legislative, BCFK–HIIC), G.C per cent (Euro-
pean, BCDF–HIIC) and K.DI per cent (local, BCFE–HIIC) (for the full 
distributions see Tables E.B, E.H and E.J). One of the main reasons 
for this is the average district magnitude, which is much lower in 
local than in European or legislative elections. Second, in local 
elections there are JID competitions: logistically very demanding 
30 For those interested see Freire and Teperoglou, “European elections” (note BG) 
and Freire (note HH).
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for small parties. )ird, national factors have much less weight in 
local elections. Fourth, incumbent government punishment was 
reduced in the HIIC local elections due to the fact the legislative 
contest took place shortly before.31 
Although the spill-over of the majoritarian trend from legisla-
tive to European elections was not predicted by the second-order 
elections model, we believe it is a phenomenon that can neverthe-
less be accommodated in that theoretical framework. We should 
bear in mind first-order elections are more important than Eu-
ropean elections in terms of financial state resources, mass media 
visibility and organization structure.32 )erefore, if some parties 
lose their force on the national level, this will tend to contaminate 
other levels of power.
Let us pass to the diAerential performance of political parties 
(across types of elections) according to their size.33 )e first hy-
pothesis to be tested is whether or not on average, small-  (Left 
Bloc [BE—Bloco de Esquerda] before HIIC, among others) and 
medium-sized parties (PCP, CDS-PP, and BE since HIIC) have 
always performed better (that is, they received higher percentages 
of votes) in European than in legislative elections.34 )e second 
hypothesis is to discover if on average the large parties (PS and 
PSD) have always performed better in legislative than in Euro-
pean elections. 
31 For further information, see Freire (note HH).
32 Eijk and Franklin (note H); Y. Déloye (note HI); J. M. Magone, “Portugal”, 
in Lodge (note HI), pp. HBI–F; Espindola and Garcia (note HI); Kavakas, D. (HIIK), 
“Greece”, in Lodge (note HI).
33 Reif and Schmitt (note BH); Marsh (noteH); Eijk and Franklin (note H).
34 Although in HIIC the BE changed category in terms of its size, for the sake of 
longitudinal comparisons we kept it in the small parties category.
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S1/0<.:: A. Freire, “)e HIIC European elections in Portugal: Primaries or simply 
second order?”, Portuguese Journal of Social Science C, B (HIBI), pp. FB–DD, using data elabo-
rated from www.cne.pt and www.dgai.mai.pt.
N17.: about the procedures used to disaggregate coalitions, see A. Freire, “Second-
order elections and electoral cycles in democratic Portugal”, South European Society and 
Politics C, J (HIIG), pp. KG–FC; and A. Freire and E. Teperoglou, “European elections and 
national politics: Lessons from the ‘new’ southern European democracies”, Journal of 
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties BF, B (HIIF), pp. BIB–HH.
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In terms of the performance of diAerent types of political par-
ties, according to their size, theories about second-order elections 
always received empirical support (Table F.G).35 Some qualifica-
tions are due, however.  
In Table F.G we can see the PS and PSD always perform bet-
ter in legislative than in European elections, but this diAerential 
performance was  more pronounced in the HIIIs (+E.D) and much 
more pronounced in the HIIC elections (+F.G)  (legislative versus 
European) than in the BCCIs (+E.H). )e elections of the BCDIs are 
not completely comparable with those of the BCCIs and HIIIs, 
particularly because of the presence of the short-term flash party, 
the Democratic Renewal Party (PRD—Partido Renovador De-
mocrático) in the BCDIs. On the contrary, the two mid-sized par-
ties (PCP and CDS-PP) always performed better in European 
than in legislative elections, but this diAerential performance was 
much less pronounced in the last decade. 
Finally, the very small parties (both from the left and the right) 
always performed better in European than in legislative elections, 
but this diAerential performance was especially pronounced in the 
last decade. )us, in the last decade the losses of the largest parties 
(from legislative to European elections) mainly benefited the very 
small parties. )is situation is largely due to the BE’s extraordi-
nary result obtaining BI.F per cent of the votes to become the third 
party and entering the group of middle-sized parties, but also to 
the growth of the very small parties in general. )is situation was 
replicated at the last legislative elections, although to a minor ex-
tent: the BE was the party with the highest growth vis-à-vis the 
35 )e appropriate tests (t-test for paired samples) revealed that the diAerences in 
party performance are always significant. For further details, as well as for a systematic 
comparison of this data for the Portuguese case with Greece and Spain, where similar 
conclusions were found for Greece but not for Spain (due to the regionalist/nationalist 
parties), see Freire and Teperoglou “European elections” (note BG).
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HIIK legislative elections, and there was also some growth in the 
other medium/small and micro parties. 
Except for the small parties, local elections used to be similar 
to European elections: better for medium-sized parties and worse 
for the largest parties (than in the legislative), but this was not the 
case in the HIIIs, nor in the HIIC local elections. Overall, these 
local elections were rather bipartisan (as in the rest of the decade), 
and thus the largest parties performed better here than in either 
the legislative or in the European elections. )e reverse is true 
for both medium and small parties, but especially for the latter. 
Again, the reasons for this latter deviation in the local elections 
are several and beyond the scope of this chapter.
'e Long-Term Impact of Voting Modes  
upon the Anchors of Partisanship
As we noted above, there are three major modes of voting in 
European elections: voting with the head, voting with the heart 
and voting with the boot. In European elections, most voters vote 
with the head.36 However, European elections provide opportuni-
ties for voters to defect from the parties they would normally vote 
for in legislative contests (usually either by voting with the heart 
or by voting with the boot).
Franklin envisages two possible eAects of those opportunities 
for defection in European elections. First, the use of opportuni-
ties for defection in European elections will aAect the socializa-
tion of young voters—both in European and legislative elections, 
and this will delay or prevent the acquisition of strong national 
partisanships. )is eAect across the board might create major dif-
ficulties for the stabilization of the political and party systems in 
36 Franklin (note J), p. E.
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new democracies by delaying (or even preventing) the establish-
ment of stable patterns of voting behaviour. Second, the use of 
the opportunities for defection by young voters will aAect their 
behaviour only in European elections, thus allowing them to ac-
quire “just as strong a partisanship in national elections as earlier 
cohorts of voters did”.37
)rough the diAerential performance of the parties according 
to their size in first-order and European elections, we have already 
seen electors in the recent southern European democracies do—
at least apparently—use the opportunity for defection in Euro-
pean elections, especially in the cases of Greece and Portugal. Of 
course, even leaving aside diAerential turnout (which might have 
a significant impact upon the performance of the diAerent types 
of parties), those are at best only crude measures of defection, 
since they cannot take into account the vote transfers (on the in-
dividual level) cancelling each other out (and therefore not visible 
at the aggregate level). 
Consequently, we need to evaluate the level of disloyal electoral 
behaviour in European elections through the use of individual-
level data.
Analysing the level of “quasi-switching” is one way to conduct 
such an evaluation (it is measured by comparing the vote recall in 
European Parliament elections with the voting intention in a hy-
pothetical and concurrent national election). “To the extent that 
such voters (the defectors in European elections) vote diAerently 
than they would have done in a concurrent national election they 
have been characterized as being engaged in ‘quasi-switching’.” 
)e expectation is the following: “we should observe increas-
ing levels of quasi-switching as the passage of time allows voters 
to leave the electorate (through death and infirmity) who have 
37 Franklin (note J), p. F.
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learned a more rigid habit of voting, and as the number of vot-
ers who experienced European Parliament elections during their 
formative years increase”.38
According to the data processed by Franklin,39 and considering 
only those who voted in European Parliament elections, the levels 
of quasi-switching for BCDC, BCCG, BCCC and HIIG are the following: 
Greece—D.B, BH.G, C.E and D.E per cent; Portugal—C.F, BH.F, F.K and 
GH.D per cent; Spain—HH.H, BH.K, BK.K and BI.D per cent. Except for 
Portugal, which has a surprisingly high level in HIIG, there is no 
38 Franklin (note J).
39 Franklin (note J), p. C.
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N17.::
* Total volatility (TV) = (|PiV |+ |PjV|+ |PkV|+ |PlV|…+|PnV|)/H, where PiV rep-
resents the change, in absolute terms, in the aggregate vote for a party between two 
consecutive elections, in S. Bartolini and P. Mair, Identity, competition and electoral avail-
ability: &e stabilization of European electorates, !))%–!")% (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, BCCI), p. HI. 
** Inter-bloc Volatility (BV) = (|P(iV + jV + kV)|+ |P(lV + mV + nV)| )/H, where P(iV 
+ jV + kV) represents the net change, in absolute terms, in the aggregate vote for parties 
i, j and k—all of which come from the same bloc—between two consecutive elections, 
in S. Bartolini and P. Mair, p. HH.
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general increase in the level of quasi-switching, and there are no 
linear trends in this respect. 
)us, while the level of quasi-switching seems to be dependent 
upon political conjunctures the individual-level data regarding 
quasi-switching does reveal some propensity of voters to defect 
in national legislative elections. Moreover, quasi-switching can be 
said to be only an underestimation of disloyal electoral behaviour: 
voters do not experience the same level of constraints in a hypo-
thetical national election as in a real one.
Has that apparently disloyal electoral behaviour had any im-
pact upon legislative electoral behaviour? If so, did it have ma-
jor consequences in terms of the stabilization of the political and 
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party systems in Portugal (and the new southern European de-
mocracies) by delaying or even preventing the establishment of 
stable patterns of voting behaviour? 
To answer these questions, we will use both aggregate meas-
ures of electoral volatility and indicators of the level of social and 
ideological anchoring of partisanship on the individual level.
On the aggregate level, the concepts of total and inter-bloc 
electoral volatility will be used.40 Considering second-order elec-
tions may be used by voters to express their discontent with the 
incumbent government, and considering these elections have no 
direct consequences for national government formation, it is pos-
sible for voters to feel more able to change their voting options in 
40 S. Bartolini and P. Mair, Identity, competition and electoral availability: &e stabili-
zation of European electorates, !))%–!")% (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, BCCI), 
pp. BF–KH, JBJ–G.
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second-order than in first-order elections. We expect this might 
happen both in terms of vote swings within the same ideologi-
cal quadrant (within-bloc volatility) and between the left–right 
boundary (inter-bloc volatility). Note that the sum of within- and 
inter-bloc volatility gives us total volatility. 
)e results in the case of Portugal (BCFK-HIIC) were deceiving 
(see Tables E.K, E.E and E.F). With minor exceptions, total volatil-
ity usually plays a larger role in legislative elections than in both 
local and European Parliament elections—sometimes much larg-
er; as for within-bloc volatility, the findings were also negative, 
although here the picture is more mixed.41  
For Greece and Spain, considering the average of total volatil-
ity in national and European Parliament elections for the entire 
period (BCDB–DF and HIIG), Caramani found total volatility was 
higher in national than in European elections,42 although the dif-
ferences are rather small (the opposite was found by the author 
for the BH EU member states: higher total volatility was usually 
found in European than in national elections, except in Finland, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands where the reverse was true). In 
the Portuguese case average total volatility was much higher in 
national than in European elections.43
In a general comparative and longitudinal perspective, at the 
national level Greece, Portugal and Spain do exhibit some of 
the most volatile elections of the Western European countries 
between BCGK and HIIH.44 )is is, of course, an indicator of their 
41 Freire (note BF).
42 Caramani (note C), p. K.
43 Caramani (note C).
44 R. Gunther, “As eleições portuguesas em perspectiva comparada: Partidos e 
comportamento eleitoral na Europa do sul”, in A. Freire, M.C. Lobo and P. Magalhães 
(eds), Portugal a votos: As eleições legislativas de (**( (Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências So-
ciais, HIIG), p. JC.
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character as recent democratic regimes, within which patterns of 
electoral behaviour were not yet stabilized. However, after analys-
ing electoral volatility in each election since the first democratic 
contest until HIIH,45 we can say European elections have had only 
45 Gunther (note GG), p. GI.
T3>?. F.D 
())" European and Legislative Elections: Social Structure, 
Church Attendance, Left–Right Self-Placement and Vote 
(logistic regressions)
Independent variables
Dependent variable:  
Past vote (recall) in elections
(**" Legislative (**" European
Self-placement on left–right 
scale &.+((*** &.*#(***
Education &.$!'*** &.&'%
Subjective social class -&.&*# &.%*!
Church attendance &.!"(* &.'%+***
Pseudo R% (Nagelkerke) &.$%& &.(&"
N (#$ !&&&
Valid N $"% '""
S1/0<.:: data elaborated by the author from the European Election Study (EES) HIIC, 
and the Portuguese National Election Study (HIIC). See also www.piredeu.eu and www.
ics.ul.pt.
N17.:: Dependent variables are vote in European or legislative election recoded as left 
(I) and right (B). )e positioning of the parties in terms of left and right was done using 
electors’ perceptions of parties’ locations on the left-right scale. Independent variables: 
(a) self-placement on a left (B) right (BI) scale; (b) education—age when voter stopped 
studying (years old); (c) subjective social class—(B), “working class”; (K) “upper class”; 
(d) church attendance—“never” (B) to “several times a week” (K); (e) PNES—the same 
independent variables but sometimes with diAerent operational definitions were used 
(f ) *** p < I.IB, ** p < I.IK, * p < I.B; (g) due to diAerential turnout, only those who also 
voted in European elections were included for the legislative elections.
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a minor eAect, if any, upon electoral behaviour instability, and thus 
on the stabilization of each one of the three party systems. 
In terms of total volatility, the highest levels of volatility oc-
curred before the first European elections took place (and also 
concurrently in the Greek and the Portuguese cases: BCDB and BCDF, 
respectively). In terms of within-bloc volatility the picture, while 
more mixed, is basically similar. In any case, the major changes 
in the party systems took place before (or concurrently with) the 
first European elections, and were related to changes in the sup-
ply-side of politics: Greece in BCDB (the collapse of the Union of 
the Democratic Centre [EDIK] and the ascension of the Panhel-
lenic Socialist Movement [PASOK]); Portugal in BCDK and BCDF 
(the rise and fall of the PRD and the rise of the PSD) and in 
Spain in BCDH (with the collapse of the Union of the Democratic 
Centre [UCD—Unión de Centro Democrático] and the rise of 
the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party [PSOE—Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español]).
Aggregate volatility is a crude measure of electoral change, in 
that it may sometimes represent understated values for shifts in 
individual-level political preferences: there may be many voting 
shifts that cancel each other out. )at is why we will test to see 
whether the social and ideological anchors of partisanship are 
weaker in second-order than in first-order elections, thus indicat-
ing the greater probability of vote shifts between left and right 
in second-order elections. Because we want to test the electors’ 
propensity to cross the left–right divide, in Table F.D, we use the 
vote for parties of the left (I) and the right (B) as our dependent 
variable in each type of election. )e independent variables are: (B) 
several indicators of the social anchors of partisanship (see notes 
in Table F.D) and (H) left–right self-placement. Since the depend-
ent variable is a dichotomy, we will be using logistic regressions.
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)e results in Table F.D show the vote in the HIIC legislative 
elections was less anchored in ideological and social factors than 
the HIIC European elections. Similar tests for Greece and Spain 
and Portugal (for the HIIG elections) were presented elsewhere.46 
)e latter reveal sometimes the vote is more anchored in European 
than in legislative elections (Greece); however, sometimes the re-
verse is true (Portugal and Spain). Only for Greece and Portugal, 
the same comparisons between legislative and European Parlia-
ment elections for an extensive period (BCDK-DF and HIIG respec-
tively for Greece and Portugal) lead to the conclusion that “the 
individual-level evidence allows us to infer that sometimes people 
are more prone to change their vote across party/ideological blocs 
in European elections than in legislative ones; on other occasions 
the reverse is true. )erefore it can be ascertained the phenomena 
is mainly dependent upon the political conjuncture”.47 )us, the 
more recent HIIC data again reinforces this conclusion.
As a result, we must conclude the levels of defection are not 
necessarily higher in European than they are in legislative elec-
tions, because the levels of defection are dependent upon the po-
litical conjuncture in any type of election and the highest levels 
of defection regarding legislative elections in Portugal (and also 
in the other two recent southern European) democracies began 
before (or concurrently with) the first elections to the European 
Parliament. Consequently, the latter elections could not have had 
any significant eAect upon that disloyal electoral behaviour on the 
national level. We must also conclude European elections have 
had only a minor eAect upon the instability of legislative electoral 
46 Freire and Teperoglou “European elections” (note BG). 
47 A. Freire and E. Teperoglou, “European elections and electoral cycles in Greece 
and Portugal, BCDB/DF–HIIG”, paper presented to the European Parliament Elections 
HIIG conference, Budapest, HB–HH May HIIK. Available at www.europeanelectionstudies.
net/Papers/Paper_Draft_Budapest_May-BI-HIIK_Freire_Teperoglou.pdf.
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behaviour and thus, had only a minor eAect on the stabilization of 
the party systems in each of the three countries.
A more direct indicator of the level of party attachments in a 
country is that of the percentage of citizens who identify with any 
political party (party identification). In Figure F.B we present data 
comparing the levels of party identification in the three recent 
southern European democracies and in eight long-established 
European democracies between the BCFIs (or BCDIs, according to 
data availability) and HIIG. )ere we can see there is a general-
ized downward trend in terms of party identification among the 
European electorates except in Spain and the Netherlands. How-
ever, the causes for this quasi-generalized downward trend have 
been traced elsewhere, and have not been connected with defec-
tion rates at European elections (although this hypothesis was 
not tested).48 Moreover, both Portugal and Greece do show some 
of the smaller downward trends in party identification across Eu-
rope, so low they are neither statistically significant nor relevant: 
we would be better talking about stabilization rather than decline 
in these two cases.49 
)us, at least for the three southern European democracies, the 
decline in party identification cannot be derived from defection 
rates at European elections because either there is no decline in 
party identification (Spain) or the decline is small (Greece and 
Portugal) and is more properly classified as stabilization.
)e reversion of the trend (away from majoritarian politics) 
we found both in the HIIC European and legislative elections but 
48 H. Schmitt and S. Holmberg, “Political parties in decline?” in H.-D. Klinge-
mann and D. Fuchs (eds) Citizens and the state (Oxford: Oxford University Press, BCCK, 
BCCD), pp. CK–BJJ; R. J. Dalton and M. P. Wattenberg, Parties without partisans: Political 
change in advanced industrial democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, HIII).
49 A. Freire, “Left–right ideological identities in new democracies: Greece, Portu-
gal and Spain in the Western European context”, Pôle Sud: Revue de Science Politique de 
l ’Europe Méridionale HK, II (HIIE), pp. BKJ–FJ.
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Yes #!.$ +#.% (+.# +*.! ((.&
No, don’t know, 
no reply %*.( $%.* '$.' $!." '$.&
N !&& !&& !&& !&& !&&
N absolute !&&& +&& !&&& !'+& !&&
S1/0<.:: Eurobarometer GB.B (BCCG) (BCCG mass survey); European Election Study BCCC; 
HIIG; HIIC (BCCC, HIIG and HIIC mass surveys); A. Freire, J. M. L. Viegas and F. Seiceira 
(eds), Representação política: O caso português em perspectiva comparada (Lisbon: Sexante, 
HIIC).
N17.:: 1) PID—Party Identification; H) basically, the same question wording was ap-
plied in each one of the five surveys (“Do you consider yourself to be close to any 
particular party?”).
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PSD '(.( '$.+ '#.& '#.! $&.!
CDS-PP +.$ (.' $.& %.' $.+
Others &.* &.+ !.! !.$ &.%
N !&& !&& !&& !&& !&&
N absolute ($( %*( (+# #*+ ((&
S1/0<.: See Table F.C.B. 
N17.:: See Table F.C.B.
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not in that year’s local elections, are at least partially due to the 
more severe institutional barriers in the latter elections. Neverthe-
less, this raises some doubts about the existence of a trend away 
from majoritarian politics in the HIIC Portuguese election cycle. 
Of course, we need to wait for more elections to clarify this doubt, 
namely to know if the “new era in Portuguese politics” we are sure 
arrived with the HIIC European and legislative elections is here 
to stay or if it is only a short-term episode in Portuguese democ-
racy.50 However, data on party identification can also help us in 
this task. 
On the one hand, data on the distribution of party attachments 
presented in Table F.C.H also points to a trend away from ma-
joritarian politics in HIIC: the joint percentage of PS and PSD 
oscillated between DG (in BCCG and HIIG) and DF per cent (BCCC) 
in the first period; but since HIID there has been a reduction in 
the concentration of party attachments in the two major parties: 
DB per cent (HIID) and EC per cent (HIIC) (see Table F.C.H). )e 
decline in party identification with the two major parties is due 
mainly to the growth of identification with the radical left taken 
together (PCP and BE): from K.F per cent in BCCG to HK.G per cent 
in HIIC (and with BI.E and BK in HIIG and HIID). And this is also 
why the decline in party attachments is hurting the PS above all 
(from GD.J in BCCG to HC.F in HIIC), and not the PSD (which in 
fact increased its respective level of party identification: from JE.E 
in BCCG to GI.B in HIIC) (see Table F.C.H).
On the other hand, while the overall level of party attach-
ment (i.e. the total number/percentage of people identifying with 
any party) declined between BCCG (FB.G per cent) and HIIC (EE.I 
per cent), there are significant ups and downs (i.e. a trendless 
fluctuation) in the entire period (BCCG–HIIC) while between HIIG 
50 Freire (note HH).
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and HIIC the number of party identifiers increased (see Table 
F.C.B). 
In any case, for three main reasons the developments in the 
overall level of Portuguese party attachments between BCCG and 
HIIC shown in Tables E.C.B and E.C.H can hardly be said to be a 
result of the second-order nature of European elections on the 
formation of the partisan identities of Portuguese citizens. First, 
because these changes occurred around JI years after the tran-
sition to democracy in Portugal, and after five elections to the 
European Parliament: thus, they can hardly be said to be the re-
sult of the impact of the European Parliament upon the early 
formation of Portuguese citizens’ partisan attachments. Second, 
because the decline in the overall level of partisan attachments 
in HIIC is mainly a result of changes that occurred on the left of 
the ideological spectrum (decline in the number of PS identifiers, 
growth in the number of radical-left identifiers). )ird, because 
these latter changes are mainly the result of specific political cir-
cumstances between HIIK and HIIC, which had an impact on both 
the European and the legislative elections. 
)e HIIC European elections were marked by some interesting 
features. First, the incumbent PS government received the great-
est punishment ever in European elections. )is element was in 
part due to the severe economic crisis, which was also present 
in other European countries (the severe punishment of the in-
cumbents, especially those from the centre-left camp). Second, 
the PSD’s victory and the PS’s punishment were not predicted 
by the polls. )ird, the near extinction of the CDS-PP predicted 
by many polls was not confirmed by the final results. Fourth, the 
radical-left parties, BE and PCP, received a very large propor-
tion of the vote (HB.J per cent). Fifth, the BE more than doubled 
its vote percentage (from K.B per cent in HIIG to BI.F per cent in 
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HIIC) and was one of the major winners of this European Par-
liament election. Sixth, the PS and PSD together received the 
lowest vote percentage in European elections since BCDF (KD.H per 
cent).51 As we have seen, data on the distribution of party identi-
fication BCCG–HIIC also points to a trend away from majoritarian 
politics: a decline in the percentage of party identifiers with the 
two major parties, due mainly to a decline in PS identifiers and to 
an increase in radical-left identifiers. 
Two of the most curious factors in the HIIC European elec-
tion—the punishment of the incumbent government and the 
change in party system format (away from the majoritarian format 
in place since BCDF)—were at least partly mirrored in that year’s 
legislative elections (more the latter element than the former), 
thus showing that European elections did function as a kind of 
primary for the national election. 
On the other hand, the results of the European election were 
not fully replicated in the ensuing legislative election: the level of 
incumbent punishment was much lower—the winning party (the 
PS) was diAerent. )us, in this particular respect the European 
elections did not function as primaries for the national elections 
that followed.52
Conclusions
On HK April BCFG, Portugal initiated the so-called “third-wave” 
of world-wide democratization. Greece (November BCFG) and 
Spain (BCFK) soon joined that trend. )us, the three countries 
share an authoritarian heritage that is much longer in the cases of 
Portugal and Spain than in the case of Greece. Moreover, between 
51 Freire (note HH).
52 Freire (note HH).
HBD T-. E/012.345637514 18 P107/9/.:. D.;1<03<=
seven and ten years after their first democratic elections, each of 
these countries held their first election to the European Parlia-
ment. )us our main research question was the following: what 
lessons can be learned from the longitudinal (BCDB–DF and HIIC) 
and comparative study of European elections in the recent south-
ern European democracies regarding the interrelations of voting 
behaviour in first- and second-order elections, both for consoli-
dating and established democracies? 
More specifically, what lessons can the eight post-communist 
democracies that joined the EU in HIIG learn from this study? 
Most of all, we sought to evaluate the impact of voting behaviour 
in European elections upon the stabilization of partisanship an-
chors of in new democracies. 
In these democracies, especially during the first decades of 
their new regimes, this can be upsetting for the consolidation of 
partisanship anchors and, consequently, for the stabilization of 
the party system. )us, by studying Portugal (although mainly as 
an example of the “new” southern European democracies), in its 
first three decades of democracy, we wanted to learn some lessons 
about the impact of European elections upon the stabilization of 
partisanship anchors in new democracies that might be helpful 
for the post-communist member states. 
Additionally, the second-order elections’ model makes no pre-
dictions in terms of the long-term interrelations between voting 
behaviour in national and European elections, and that is yet an-
other reason to consider our study innovative. Moreover, to our 
knowledge the only longitudinal study on this subject focused 
only on volatility measures at the aggregate level.53
Several conclusions are worth mentioning in terms of the 
short- and long-term impacts of national factors upon voting 
53 Caramani (note C).
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behaviour in European elections. First, with the partial exception 
of Spain, political parties perform diAerently in legislative and 
European elections: the large parties perform better in first-order 
than in European elections, while for the medium, medium-small 
and small parties, the reverse is true.
Schmitt found a diAerent picture for the eight post-commu-
nist consolidating democracies that participated in European 
elections for the first time in HIIG: the party system format was 
not significantly diAerent in legislative and European elections.54 
What are the reasons for these diAerences between the post-
communist consolidating democracies and the group consisting 
Greece, Portugal and Spain? 
)e first point is that we must be cautious in making this com-
parison, because there has only been one European election for 
the former set of countries. Bearing this in mind, we can point to 
the diAerent level of party system institutionalization in southern 
Europe and in central eastern Europe (even if the situation in 
central eastern Europe is not homogeneous, with some systems 
much more stabilized than others) as an explanation that needs 
to be further developed in future studies: by the time of the first 
European election, levels of party system institutionalization were 
significantly higher in the former set of countries than in the lat-
ter.
Perhaps the first major lesson from the study of Portugal re-
garding the impact of national factors upon European voting 
behaviour is that such an impact has both a short-term and a 
long-term nature. Comparing legislative and European elections 
in terms of the trends of the ENEP we concluded that for both 
Portugal and Spain the majoritarian drive in the party system 
during legislative elections—in force since the end of the BCDIs 
54 Schmitt (note BB).
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and the beginning of the BCCIs—is mirrored in the European 
contests. 
Furthermore, European elections seem to be losing their dis-
tinctive character vis-à-vis first-order elections: the diAerences 
in the ENEP are fading in both countries. Although the spill-
over of the majoritarian trend from legislative to European elec-
tions we observed in Portugal and Spain was not predicted by the 
second-order election model, that phenomenon can nevertheless 
be accommodated in that theoretical framework: if some parties 
lose their force in the more important political arena (the na-
tional level), this will tend to contaminate other levels of power 
(European). )us, we believe future studies of second-order elec-
tions should investigate the long-term impact of national factors 
upon European elections in more countries, particularly in terms 
of party system format.
)ese results are somehow parallel/similar to those encoun-
tered by Caramani, who found that, except for some cases with 
“higher diAerentials” (Denmark, France, Austria, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, Germany and Ireland), the levels of volatility 
between European and national elections (“mixed volatility”) vis-
à-vis volatility in national elections, are relatively small.55 
All these results suggest a major problem with the second-or-
der elections’ model is that it is trying to explain diAerentials in 
voting behaviour between national and European elections but, 
except in some countries, such diAerentials are usually small. )us, 
in future studies, we should perhaps focus more on explaining the 
absence of major diAerences between voting in European Parlia-
ment and national elections.
)e second major lesson is especially relevant for consolidat-
ing democracies. It relates to the long-term impact of voting 
55 Caramani (note C).
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behaviour in European elections upon partisanship anchors in na-
tional electoral politics and is related to the chapter’s four major 
conclusions. First, the levels of defection are not necessarily higher 
in European than in legislative elections, because they are depend-
ent upon the political conjunctures. Second, the highest levels of 
defection in legislative elections (in Greece, Portugal and Spain) 
began before (or concurrently with) the first European elections, 
consequently, the latter elections could not have had any signifi-
cant eAect upon that disloyal electoral behaviour on the national 
level. )ird, European elections have had only a minor eAect upon 
the instability of legislative electoral behaviour, and thus they have 
had only a minor eAect upon the stabilization of the political and 
party systems in each of these three countries. Fourth, at least in 
the three recent southern European democracies, the decline in 
party identification cannot be derived from defection rates at Eu-
ropean elections because either there is no decline in party identi-
fication (Spain) or the decline is small (Greece and Portugal), and 
more properly classified as stabilization.
Both the similarity in party system format between national 
and European elections and the lack of any impact of defection 
rates in European elections on partisanship anchors in the recent 
southern European democracies can be due to reduced levels of 
Euroscepticism being voiced in the European arena.56
)ings might be diAerent in at least some of the new east-
ern member states where Euroscepticism is more widespread.57 
In fact, in Table F.BI we see that, on average, central and eastern 
56 C. van der Eijk and M. N. Franklin, “Potential for contestation on European 
matters at national elections in Europe”, in G. Marks and M. R. Steenbergen (eds), Eu-
ropean integration and political conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, HIIG), 
pp. JH–KI.
57 P. Taggart and A. Szczerbiak, “Contemporary Euroskepticism in the party sys-
tems of European Union candidate states of central and eastern Europe”, European 
Journal of Political Research GJ, B (HIIG), pp. B–HF.
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European societies are more polarized than Western societies, 
both in terms of the left–right divide and in terms of European 
issues—although the diAerences are more marked in terms of 
the latter. One basic lesson for the eight post-communist con-
solidating democracies is the following: due to their second-order 
nature,58 European elections do not seem to have much of an ef-
fect upon disloyal behaviour in legislative elections, or upon the 
disturbance of the stability or the institutionalization of the po-
litical and party systems in new democracies. 
However, these eAects were explored both in Portugal and in 
other two recent democracies that, by the time of their first Eu-
ropean elections had already had a nearly fully-stabilized party 
system. )e eAects of European voting behaviour upon legislative 
elections might be diAerent in polities in which the party system 
is not yet (fully) stabilized (as it is the case at least in some of the 
countries in central and Eastern Europe). 
Moreover, when there is more polarization around European 
issues, as it is the case at least in some of the countries in central 
and Eastern Europe, it is more likely what happens at the Euro-
pean level can contaminate the party systems at the national level 
and, consequently, Europeanization is more likely to influence 
national party politics in these cases. )us, further research into 
these issues will still be required—and the new post-communist 
member states will provide a good laboratory for that.
58 )ere is a major diAerence between the first European Parliament elections 
that took place in Greece (DB.K per cent with compulsory voting), Portugal (KB.HD per 
cent for the second European Parliament elections in the country because the first were 
concurrent with national legislative elections) and Spain (ED.KH per cent) vis-à-vis the 
HIIG European Parliament elections in the eight post-communist countries (which had 
an average turnout of JB per cent)—a much higher turnout in the former three countries 
than in the latter. However, turnout is not a topic analysed in this chapter and therefore 
the explanation for this diAerence is a matter for future research.
The Support for European 






)e study of the attitudes of European citizens in relation to 
European integration can benefit from the use of a singularly vast 
amount of data, particularly those provided by the regular and 
frequent Eurobarometer surveys funded by the European Com-
mission. 
)ese surveys have been conducted in Portugal since BCDI.1 
Analysis of those results by scholars interested in the intensity, 
tendencies and causes of support for the integration process from 
the BCDIs to the present have arrived at three fundamental conclu-
sions in respect of Portugal:
B. Portuguese public opinion is characterized, at least since 
the country’s accession to the European Union (EU), by 
strong levels of support for European integration.2 
H. Despite a fall in the level of this support since BCCH—part 
of a general European trend—support for integration 
1 Eurobarometer BG ( January BCDI).
2 M. Bacalhau, Atitudes, opiniões e comportamentos politicos dos portugueses (!"$+–"+) 
(Lisbon: Author, BCCG) and M. C. Lobo, “Portuguese attitudes towards EU member-
ship: Social and political perspectives”, in S. Royo and P. C. Manuel (eds), Spain and 
Portugal in the European Union: &e first !% years (London: Frank Cass, HIIJ), pp.CF–BBD.
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continues at a very high level, both in absolute and in 
comparative terms.3
J. )is support is based on principally “instrumental” crite-
ria, however. )at is to say, it is based more on a percep-
tion of the benefits of integration for the country and 
specific social groups than the consequence of an “aAec-
tive” relationship with either the European political sys-
tem or its institutions.4 
)ese conclusions result from the analysis of two indicators 
regularly present in the Eurobarometer surveys. )e first measures 
the opinions of individuals on whether their country has “benefit-
ed or not” from being a member of the EU (benefit). )e second, 
rather than explicitly seeking a cost-benefit assessment of integra-
tion, measures the opinions of individuals on whether their coun-
try belonging to the EU is “a good thing, a bad thing or neither 
one nor the other” (membership). )ese indicators provide us with 
the longest running data series in the Eurobarometer surveys.5
Analyses made in Portugal from the results of the application 
of these questions in opinion polls tend to begin with the assump-
tion that each one measures dimensions that are fundamentally 
distinct from the attitudes of the individuals. From this perspec-
tive, the benefit indicator will capture “a utilitarian view of inte-
gration”, “soliciting a retrospective analysis of the advantages and 
3 Lobo (note H) and A. C. Pinto and M. C. Lobo, “Forging a positive but in-
strumental view: Portuguese attitudes towards the EU, BCDE–HIIH”, in A. Dulphy and 
C. Manigand (eds) Public opinion and Europe: national identity in European perspective 
(Paris: Peter Lang, HIIG), pp. BEK–DB.
4 Lobo (note H); Pinto and Lobo (note J).
5 Data relating to membership has been collected in a total of KB Portuguese sur-
veys, from Eurobarometer BG (note B) to Eurobarometer EG (November HIIK), which is the 
last survey available at the time of writing. )ere have been GI surveys with questions 
relating to benefit, from Eurobarometer HK (March BCDE), also to Eurobarometer EG.
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disadvantages of belonging to the EU”.6 In other words we are 
in the domain that is normally designated as “specific support” 
for a political system, related to “the satisfaction that the mem-
bers of a system feel who obtain from the outputs and perceived 
performances of the political authorities”.7 Similarly, some of the 
first studies of political attitudes towards the EU identified the 
existence of a “utilitarian response base”, connected to the “sup-
port based in a relatively firm perceived interest” on the citizens’ 
part,8 captured precisely as recourse to the indicator measuring 
the citizens’ perceptions of the benefits resulting from European 
integration. 
Conversely, in existing studies of the Portuguese case, the indi-
cator membership has been treated as capturing an “aAective and 
diAuse vision” of integration. At the root of this assumption, the 
fact the percentage of people who believe Portugal has benefited 
from its membership of the EU has been consistently higher than 
the percentage of those who believe EU membership “is a good 
thing” has been interpreted as indicating that, in the Portuguese 
case, the “consensus” on integration is based on a “narrow and in-
strumental view of the benefits of belonging to the EU”.9
However, there are some potential problems with this type 
of analysis. On the one hand, the direct comparison of the pro-
portion of respondents who believe Portugal has benefited from 
its membership of the EU and those who state belonging to the 
EU is a good thing, neglects the fact the two indicators are not 
6 Lobo (note H), p. BIH.
7 D. Easton, “A reassessment of the concept of political support”, British Journal 
of Political Science K, G (BCFK), p. GJF.
8 L. N. Lindberg and S. A. Scheingold, Europe’s would-be polity: Patterns of change 
in the European Community (Eaglewood CliAs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, BCFI), p. GI.
9 Pinto and Lobo (note J), p. BFJ.
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strictly comparable: while the former solicits a dichotomous re-
sponse (“benefited” or “not benefited”), the latter allows a third 
response (“neither one thing nor the other”), which makes their 
direct comparison a questionable exercise. On the other hand, the 
assumption that the former yields an instrumental dimension or 
a cost-benefit relationship in the individual’s attitudes, while the 
latter gives a distinct dimension of diAuse support and aAection— 
not contingent in relation to the costs and benefits produced by 
integration— is also questionable from an empirical viewpoint.
In fact, there are good reasons to believe the membership in-
dicator is just one more indicator of utilitarian support. Recent 
analyses of the dimensionality of the European citizens’ attitudes 
towards the EU have come to confirm the membership and ben-
efit indicators are, in fact, measures of the same latent variable. 
For example, Lubbers and Scheepers demonstrate the instrumen-
tal support or scepticism with respect to the EU, connected to 
perceptions of the costs and benefits resulting from the integra-
tion process (measured by either the membership or the benefit 
indicator) must be clearly distinguished from political support or 
scepticism in relation to the EU, which is connected to the extent 
citizens accept the sharing of political authority between the na-
tion state and the EU as a political system.10 Similarly, Chierici 
shows that indicators of specific support, such as membership or 
benefit, must be clearly distinguished from indicators of diAuse 
support for the EU as a political community, among which are 
included the individual’s attitudes regarding the sharing of sov-
ereignty between the nation state and the European political sys-
tem.11 Even authors less concerned with establishing distinctions 
10 M. Lubbers and P. Scheepers, “Political versus instrumental Euro-scepticism”, 
European Union Politics E, H (HIIK), pp.HHJ–GH.
11 C. Chierici, “Is there a European public opinion? Public support for the 
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between these political and instrumental dimensions of attitudes 
towards the EU have noted that the questions on individuals’ po-
sitions with respect to the sharing of powers with European in-
stitutions in the creation of public policy are those that capture a 
dimension of political attitudes relating to the legitimacy of the 
EU as a political system, which is largely independent of the as-
sessment of its actual performance and the costs it incurs or ben-
efits it distributes.
)us, this chapter has two aims. First, to investigate up to what 
point the distinction between instrumental support and political 
support is empirically sustainable in the Portuguese case; and sec-
ond, in the light of this, to reassess some of the main conclusions 
concerning the intensity, evolution and basis of the support for 
Europe in Portugal.
Instrumental Support and Political Support
One possible way to assess to what point Portuguese support 
for the EU is in fact multidimensional—and which indicators will 
give us access to these possible diAerent dimensions—consists in 
an examination of the data that already exists at the individual 
level. Table D.B shows the results of the factor analysis of a series 
of variables available in the Eurobarometer Trend File !"$*–(**(, 
limited in this case to the surveys conducted in Portugal from the 
BCDIs. Included in this analysis are the membership and belonging 
indicators that, as we have already seen, have been used in previ-
ous studies of the Portuguese case as indicators of specific and 
European Union, theoretical concepts and empirical measurements”, paper presented to 
POLIS (Paris, HIIK). Chierici added a third dimension, that of diAuse support for Eu-
ropean political institutions (measurable through indicators of the confidence citizens 
have in institutions such as the European Commission or the European Parliament). 
However, since there are many fewer surveys of these dimensions than those measuring 
scales of instrumental and political support, we will not discuss this third dimension.
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of diAuse support, respectively. Also included are the answers to 
questions put to the same individuals to ascertain their views on 
whether a decisions in a range of public policy areas ought to be 
taken by the Portuguese government or within the EU. )e public 
policy areas included in this study are those available in the long-
est running series, between Eurobarometer JB (March BCDC) and 
Eurobarometer KF.B (May HIIH), viz: environment, foreign aAairs, 
education, health and social security, scientific and technological 
research, monetary policy and social communications.12 As can 
be seen from Table D.B, the solution encountered suggests that, 
in Portugal, as is true of European public opinion in general,13 
while the measures benefit and membership form a single dimen-
sion (which we shall call instrumental support), this dimension is 
empirically distinct from another connected with the acceptance 
or rejection of the EU as a political authority with public policy 
decision-making powers (political support). In other words, those 
who tend to believe Portugal has benefited with integration also 
tend to believe membership of the EU is a good thing.14 Simi-
larly, the respondents’ attitudes about the convenience of reserv-
ing decision-making power on a number of public policies to the 
Portuguese political authorities, or sharing it with the EU, tends 
to result in a single attitudinal dimension that is largely independ-
ent of perceptions of the benefits or the benevolence of Portugal’s 
membership of the EU.
12 All of these variables were codified with three values, from the least to the great-
est degree of support, as follows: Belonging (B “bad”, H “neither good nor bad”, J “good”); 
benefits (B “no benefits”, H “Don’t know/no reply”, J “benefits”); with regards the diAer-
ent areas of public policy (B “by the Portuguese government”, H “Don’t know/no reply”, 
J “as a set within the EU”).
13 Lubbers and Scheepers (note BI) and Chierici (note BB).
14 At the individual level, the correlation between the two variables is I.KC (p < 
I.IIB).
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)e idea were are faced with two clearly distinct dimensions 
of the attitudes of individuals in relation to European integration 
gains additional support by testing, for each of them, some hy-
potheses about the factors which at the individual level determine 
the adoption of attitudes of greater or lesser support for European 
integration. )e investigation on this theme converges in some of 
the following fundamental hypotheses.
Cognitive mobilization: according to Inglehart, elevated levels 
of interest and political information are necessary for the under-
standing of information concerning a process, such as European 
integration, which has a high level of abstraction.15 In this way, we 
should expect that the greater the level of cognitive mobilization, 
the lesser will be the perception of threat and incomprehension 
15 R. Inglehart, “Cognitive mobilization and European identity”, Comparative 
Politics J, B (BCFI), pp. GK–FI.
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felt by individuals in relation to integration and, consequently, the 
greater the support for integration will be.
Utilitarianism: according to some analysts, the process of Eu-
ropean integration, in enabling the liberalization and mobiliza-
tion of capital, goods and labour, produces diAerential benefits 
and costs for the citizens. )ose with the greatest levels of human 
capital—education and skills—are much better equipped to adapt 
to the occupational competition promoted by the single market 
and consequently will generally be more supportive of integra-
tion.16
Systemic performance: Anderson advances the hypothesis that, 
despite being poorly informed about the process and consequences 
of European integration, citizens are able form opinions about it 
on the basis of simple heuristic rules allowing them to reach con-
clusions on complex matters. In particular, in order to assess the 
process of European integration and its consequences, individuals 
tend to resort to their degree of satisfaction with the performance 
of the political institutions or with the domestic economy, using 
these as reference points for a more distant and complex reality.17
From this point of view, the greater the degree of satisfaction 
with the operation of the domestic political institutions, the bet-
ter the light under which the process of European integration is 
judged. )is hypothesis is, moreover, the one research in Portugal 
has suggested as providing the best explanation for the relation-
ship of the Portuguese with Europe. As Lobo argues, “satisfaction 
16 M. Gabel and H. Palmer, “Understanding variation in public support for Eu-
ropean integration”, European Journal of Political Research HF, B (BCCK), pp. J–BC, and M. 
Gabel, Interests and integration: Market liberalization, public opinion and European union 
(Michigan, MI: University of Michigan Press, BCCD).
17 C. J. Anderson, “When in doubt, use proxies: Attitudes towards domestic poli-
tics and support for European integration”, Comparative Political Studies JB, K (BCCD), pp. 
KEC–EIB.
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with [national] democracy is the most important variable in ex-
plaining support for European integration”.18 
)e comparative study of this theme has, however, raised some 
doubts about the generalization of this explanation. Sánchez-
Cuenca, for example, suggests a hypothesis that is, prima facie, op-
posed to the previous one: support for the EU is likely to increase 
with dissatisfaction with the national political system.19 In other 
words, when citizens have less confidence in their domestic po-
litical system—whether it is thought to be aAected by ine@ciency 
or corruption, for example—the greater will be their support for 
deeper European integration and the transfer of powers to the su-
pra-national political system. Yet others suggest attitudes towards 
the EU political system are in-and-of-themselves consequential 
since in spite of information deficits individuals form independ-
ent opinions in relation to the performance of the European insti-
tutions in their own right, attitudes that end up being relevant for 
the rise or decline in support for European integration.20
National identity: an additional hypothesis concerning sup-
port for integration concerns feelings of national identity. Carey 
suggests the transfer of sovereignty involved in the integration 
process is particularly rejected by those individuals whose politi-
cal identity is linked exclusively with the nation state rejecting 
the concurrent sense of belonging to a multi-national political 
community.21 McLaren suggests these individuals are more likely 
18 Lobo (note H), p. BIK.
19 L. Sánchez-Cuenca, “)e political basis of support for European integration”, 
European Union Politics B, H (HIII), pp. BGF–FB.
20 L. McLaren, “Explaining mass-level Euro-scepticism: Identity, interests and 
institutional distrust”, paper presented to annual meeting of the American Political 
Science Association (Washington, DC, B–G September, HIIK).
21 S. Carey, “Undivided loyalites: Is national identity an obstacle to European in-
tegration?”, European Union Politics J, G (HIIH), pp. JDF–GBJ.
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to sense European integration as a threat to (the loss of ) national 
identity, which leads them to exhibit lower levels of support for 
integration.22
Party preferences: )e final hypothesis relates the support con-
ceded to integration with party preferences. Studies, such as those 
carried out by Gabel or Anderson, suggest the proximity of indi-
viduals to the party or parties controlling the government of the 
day has a positive influence on support for the European integra-
tion process.23 Given it is the national governments that are the 
main actors in the political decision-making process within the 
institutional architecture of the EU, citizens will project their as-
sessments of the governing party into an evaluation of the entire 
integration process: the closer they are to the government, the 
more favourable they are to Europe. 
However, not all studies on this line arrive at the same conclu-
sion. For example, Roy argues the relationship between support 
for the party of government and support for integration is con-
ditional and that during normal periods the eAect of preferences 
for parties of government upon support for the EU is reduced, if 
not negative. )e argument is that when citizens feel better rep-
resented by their national government they have few incentives to 
wish to see power being lost to European institutions through the 
process of integration.
Table D.H shows the result of the empirical test of these hypoth-
eses in the Portuguese case. Two indices were constructed. )e 
first, instrumental support, resulted in the calculation of an aver-
age for each individual of values for the membership and benefit 
variables, an index that which oscillates between one (minimum 
22 L. McLaren, “Public support for the European Union: Cost-benefit analysis or 
perceived cultural threat?”, Journal of Politics EG (HIIH), pp. KKB–EE.
23 Gabel (note BE); Anderson (note BF).
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support) and three (maximum support).24 )e second variable, 
political support, resulted in the calculation of the average of the 
variables measuring support for joint decision-making in the ar-
eas of environment, foreign aAairs, education, health and social 
policy, scientific and technological research, monetary policy and 
social communication, which, as above, reached values between 
one (minimum support) and three (maximum support).25
)e independent variables, the eAects of which are being test-
ed, are: an index of opinion leadership (which measures the fre-
quency with which respondents discuss political topics and seek 
to persuade those around them), capturing the degree of individu-
al cognitive mobilization; education (age at which the respondent 
ceased formal education) and occupation (-B, manual labourers 
and unemployed; B, professionals and executives; I, others), meas-
uring the level of educational capital and occupational abilities of 
the individuals; satisfaction with national democracy and satis-
faction with democracy within the EU, which measures the per-
formance of the Portuguese and European political systems as 
they are assessed by the respondents; exclusive national identity 
(B, exclusively Portuguese, I, others), distinguishing those indi-
viduals who feel part of the national political community alone 
and all others; and intention to vote for the party of government 
(B, yes, I, no), through which we can distinguish those individu-
als who support the activities of the national government and the 
others. Gender (B, female; I, male), age and left-right ideological 
self-placement (B, more to the left; BI, more to the right) are used 
as control variables. )e set of cases includes the results of the 
Eurobarometer surveys conducted during BCCJ, BCCD, BCCC, HIII 
and HIIB, the only years in which the surveys include information 
24 Alpha value = I.FB.
25 Alpha value = I.DH.
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on all of the variables in the model. )us, in order to capture and 
control temporal tendencies, taking into account the fact the da-
tabase incorporates surveys conducted at diAerent times, a set of 
dummies were introduced for each year (the coe@cients of which 
are not presented). )e results of the linear regression analysis are 
shown in Table D.H
With respect to the control variables, it should be noted that 
both the instrumental support and (especially) the political 
support for integration tends to be greater the younger the re-
spondent. Second, the gender diAerences only have an eAect on 
instrumental support, with women exhibiting greater scepticism 
than men, when it comes to the benefits and advantages of Eu-
ropean integration. Finally, the political views of the respondents 
do not seem to have any eAect on either the instrumental or the 
political support for Europe.
In relation to the cognitive mobilization hypotheses, it can be 
seen that the variable used to test it behaved in similar manner in 
the two models: the eAect is in the expected (positive) direction 
and has the same order of magnitude (with practically equal coef-
ficients for the dependent variables measured on a scale with the 
same amplitude). )is eAect, however, is relatively reduced, with 
the coe@cients standardized and not exceeding the value of I.IE 
in both models. Equally limited is the explanatory power of the 
two variables—education and professional occupation—which 
test the utilitarian hypotheses at the individual level. In the model 
applied to the dependent variable “instrumental support”, only 
education produced statistically significant eAects (with occupa-
tion approaching statistical significance). However, despite being 
in the expected direction (more years of education, greater sup-
port), these eAects are also limited when compared with those 
produced by other variables in the model. With respect to the 
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model applied to the dependent variable “political support”, only 
occupation produced statistically significant eAects, despite the 
importance of the variable in this model —with a standardized 
beta coe@cient of only I.IK— being even less than that produced 
in the previous one. In summary, the idea the attitudes of indi-
viduals in relation to Europe are determined by social attributes 
through which they receive the benefits of integration, despite re-
ceiving confirmation in respect of instrumental support and (less, 
as is to be expected) with respect to political support, is far from 
providing the best available explanation for that which moves 
Portuguese opinion in relation to Europe.
Much more successful are those explanations connected both to 
the subjective assessments of the performance of the political sys-
tem and to political identities. In the Portuguese case, McLaren’s 
hypotheses are immediately confirmed: despite the low levels of 
information about the integration process, the electors do not stop 
evaluating the performance of European institutions in a manner 
that has consequences for the support conceded to integration.26 
)e satisfaction with democracy in the EU variable aAects the 
level of support for integration in the expected direction, inde-
pendently of levels of satisfaction with national democracy, and 
has an eAect in both instrumental and political levels of support.
However, there are also very important diAerences between the 
two models. First, despite those whose political identities are con-
nected exclusively with the nation state also being those least likely 
to support European integration, the eAect of the identity variable 
is greater with respect to political support. Second, although the 
assessment of the operation of democracy in Portugal and support 
for the governing party of the day result in greater instrumental 
support for integration, neither one nor the other variable has any 
26 McLaren (note HI).
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eAect on political support for integration. In other words, while 
the evaluation of the benefits the country receives as a result of 
integration is aAected—understandably—by the assessments of 
the systemic performance of the EU, the national government 
and the national institutions, the willingness of citizens to share 
decision making-power within the EU is only aAected by the as-
sessment made of the European institutions within which this 
power is to be shared. 
It can be said, then, there are some variables tending to aAect 
support for integration, whether this support is instrumental or 
political. )e younger, the more cognitively mobilized, the better 
the opinion of the functioning of EU democracy and the bet-
ter the ability to consider oneself as European (as well as Portu-
guese) display greater levels of support for European integration. 
However, while instrumental support for integration is seriously 
conditioned by the assessment of the national political system’s 
performance—used by individuals as a heuristic through which 
they weigh up the costs and benefits of integration—political 
support for integration is fundamentally conditioned by the po-
litical identity of the individuals and by their evaluation of the 
systemic performance of the EU—and only of the EU. In sum, 
instrumental and political support for integration are dimensions 
that despite being connected, are fundamentally diAerent in their 
distribution among individuals and in their fundamental attitudi-
nal correlates.
Tendencies of Support for the EU
How have Portuguese attitudes towards the EU evolved? )e 
diagnostic made by the majority of analysts is convergent: during 
a first phase, from accession to the beginning of the BCCIs, there 
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was a strong increase in the perception of benefits and in support 
for EU membership.27 Since then, it is argued, there has been a 
slight decrease in support for the EU, without, however, aAect-
ing the generalized consensus concerning integration.28 However, 
what we have seen so far makes us suppose two things: on the one 
hand, this assessment deserves to be made not only at the level 
of instrumental support, but also at the level of political support 
for integration; and on the other, that the evolution of these two 
dimensions cannot be entirely coincident.
27 Bacalhau (note H); Lobo (note H).
28 Pinto and Lobo (note J).
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Figure D.B presents the evolution over time of the net diAer-
ence between the proportion of respondents in each Eurobarom-
eter survey who have stated membership of the EU has been good 
and bad for Portugal, with a local regression curve adjusted to 
the data points.29 As we can see, there is indeed a very rapid in-
crease in the positive instrumental support for integration until 
the beginning of the BCCIs, followed by a decline that, although 
interrupted around HIII, has become more accentuated in recent 
years. Predictably in the light of what has been said above, the 
evolution of the perception of the benefits of EU membership has 
29 Between Eurobarometer BG (note B) and Eurobarometer EJ (May HIIK).
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HGH T-. E/012.345637514 18 P107/9/.:. D.;1<03<=
followed a course that is equal to that of the belonging variable 
(Figure D.H). Furthermore, the decline in instrumental support for 
European integration recorded in Portugal since the beginning of 
the millennium has a particular importance: despite the propor-
tion of those with positive opinions concerning integration being 
GI per cent greater than those with negative opinions, in both 
cases the decline in instrumental support for integration has been 
such that in HIIK it reached its lowest value since BCDE–F—the im-
mediate post-accession years. 
Table D.J shows the results of a more detailed analysis of 
the tendencies verified in relation to Portuguese instrumental 
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support for integration. We also test the eAect of the two histori-
cally important dates: the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and 
confirmation of the entry of monetary union, of which Portugal 
was a founding member in BCCC. It is almost entirely accepted the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty in February BCCH and the “no” 
vote in Denmark’s referendum in July of the same year signified a 
turning point in the so-called permissive consensus with respect 
to European integration, with public support for the process de-
clining across Europe. 
As for monetary union, it signified a qualitative leap in the 
integration process, whether by making visible a remarkable level 
of economic coordination between the member states, or by—
particularly in the Portuguese case—representing the manifest 
triumph of the national political authorities in the prosecution 
of the principal strategic economic policy objective of the second 
half of the BCCIs.
)e results presented in Table D.J confirm the statistical sig-
nificance of the tendencies we detected visually. Until BCCH, the 
balance in favour of the idea that Portugal’s membership of the 
EU was a good thing for Portugal grew in a statistically signifi-
cant manner at the rate of six points each year (since BCDI), and 
almost ten per cent in the case of benefit. However, Maastricht 
produced a double eAect: in the short-term, an abrupt fall in in-
strumental support, and in the long-term, a decline at a rate of 
almost two points per year. Although monetary union had a posi-
tive impact in the short-term, this positive impact was inferior 
in magnitude to the negative impact of Maastricht and has not 
produced any statistically significant long-term eAect. In other 
words, apart from the temporary jump brought by monetary un-
ion, instrumental support for integration amongst Portuguese has 
declined constantly since BCCH.
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To what extent is this decline in support for integration also 
reflected in a decline of support for the sharing of decision-mak-
ing power with European institutions? In order to answer this 
question, we have analysed four public policy areas: science, envi-
ronment, education and health and social policy. 
)e first pair, science and environment, are themes tradi-
tionally described as belonging to a higher level of endogenous 
internationalization,30 that is, they are intrinsically international 
30 R. Sinnott, “Policy, subsidiarity and legitimacy”, in O. Niedermayer and R. Sin-
nott (eds), Public opinion and internationalised governance (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, BCCK), pp. HGE–FE.
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areas of government in which supranational decision-making 
brings potential benefits of e@ciency. Education and health and 
social policy, however, are areas traditionally reserved to national 
governments, because their alteration could have important dis-
tributive consequences or because they are closely identified with 
national culture.
Figure D.J and Figure D.G show the evolution of support given 
to the sharing of decision-making with the EU in the areas of 
science and the environment. In both cases, and for the entire pe-
riod studied, the majority of Portuguese want these policies to be 
F59/0. D.G 
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established within the EU. Table D.G applies the previous model to 
the evolution of net support for the sharing of powers in the areas 
of science and the environment.
)ere are similarities in relation to the tendencies previously 
detected with respect to instrumental support; however, there are 
also very important diAerences. )e similarities relate to the in-
crease of support for the Europeanization of these policies during 
the years preceding the Maastricht Treaty, an increase at a rate 
similar to that in the case of the instrumental support indicators. 
Similarly, Maastricht had a long-term impact, with the level of 
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political support decreasing since the treaty’s implementation at a 
rate of around five per cent per annum in the case of science and 
seven per cent per annum in the case of environment. However, 
there are two crucial diAerences in comparison with instrumental 
support. On the one hand, political support in these two areas 
of governance was insensitive to the short-term impact of either 
the Maastricht Treaty or of monetary union. On the other hand, 
though, since the introduction of monetary union, political sup-
port has increased at a rate of two per cent per annum in the case 
of science, and seven per cent in the case of environment. In other 
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words, unlike with instrumental support, monetary union appears 
to have had a long-term eAect on political support that consti-
tutes an inversion of the downward trend seen since Maastricht.
Table D.K shows the result of the same analysis, this time ap-
plied to policies traditionally considered as belonging to nation 
state: education and health and social policy. In this example, the 
trends of rising support up to Maastricht then falling support af-
ter, are not statistically significant. However, the long-term eAect 
of monetary union is also visible. Since monetary union, support 
for sharing power with the EU in these two areas has increased in 
Portugal at an annual rate of five per cent for education and three 
per cent for health and social policy.
Conclusion
Existing research into Portuguese attitudes towards European 
integration has converged on the idea an instrumental consen-
sus prevails among the general public: a large majority of citi-
zens support integration, but based on the perception there is a 
cost-benefit relationship in the country’s favour. Despite a small 
decline in the level of support since BCCH, this general consensus is 
argued to have remained largely in place. 
)is chapter suggests these analyses have only captured part 
of that which is important to describe and explain in relation 
to Portuguese support for the EU. )at part is what is here de-
scribed as instrumental support, based upon an assessment of 
the relationship between the costs incurred and the benefits 
received through Portugal’s membership of the EU. What is 
important to note, however, is that citizens seem to make this as-
sessment by resorting to the information available and that can be 
processed concerning Portuguese reality: the performance of both 
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the political institutions and the Portuguese government. )us, 
since several studies have shown these performances have been 
assessed ever more negatively by the Portuguese—at least since 
the beginning of the BCCIs—31it comes as no surprise the indica-
tors of instrumental support for integration have also exhibited a 
structural tendency to decline since BCCH. In fact, saying there is 
a consensus in Portugal on the benefits of integration may have 
become excessively optimistic: despite a majority of Portuguese 
continuing to see integration more as a source of benefits than of 
costs, the decline in instrumental support over recent years has 
resulted in levels of support that have reached their lowest point 
since the country’s accession.
However, none of what has been said seems to prevent an ap-
parent increase of another form of support for integration: defend-
ing or at least accepting the sharing of power between member 
states and the EU’s institutions in the definition of public policies. 
)is sort of political support is not been greatly aAected at the 
individual level by the evaluation of national institutions. What 
counts instead is the assessment of the general performance of the 
EU as a political system, as well as feelings of national identity. 
In contrast with what happened with instrumental support, the 
available data suggests political support for integration has in-
creased during recent years—particularly since the realization of 
monetary union—both in areas in which such support has always 
been relatively high (scientific and environmental policies) and in 
areas that traditionally have been reserved to the national govern-
ment (education and health and social policies). 
In conclusion, the nature of support for integration seems to 
be changing in Portugal, from a support fundamentally based in 
31 A. Freire, “Desempenho da democracia e reformas políticas: O caso português 
em perspectiva comparada”, Sociologia: Problemas e Práticas GJ (HIIJ), pp. BJJ–EI.
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the perception of benefits accruing to the nation state towards a 
support based in the acceptance of the EU as a political commu-
nity and political system. )is destiny, however, is not inevitable. 
We have already seen some historic markers in the construction 
of Europe resulting in the inversion of previous tendencies (the 
Maastricht Treaty in the case of instrumental support and mon-
etary union in the case of political support). Only time will tell to 
what extent more recent events—the failure to obtain approval 
for the European constitution and the French and Dutch referen-
dums, for example—have produced comparable eAects.
Conclusion:
Europeanization and 






)e contributions in this volume tell the story of how Por-
tugal’s membership of the European Union has shaped political 
processes in Portugal since the country’s accession to the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) in BCDE.1 )is story of ad-
aptation to Europe, in particular the adaptation of democratic 
institutions—in other words, the story of the Europeanization of 
Portuguese democracy—is told from two main perspectives. On 
the one hand, there are chapters that focus on institutional adap-
tation ( Jalali on government; Resende and Paulo on parliament; 
Piçarra and Coutinho on courts; Royo on interest groups), on the 
other, there are chapters that focus on adaptation of behaviour 
and attitudes (Ruivo et al on elites; Freire on voting behaviour; 
Magalhães on support for European integration). Seen together 
these contributions comprehensively capture the diAerent facets 
of Europeanization, allowing the reader to understand the struc-
tural eAects of what Teixeira in his introduction to this volume 
calls “the closing of the cycle of normalization of the Portuguese 
presence in the international system”. 
1 )e author would like to thank Tiago Fernandes and Pedro Lains for their 
comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
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I would like, in this concluding chapter, to come back to the 
central theme of the book and discuss the broader implications of 
European integration for Portuguese democracy. In particular, my 
aim is to use the findings from the preceding chapters to discuss 
the question to what extent European integration has strength-
ened—or rather undermined—national democracy in Portugal. 
In other words, rather than summarizing the separate conclusions 
from the diAerent contributions in this rich volume, I draw on the 
key findings of the book to discuss how the two related processes 
of Europeanization and democratization play out in the Portu-
guese context. 
Two Contrasting Views
Reading through the diAerent contributions of this volume, it 
is evident that the question of democratization and Europeaniza-
tion pervades any discussion of Portugal’s recent political history. 
A preliminary remark is that, as Teixeira notes, whereas Portugal 
did not join the EEC until BCDE, it was already active in other 
international organizations, such as NATO, the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), even be-
fore the BCFG revolution. Moreover, Portugal had been a member 
of the UK-led European Free Trade Association (EFTA) since 
BCEI.2 Hence, even under the authoritarian regime, Portugal had 
been relatively well integrated in an internationalizing Europe. 
One point to note is that while this might lead to the question 
about the eAect of Europeanization or internationalization on re-
gime change, this question is not explicitly discussed in this vol-
2 Teixeira, chapter B; see also N. Andrese Leitão, “Portugal’s European integration 
policy, BCGF–BCFH”, Journal of European Integration History F (HIIB), pp. HK–JK.
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ume. )e scope of the analysis of the “Europeanization eAect” in 
all contributions is clearly on post-BCFG Portugal.
Second, of the years since BCFG era, most have been spent as 
member of the EEC and its successor, the European Union (EU). 
)is means that most of Portugal’s modern democratic history 
is simultaneously a European story. )ird, and more important, 
connecting with the community of modern European societies 
with liberal democracies and market-based economies was an 
essential part of the consolidation strategy in the nascent Por-
tuguese democracy. As Teixeira argues, “democratic consolida-
tion and Portugal’s integration in the European economic space 
were… inseparable”.3 Moreira et al make a similar observation: 
“the European option was an important factor in the break from 
a dictatorial, isolationist and colonialist past”.4
I call this view, in which democratization and Europeaniza-
tion are seen as two processes that simultaneously contribute to 
the development and modernization of Portugal, the “brothers-
in-arms” view. It is safe to say this view captures the common 
opinion (communis opinion) as to why Portuguese governments in 
the early years of post-revolution democracy recognized the im-
portance of seeking a place in the European sun: EEC/EU mem-
bership was seen as oAering political stability, economic growth 
and social modernization. Portuguese public support for Euro-
pean integration, strong since accession, certainly from a com-
parative European perspective, tends to be viewed in line with 
such an instrumentalist view of European integration: while there 
may be costs in terms of the loss of national autonomy, these are 
greatly outweighed by the benefits of political stability and eco-
nomic growth.
3 Teixeira (note H).
4 Ruivo, Moreira, Pinto and Almeida, chapter H.
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In contrast with the perhaps overly optimistic brothers-in-
arms view, however, there is also a more sceptical take on the re-
lation between European integration and national democracy. I 
call this the frères ennemis (sibling rivals) view.5 )is perspective 
tends to get less attention in the Portuguese public discourse, and 
is touched upon only sporadically in some of the contributions to 
this volume. Yet, for a balanced discussion of the eAects of Eu-
ropean integration on national democracy, I believe it should be 
taken into account. From this perspective, Europeanization and 
democratization are seen as simultaneous, but rival processes that 
push member states in diAerent directions. Rather than fighting 
hand-in-hand, sibling rivalry drives them apart. )e underlying 
rationale for such a view is that the integration process has always 
been driven more by liberal than by democratic concerns; it is 
more about output legitimacy than about input legitimacy.6 Eu-
ropeanization thus potentially strengthens national democracy by 
increasing the eAectiveness of public policies, and in more general 
terms empowers national executives.7 Yet at the same time it also 
potentially aAects the quality of national democracy by subjecting 
the domestic political and legal order to a supranational European 
order and, thus, takes decision-making capacity away from core 
domestic democratic institutions, such as national parliaments. 
)ese two perspectives present fundamentally diAerent 
takes on the impact of European integration on national 
democracy and signal a tension between the two concepts of 
5 I draw here on an analogy with Wallerstein’s inspiring account of liberalism 
and democracy. See I. Wallerstein, “Liberalism and Democracy: Frères Ennemis?” Fourth 
Daalder Lecture (Leiden: Leiden University, BCCF).
6 F. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: E6ective and democratic? (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, BCCF).
7 A. Moravcsik, “Why the European Community strengthens the state: Domes-
tic politics and international cooperation”, Center for European Studies Working Paper KH 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, BCCG).
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Europeanization and democratization. )is is not just an abstract 
issue that plays out at the conceptual level, but is ultimately a 
matter of political choice. After all, while the underlying ration-
ales of either perspective are seemingly not so diAerent, they rep-
resent fundamentally diAerent ideas about the relation between 
European and domestic institutions. In the “brothers-in-arms” 
perspective, the central idea is that of a vincolo esterno (external 
constraint), in which the notion of subjecting the national to the 
European is viewed positively as a way to “lock” domestic reform 
processes in a strong European context. Hence, the antidemo-
cratic aspect of the integration process is recognized, but valued 
positively from the perspective of relatively weak domestic po-
litical institutions. In the frères ennemis perspective, by contrast, 
subjecting the national to the European is viewed negatively, as a 
process that ultimately curtails national democracy. It thus con-
siders that while the process of European integration may have a 
solid foundation in terms of contributing to prosperity and peace 
across the European continent, it is also a process that needs to be 
kept in check by strong domestic institutions.8 
Domesticating Europe
When it comes to Portugal the first perspective has clearly been 
dominant. Europeanization has been viewed almost entirely as an 
external link supporting democratic consolidation.9 )e chapters 
8 See R. M. Fishman, “Shaping, not making, democracy: )e European Union 
and the post-authoritarian political transformations of Spain and Portugal”, South Eu-
ropean Society and Politics D (HIIJ), pp.B–H, JB–GE.
9 K. Dyson andQK. Featherstone, “Italy and EMU as a ‘vincolo esterno’: Empow-
ering the technocrats, transforming the state”,QSouth European Society and Politics B, H 
(BCCE): pp. HFH–CC; J. Magone, “)e di@cult transformation of state and public adminis-
tration in Portugal: Europeanization and the persistence of neo-patrimonialism”, Public 
Administration DC, J (HIBB), pp.QFKE–DH.
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in this volume largely agree on this positive perspective of the 
relation between European integration and national democracy. 
Yet, the diAerent analyses of institutional and behavioural adapta-
tion within Portugal to European integration also signal—some-
times explicitly and sometimes implicitly—that the relationship 
between European integration and national democracy is less 
straightforward than might be assumed from the somewhat naïve 
brothers-in-arms perspective. 
)e clearest signal of an increasingly troubled relationship 
comes from Magalhães who observes that while instrumental 
support for European integration might have been very strong in 
the early years of EEC/EU membership, “saying there is a con-
sensus in Portugal on the benefits of integration may have be-
come excessively optimistic”.10 Magalhães stresses that this is not 
necessarily problematic, because while instrumental support for 
European integration is decreasing, what he calls “political sup-
port” for integration has increased. )is means support of the EU 
is based more on the acceptance of the EU as a political com-
munity, than in the perception of specific benefits deriving from 
Europe. )is trend from instrumental to political support for in-
tegration may perhaps be viewed as a maturation of support for 
European integration. However, Magalhães warns us to be careful 
with over-interpreting these findings, as trends of support in the 
past have also turned around. Given that instrumental support for 
European integration is very much a correlate of the satisfaction 
with national democratic institutions, these findings may well say 
more about domestic changes than about a changing relation with 
Europe.
Another signal comes from Freire, who criticizes the second-
order nature of European Parliament elections and argues that, at 
10 Magalhães, chapter D.
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least in the Portuguese case, what is striking is not the influence 
of Europe on national party systems, but rather the absence of this 
influence.11 Friere seems to argue that rather than the Europeani-
zation of national party systems, we are witnessing the domestica-
tion of European elections. 
Domestication is a term used by Helen Wallace to indicate 
“the ways in which domestic factors frame and influence the in-
coming impacts of Europeanization”.12 It is an important notion 
because it highlights the fact that Europeanization is not just pas-
sively encountered. Rather, it is a process shaped by domestic ac-
tors and mediating institutions. With regard to the influence of 
European elections on national party systems, Freire argues the 
fact that Portugal already had a “nearly fully-established party 
system” meant European elections had relatively little eAect on 
disloyal voting behaviour. Portuguese voters largely vote for simi-
lar parties at the national and the European level, and when they 
switch at one level this is often a sign that they are about to switch 
at the other. What matters most is domestic political matters.
Moving to the institutional level, Jalali argues that the process 
of adapting Portuguese central government to European integra-
tion has been noticeable, albeit rather limited.13 )ere has been 
administrative change, for example, in terms of the creation of a 
Secretary of State for European AAairs and a support General-
Directorate of European AAairs (DGAE), as well as European 
o@ces in individual ministries, such as education and finance. 
However, Jalali doubts whether this has truly transformed the 
Portuguese core executive and national bureaucracy. It is more a 
11 Freire, chapter F.
12 H. Wallace, “Europeanization and globalization: Complementary or contradic-
tory trends?”, New Political Economy K, J (HIII), pp. JEC–DH.
13 Jalali, chapter J.
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pattern of absorption than of transformation, he concludes. Jalali 
argues that the same goes for domestic interest groups: they play 
along at the European level, but a lack of resources keeps them 
focused strongly on the national government. )is also confirms 
the impression from Royo’s chapter on trade unions and employ-
ers, which concludes that the role of the government vis-à-vis the 
social partners remains very strong and focused on centralized 
national concertation schemes.14 Europeanization, he argues, has 
opened the Portuguese economy, but has done little to aAect the 
main features of the Portuguese industrial relations framework, 
which is still determined strongly by the legacies of authoritarian-
ism and revolutionary experiences.
Jalali also points to another side of Europeanization, namely 
that European integration not only constrains domestic policy-
making, but also oAers strategic opportunities—in particular to 
core executives.15 In Portugal, European integration thus exacer-
bated a situation in which the domestic legislature already has a 
traditionally weak control over government. )is is reflected, ac-
cording to Resende and Paulo, by the very late institutionaliza-
tion of domestic scrutiny procedures for EU aAairs. Only in HIIE, 
with the so-called European Scrutiny Law, did the Portuguese 
legislature institute a European AAairs Committee and begin 
the systematic scrutiny of matters that fall within parliament’s 
legislative remit. Resende and Paulo acknowledge that the new 
Portuguese system falls short of a mandate procedure as used in 
countries such as Austria and Denmark. Yet, based on the high 
number of parliamentary opinions sent to the European institu-
tions they argue that “[f ]rom HIIE the parliament became one 
of the most eAective scrutinizers of European legislation in the 
14 Royo, chapter E.
15 Jalali (note BJ).
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EU”.16 One could of course argue against using opinions sent 
to Brussels as benchmark for eAective scrutiny, which is after all 
much more about holding national rather than European execu-
tives accountable, as Resende and Paulo also point out. Hence, 
the main question is about the extent to which newly-acquired 
European scrutiny powers might spill over into more general ex-
ecutive-legislative relations in Portuguese politics. Here it seems 
the jury is still out, although there is some ground for modest 
optimism about a more balanced relationship.
One final and fascinating aspect of Europeanization is the ap-
plication of European law by the Portuguese courts. )e first ob-
servation is that Portuguese courts, on the whole, make very little 
use of the so-called preliminary reference procedure that allows 
national judges to clarify questions about the interpretation by 
sending a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in Luxembourg. )is is striking because in line with the 
monist legal culture the principles of supremacy and direct eAect 
of European law has been quickly accepted. In contrast to the po-
sition in some other states, the Portuguese legal system has been 
quite receptive to European law. Yet, it would be naive to interpret 
the relatively low number of questions sent to Luxembourg as the 
absence of any issues related to the transposition of European law. 
Piçarra and Coutinho make two important observations: first, 
there is “a certain lack of understanding on the part of some Por-
tuguese courts as to how the preliminary rulings procedure works” 
and, second, with regards the interpretation of European law there 
seems to be a certain confidence on the side of Portuguese courts 
that leads judges to resolve any doubts without recourse to the 
CJEU.17 Piçarra and Coutinho are ambivalent about whether this 
16 Resende and Paulo, chapter G.
17 Piçarra and Pereira Coutinho, chapter K.
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proactive attitude based on the constitutional autonomy granted 
to lower courts in Portugal should be appreciated for its proactive 
attitude or, perhaps, problematized as a form of slight arrogance. 
To establish to what extent European integration has been “do-
mesticated” in Portugal, that would be a crucial question.
On Balance?
What can we conclude about the eAect of European integration 
on national democracy in Portugal? On balance, the contributions 
from this volume point to an optimistic scenario. Europeaniza-
tion has strengthened the process of democratic consolidation 
in Portugal and both national institutions and attitudes and be-
haviour of population and elites have adapted to the demands of 
EU membership. )e dominant view is that Europeanization and 
democratization are more brothers-in-arms than sibling rivals. 
Yet readers would be mistaken should they take it for granted 
that Portugal has fully adapted to European integration and to 
conclude that the relationship between European integration 
and national democracy is unproblematic. Instrumental support 
for European integration is on decline, European elections are 
not really about Europe and the outcomes are quite in line with 
those of national elections, the system of interest representation is 
strongly determined by historical legacies, parliament is only just 
beginning to fight back and regain some political territory lost to 
the executive, judges are accepting the primacy of European law 
but reluctant to demonstrate any doubts about the interpretation 
of the treaty that have been resolved by the Europe court. )ese 
observations show that European integration goes to the heart of 
the functioning of national democratic institutions and that the 
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way in which Portugal adapts to Europe is determined strongly by 
its idiosyncratic social and political context. 
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CGTP. See General Confederation of 
Portuguese Labour
CIAC. See Inter-ministerial 
Commission for Community 
AAairs
CILFIT: BHF, BJE, BJD






Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (Coreper): CD
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): 
BD
Common Foreign and Security 
Policy: CE–F
Common Strategy for the 
Mediterranean: HB
communis opinion: HKJ
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Communist Party of Spain/United 
Left (PCE/IU). See political 
parties
concertation: BEG–FG, BDI, HKD
Confederação da Industria 
Portuguesa (CIP). See 
Confederation of Portuguese 
Industry
Confederação do Comércio e 
Serviços de Portugal. See 
Portuguese Confederation of 
Commerce and Services
Confederaçao dos Agricultores de 
Portugal. See Confederation of 
Portuguese Farmers
Confederação Geral dos 
Trabalhadores Portugueses 
(CGTP). See General 
Confederation of Portuguese 
Labour
Confederação Nacional da 
Agricultura. See National 
Agricultural Confederation
Confederation of Portuguese 
Farmers: BKF–D, BEK
Confederation of Portuguese 
Industry (CIP): JJ–G, BKE–D, BEK, 
BEE
Conference of Community and 
European AAairs committees 
(COSAC): BIG–K
conference of speakers: BIK
Conselho Permanente de 
Concertação Social. See Standing 
Social Concertation Committee
Constitutional treaty convention: CB
Convenção dos Sindicatos 
Independentes. See Convention 
of Independent Unions
Convention of Independent Unions: 
BKI




Council of Europe: BH
Council of the Revolution: BJ
Court of Justice of the European 
Union: HKC
Delors I plan: BF
Democratic and Social Centre 
(CDS). See political parties
Democratic Renewal Party (PRD). 
See political parties
EAC. See European AAairs 
Committees
Eanes, António Ramalho: BCE
early warning mechanism. See Lisbon 
Treaty
East Timor: HI
ECB. See European Central Bank
ECJ. See European Court of Justice
Economic and Monetary Union: JC
Economic and Social Agreement: 
BEE: minimum wage, BEE
EDIK. See political parties
EEC. See European Economic 
Community
EFTA. See European Free Trade 
Association
elites: HF–JH, JC
democratic order, JH; EEC, JH; EU 
negotiating process, JJ; EU, GK; 
European identity, GK; national 
parliaments, KD; Political: 
attitude of, JD; political: 
attitude, JC–GI, KF 
employers’ guilds. See national guilds
enhanced scrutiny procedure: CK
EPU. See European Payments Union
ESL. See European Scrutiny Law
HFBI4L.Y
Estatuto de Trabalho National. See 
National Labour Statute





Portugal: membership, HI, JK
Euromanifestos project: DI
European AAairs Committees 
(EAC): JI, DD–C, CH–D, BIJ, BID, 
HKD
H June HIIE report, CB; conference, 
BIG; enhanced scrutiny, CK; 
establishment, JI; EU initiative, 
CG; European Council, CH; 
European integration, CI; 
European Security Law, DD; 
Law GJ/HIIE, CI, CG; legislative 
procedure, CH–G; political 
parties, CI; scrutiny of EU, BIF; 
sectoral committees, CG
European Central Bank: BDI
European Christian Democrats. See 
political parties
European citizenship: HF, GB–GJ, KB–K
European Commission: BB–BH, HC, BHF
as government, KG; consultation, 
BH; functional integration, HD; 
influence, KD; legislative cycle, 
DK; Lisbon Treaty, BIG; Portugal: 
assistance, BB; trust, KB, KD
European constitution: HJ, HKI
European Council: C, BB–BH, HC, DD, CC
European AAairs Committees, 
CH; European Parliament, HC; 
Lisbon Strategy HIII, HI; 
Lisbon Treaty, BIF; majority 
voting, KJ, KK; policy making, 
JI; Portugal – accession, BH, 
negotiations, C; trust, KB, KD
European Court of Justice: BBH–JD
Europeanization, BHG; CILFIT 
case, BJE; guarantor of law, 
BBG; national courts, BBH, BBG, 
BBF, BJI; Portugal: preliminary 
references, BJE; references 
from courts, BJH; preliminary 
ruling procedure, BBG–BK, BHE; 
preliminary rulings, BJI; Treaty 
on the Functioning of the 
European Union, BBE–D; Van 
Gend and Loos, BBD–BC
European Economic Community 
(EEC): F–BH, JJ
Confederation of Portuguese 
Industry (CIP), JG; economic 
and social advantages, 
BF; governing elites, JH; 
institutional relaunch, BE; 
negotiations with Spain, 
BG; Portugal: accession, 
BH, HG–K, application to 
join, BH, assistance, BH, BF, 
economic development, 
BH–BJ, membership, BH, BG, BF, 
modernization, BH, negotiations, 
BJ, support for, JK–E; Portuguese 
Industrial Association (AIP), 
JG
European enlargement: BD
European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA): D, BF, HG, HKH
European identity, GG–K, GD, GC–KB
extent, GD; Portugal: elites, KF; 
second order, GG
European institutions: BB, HK, HC, GI–B, 
FB, FF–D, DK, BIE
attitudes towards, HHC; 
European integration, 
HJJ; Europeanization, DK; 
Lisbon Treaty, BIE; national 
parliaments, DD, CF; Portugal: 
civil society, DD; support, HGG
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European integration: BG–BF, HG–D, JE, 
EH–J, ED, CI, HJB
attitudes, HHK; benefits and 
costs, HG, HHF–D; cognitive 
mobilization, HJB; consensus, 
BK; Danish referendum, HGJ; 
decision-making, JI; domestic 
opportunity, DJ; elite project, HD; 
European AAairs Committee, 
CI; European institutions, 
HJJ; Europeanization, EG, ED, 
DG, HKD; “fragmeration”, DJ; 
Maastricht Treaty, HGJ, multi-
level governance model, FI; 
national identity, HJJ; national 
institutions, EJ; Nice HIII, HB; 
party preferences, HJG; political 
parties, DE; political stability, 
HKJ; Portugal: attitudes, HH, HHK, 
democracy, HKH, foreign policy, 
BF–BD, industrial relations, 
BJC, BFK, modernization, 
JE, monetary union, HGJ, 
perception, BF, HH, support, KF; 
Single European Act BCDE, HK; 
stability, HKK; support, HE, JE, 
GJ, HHE, HJJ, HJF, HJC, HGH–J, HGD, 
HKE; systemic performance, 
HJH; transformation, EB, DJ; 
ultilitarianism, HJH
European monetary union: BC, BEF
European Parliament: HC, JB, DD, BIK, 
BDG–C, BCJ, HHI
Barroso initiative, CD; elections, GD, 
BDK–E, BCI–B, BCJ, BCD, HIG–K, HID, 
HBI–B, HBE, HBD, HKE; electoral 
system, BCB; enhanced scrutiny 
procedures, CK; EU president, 
KC; legislative procedure, CC; 
legitimacy, HC; Lisbon Treaty, 
BIG, BIE; national parliament, 
GI; political participation, 
JF; powers, KG; second-order 
elections, HC, BDG, BDF–D, 
BCD–HIH, HIF–BI, HBE–BD, HHI, 
HHG, HKE; trust, KB, KD; voting 
behaviour, BDE, BDD, HBD, HIF; 
weakness, HC
European People’s Party. See political 
parties
European political system: HC
European political union: BD
European Scrutiny Law: J, DF–C, 
CB–J, CK, CF, BII–H, BIF–D, HKD
European Union (EU): BK–HH, HE, GB, 
EH, EK, DK–D, CJ–K, CD, BIG, BBJ–HF, 
BJI, BJG, BJE–D, BCB, HKE: 
ACP Cotonu partnership, HH; 
Africa Summit, HH; approval 
of, KJ; attachment to, KF; 
attitudes towards, GH, KC, 
FD–C, HHF; Barroso initiative, 
CF; benefit of membership, 
HHE, HGB; Brazil summit, HG; 
channels of influence, KD; 
citizenship, GH; civil society, 
JJ; costs of membership, HHE; 
decision-making, HD; delegation 
of powers, KK–E; democratic 
deficit, JF; elites, JJ; enhanced 
scrutiny of legislation, CK; 
enlargement, HB–J, JF, BDJ, HBD; 
equivalence, BHK; EU law, BBH–J, 
BBE–D, BHI, BHH, BHJ–G, BHE–F, 
BJH, BJF; EU president, KD–C; 
European Commission, KG; 
European Court of Justice, 
BBH–BJ; European parliament, 
BDF; executive control, FF; 
executive elitism, JD; executive 
representation, EJ; governance, 
EB; “hollowed-out”state, EC; 
impact, FH; India strategy, 
HB; indirect citizenship, GB; 
HFJI4L.Y
institutional deepening, 
HD; institutional design, GH; 
institutional development of, 
KB; institutional reform, JF; 
integration, BC; international 
arena, KE; inter-parliamentary 
coordination, CE; legislative 
process, DD, CH–G, CF, BID; 
membership, FJ; national 
courts, BBB–BG, BBD, BHG, BJF; 
national deputies, KJ; national 
elites, GK; national governments, 
EH, EK; national parliaments, 
JD, CC–BII, BIK, BID; national 
political elites, KF; national 
sovereignty, JF; parliamentary 
elites, JC; parliamentary 
participation, CB ; policy-
making, EH; political authority, 
HJI; political community, HHD, 
HKI; political institutions, HF; 
political system, HHD–C, HGC–KI; 
political union, BD; Portugal: 
assistance, JF, attitudes towards, 
FC, HJC, HGJ, deputies, GJ, foreign 
policy, JK, “good student”, FE, 
interest groups, FF, political 
values, HI, presidency BCCH, 
BD, presidency HIII, HI, HH, 
presidency HIIF, HJ–G, support, 
HHC; pressure for adaptation, DK; 
private groups, FD; reform, HG; 
representation, KD, FD; Russia 
summit, HG; scepticism, HHD; 
scope of governance, KC; second 
Africa summit, HG; subsidiarity, 
BIJ; support, JE–F, GK, KC, CI, 
HHD, HJI, HJC–GB; territorial, 
institutional and functional 
advancements, HD; trust, KB, FD
Europeanization: BG, BC, HK, KC, EG–FG, 
BFE, HHG, HKB–K
as a process, FD; autonomization, 
EK; Barroso initiative, CE; 
economic impact, BFK; eAect 
of, DJ; EU institutions, 
DK; European integration, 
EG, ED, DG, HKD; European 
Security Law, DD; executive, 
ED, FC, external factors, CE, 
“hollowed-out” state, EC; 
impact, EC, FB, FK; interest 
groups, BFK; national courts, 
BBB, BHK; national parliaments, 
DF; neo-institutionalism, EK; 
political parties, JH; Portugal: 
courts, BJI, HKC, democracy, 
HKB, democratic consolidation, 
HKK, democratization, FJ, 
executive power, EJ, impact 
on, FG, industrial relations, HKD, 
society, BG; public policies, BC, 
HK; rational choice, EE; support, 




Portugal, JD; critique of, KD
external tie: FE–C
financial crisis: HJ
“fragmegration”: FB, FE, DJ
freedom, security and justice (AFSJ): 
CE–F, CC
General Confederation of 
Portuguese Labour (CGTP): 
BGK–F, BGC–KI, BKH, BEB, BEE–F, 
BFB––J
membership, BKG; structure, BGC
General Workers’ Union (UGT): 
BGK–E, BGD–KI, BEB, BEK, BEE, BEF, 
BFB–H, BFK
fragmentation and division, BGE; 
Intersindical, BGK; membership, 
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BKG; Socialist Party, BGF; Social 
Democratic Party, BGF; third 
confederation, BKI
General-Directorate of Community 
AAairs (DGAC): FJ
General-Directorate of European 
AAairs (DGAE): FJ, HKF
grémios. See national guilds
Guterres, António: BC, HH
hollowed-out state: EC





Inter-ministerial Commission for 
Community AAairs (CIAC): 
FJ–G
Internal Scrutiny Procedures: DD





IntUne project elite surveys: HF–D, 
GB–K, KI–B
IntUne. See IntUne project elite 
surveys 
IPEX. See inter-parliamentary 
information system
Köbler case: BHJ, BHF
Law GJ/HIIE: DC–CI, CG
Left Bloc (BE). See political parties
Leite, Manuela Ferreira: DB
Lisbon Strategy HIII: HI–B
Lisbon summit: HH
Lisbon Treaty HIIF: HG, HD, KD, DE–D, 
CB, CC–BII, BIK, BID
application, BIK: Barroso initiative, 
CE; early warning mechanism, 
CG, BIK–E; European Council, 
BIF; European Parliament, BIE; 
European Security Law, BID; 
implementation, CG; national 
parliament, DK, CB, CC, BIE–D; 
Portugal: impact on parliament, 
BII; second protocol, DF, CG; 
United Kingdom, BIG
Lomé Convention: HH
Maastricht Treaty BCCH, BK, BD, HD, JC, 
DC, BBE, BED, HGJ, HGE
Article G (J), BHB; Article BC(B), BBE; 
Article BDC, BHB; Article HJG, BHJ; 
Democratic and Social Centre, 
JK; enlargement, BD; European 
integration, HGJ, HGF, HKI; 
Europeanization, HGE
majoritarian trend: BCE–HII, HHI
market liberalization: BF
Marshall Plan: F
Ministry of Education’s o@ce 
for European AAairs and 
International Relations: FJ
monetary union: BDI–B, HGF
European Central Bank, BDI; 
European integration, HGJ, 
HGD–KI; financial constraints, HJ; 
European integration, HGF
National Agricultural Confederation: 
BKD
National Association of Portuguese 
Municipalities: DB
national courts:
EU courts, BBD; EU law, BHG, BJF; 
European Court of Justice, 
BBH, BBG; Europeanization, BHK; 
preliminary hearing, BBK–BG, BBF; 
Treaty of Rome, BBJ
HFKI4L.Y
national defence law: BG
national guilds: BKK
national identities: GH, HJJ
National Labour Statute: BGI
national parliaments: HD, JB, DE, DD, CJ
Barroso initiative, CF–D; control 
mechanisms, JB; EU decision-
making, CI; EU institutions, 
BIE; EU legislation, DF, CD; 
European institutions, DD; 
European Security Law, CF; 
Europeanization, DF; legislative 
procedure, CK; Lisbon Treaty, 
CB, DK, CC, BIK–D; monitoring 
bodies, DF; parliamentary elites, 
KD — Portugal: civil society, 
DD, EU legislation, DD — 
recruitment channel, GI; role, 
JI, JC; scrutiny of EU, DK, BIB, 
BIG, BID; scrutiny systems, DC; 
subsidiarity, BIF
National Union: BGI
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization
neo-institutionalism: EK–E
Nice Treaty HIIB: HB–H, HD
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO): C, BB, HG, HKH
OECD. See Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development
OEEC. See Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation
O@ce for European AAairs 
and International Relations 
(GAERI): FJ
Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
(OECD): HG, HKH
pacote laboral: BEF
Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) (Greece). See political 
parties
Partido Comunista de España/
Izquierda Unida (PCE/IU) 
(Spain). See political parties
Partido Popular Democrático (PPD). 
See political parties
Partido Renovador Democrático 
(PRD). See political parties
Partido Social Democrata (PSD). See 
political parties
Partido Socialista (PS). See political 
parties
Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
(PSOE) (Spain). See political 
parties
party identification: BDE, HBJ, HBK
decline, HHB; distribution, HBF; 
Party preferences: HJG
PASOK. See political parties
PCE/IU. See political parties
PCP. See political parties
permanent representative 
(PERMREP): CK, CE, CD, BIK
PERMREP. See permanent 
representative
Pillar II. See common foreign and 
security policy







Centre Bloc coalition, BEK, BFJ; 
Centro Democrático y 
Social (CDS) (Spain), BCH; 
Communist Party of Spain/
United Left (PCE/IU) (Spain), 
BCH; Democratic Renewal Party 
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(PRD), HIH, HBI; European 
Christian Democrats, JJ; 
European People’s Party, JJ; 
Left Bloc (BE), JJ, KH, CI, 
BIJ; Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement (PASOK) (Greece), 
HBI; Popular Democratic 
Party (PPD), BGK; Portuguese 
Communist Party (PCP), JJ, 
KH, CI, BGH–K, BGF, BEK, BFH, BCJ; 
Social and Democratic Centre 
(CDS), BK, JH, JJ, JK, JC, CI, 
BCJ; Social Democratic Party 
(PSD), BK, JJ, JK–E, JC, KH, KE, 
DI, CI, BGJ, BGF, BKI, BEK, BEF, BCJ, 
HBI; Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) (Germany), C; Socialist 
Party (PS), BK, BC, HJ, JJ, JK–E, JC, 
KE, CI, BGJ, BGK, BGF, BKI–H, BEK, 
BEF, BCJ, BCF; Spanish Socialist 
Workers’ Party (PSOE), HBI; 
Union of the Democratic 
Centre (EDIK) (Greece), 
HBI; Union of the Democratic 
Centre (UCD) (Spain), HBI; 
Portugal: 
BCFK union law, BGG; HIIB 
budget, DB–H; accession, 
HG, JH; capital flight, C; 
colonies, JK; constitutional 
court, BJG; decolonization, 
F, BI; democracy, F, BB, BK, JH; 
democratization, D, BI, BK, 
JK, BGB, HBF, HKH–K; economic 
divergence, HJ; economic 
growth, D; enlargement of 
EU, HH; EU political values, 
HI; European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), D; 
European integration, F, HKJ; 
European Payments Union 
(EPU), F; Europeanization, 
FJ, HKK; European integration, 
BJC — foreign policy, BI, BK, 
BC, HEB, African vocation, 
BI, Atlanticist, BB, BF–BC, HE; 
change, BK; common European 
policy, KE; consensus, BK; 
Euro-Atlanticist, BD; European 
integration, BF–BD, HE; European 
Union, JK; European, BB–BH, BK, 
JH; Portuguese-speaking world, 
BC; post-Cold War, BC, post-
EEC accession, BG; )ird world, 
BI–BB — “Hot Summer” BCFK, 
C — industrial relations, BJC–GI, 
BGJ, BED, BFB–H, BFC, collective 
bargaining, BKD–EH; corporatism, 
BGB; European integration, BFK, 
HKD; flexibility, BFF; Ministry of 
Employment, BEB; organization, 
BKI; politicization, BFJ; role of 
state, BFD; social concertation, 
BEJ; transition to democracy, 
BGH — Intersindical, BGK–D; 
labour reforms, BFJ; Marshall 
Plan, F; military coup, D–C 
— modernization, BK, JK, HKJ: 
European integration, HK, 
JE; EEC as guarantor, JG; 
transition to democracy, 
BGH — North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), C; 
Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation, F; 
political system, BDC; Salazar 
regime, F; single currency, JK; 
Social Democrat Workers, BKI; 
transition to democracy, D–C, 
JH, BGB, BGF, BKH, BFJ, BDC–CI; 
union membership, BKH; United 
Nations, HG; United States, 
BC; workers’ commissions, BGG; 
worker radicalization, BFJ
HFFI4L.Y
Portuguese Association of 
Distribution Companies 
(APED): BKD
Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). 
See political parties
Portuguese Confederation of 
Commerce and Services: BKF–D, 
BEK
Portuguese courts: 
EU law, BJE–F; European 
Court of Justice, BJI, BJH; 
Europeanization, BJI
Portuguese Industrial Association 
(AIP): JG, BKE, BKF, BKD
Portuguese parliament: HF, GI, DK, DC, 
CJ–D, BIK
EU legislation, CD; scrutiny of EU, 
CC–BIH
PPD. See political parties
principle of consistent interpretation: 
BHB
principle of direct eAect: BBD
principle of eAectiveness: BHK
principle of equivalence: BHK
principles of procedural autonomy: 
BHG
Programa de progresso económico e 
social para os anos noventa. See 
Programme of Economic and 
Social Progress for the BCCIs
Programme of Economic and Social 
Progress for the BCCIs: BEE
PS. See political parties
PSD. See political parties
PSOE. See political parties
referenda: JB, JK
Denmark, JB; Ireland, JB;Portugal, 
JD; United Kingdom, JK
Russia: HG
Salazar regime. See Portugal
Salazar, António de Oliveira: F, BI, 
BGI
scrutiny process: BII
SEA. See Single European Act BCDE
Secretary of State of European 
AAairs: CK
Single European Act BCDE: BK– BF, HK, 
HD
single European currency: HI, BFD
single market: BF, HJH
Soares, Mário: BH, BG, BGJ, BEK, BFG
Social and Democratic Centre 
(CDS) (Spain). See political 
parties
Social and Democratic Centre 
(CDS). See political parties
social bargaining: BFB
social concertation: BKB, BEJ–K, BFI–J, 
BFC
Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
(Germany). See political parties
Socialist Party (PS). See political 
parties
Sócrates, José: HG, GB
Soviet Union: BD
Spain: BG, DC, BJH, HEB
accession, BG, JH, JK; isolation, F; 
transition to democracy, JH, BGH
SPD. See political parties
Standing Social Concertation 
Committee: BKB, BKF–D, BEK–F, BFB, 
BFJ, BFD
structural funds: HK
subsidiarity: DE, CB, CJ–K, BIG
Barroso initiative, CF; legislative 
procedure, CJ; national 
parliaments, BIF; principle, CC, 
BII, BBJ; violation of, BIJ
Supreme Administrative Court: BJJ
Supreme Court of Justice: BJJ, BJD
Thatcher, Margaret: BD
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Treaty of Rome: D, BE, BBH
Article BH, BBD; Article HEF, BBG; 
national courts, BBJ; principle of 
direct eAect, BBD
Treaty of the European Union. See 
Maastrich Treaty
Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU): BBG, 
BBE: Article JI, BBD; Article HJG, 
BHJ; Article HKD, BBC, BHE; Article 
HKC, BBC; Article HEF, BBD–C, BHG, 
BJI, BJG; Article HEF (H), BBF; 
Article HEF (J), BBE, BHE–F, BJJ, BJE; 
Article HDD, BHB
UCD. See political parties
UGT. See General Workers’ Union
UN Security Council: HI
União Geral de Trabalhadores 
(UGT). See General Workers’ 
Union
União Nacional. See National Union
Unión de Centro Democrático 
(UCD). See political parties
Union of the Democratic Centre 
(EDIK) (Greece). See political 
parties
Union of the Democratic Centre 
(UCD) (Spain). See political 
parties
United Kingdom D, BD
accession referendum, JK; European 
Free Trade Association, D, HKH
United Nations (UN): HI, HG
United States: C, BB, BC
Utilitarianism: HJH
Van Gend and Loos. See European 
Court of Justice
veto players: EE, FF, DJ
vincolo esterno. See external tie
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